Habermas’s project of social criticism: between normativity, institutions and practices by Martinez, David
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
 
Habermas’s Project of Social Criticism: 
between Normativity, Institutions and 
Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David Martínez 
DPhil Social and Political Thought  
University of Sussex  
January 2017  
  
ii 
 
Contents 
Summary                   iv 
Statement and dedication                   v 
Abbreviations                   vi  
Introduction                      1 
 
 
Part I: Habermas‘s Kantianism and Hegelian criticisms of Discourse Ethics   6 
Chapter 1 – The Kantian Foundations of Habermas‘s Discourse Ethics         7 
Introduction                    7 
1. Kantian and Hegelian components in Habermas‘s oeuvre             12 
2. The place of Discourse Ethics in Habermas‘s critical theory             20 
3. The categorical imperative and the principle of universalization                   24 
4. The derivation of the principle of universalization              30 
5. The Kantian strategies of justification of (U)                   35 
Chapter 2 – Hegelian criticisms of Discourse Ethics           43 
Introduction                    43 
1. Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘s moral philosophy             48 
2. Habermas on Hegel‘s critique of Kant              57 
3. The universalizability of norms and the return of Hegel            66 
4. The process of ideal role taking                    71 
5. Moral norms, values and the formula of humanity             73  
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Part II: Habermas‘s Political Kantianism and Hegelian criticisms         79 
Chapter 3 – The Kantian Foundations of Habermas‘s Political Theory        80 
Introduction                  80  
I. Habermas‘s Kantianism in the theory of legitimacy             84  
1. Facticity, Validity and Communicative Reason             85  
2. The legal form                  91 
3. The principle of democracy                94 
II. The co-originality between private and public autonomy            98 
1. Private and public autonomy in Kant‘s Rechtslehre           100  
2. Habermas‘s co-originality thesis             105 
3. Critical assessments of Habermas‘s co-originality thesis          109 
Chapter 4- Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s Political Theory       113 
Introduction                113  
I. Hegelian and Kantian components in Habermas‘s political philosophy        119 
1. Immanent components of Habermas‘s political theory          120 
2. Democratic Sittlichkeit and political culture            127 
II. The co-originality and the return of Hegel            131  
1. The Habermas-Rawls debate, the co-originality and the Hegelian objection       132 
2. Kantian Republicanism as a solution to the Hegelian challenge         138 
III. Morality, institutions, practices and the fact of pluralism           140 
1. The normative principles of justice and the return of Hegel         142  
2. Kantian Republicanism and the fact of pluralism           147  
Conclusion                151   
Bibliography                156  
  
iv 
 
Institution: University of Sussex 
 
Name: David Martínez 
 
Degree: Doctor in Philosophy Social and Political Thought 
 
Title: Habermas‘s project of social criticism: between normativity, institutions and practices 
Summary: This thesis maintains that Jürgen Habermas‘s moral and political theories rely on 
a modified version of Kant‘s notion of normativity. Taking this as a starting point, it 
examines this component in light of criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. The 
thesis shows that Habermas can answer most of the criticisms that could arise from Hegel‘s 
critique. That said, Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims does apply to 
Habermas. This criticism states that Kant cannot connect the universal will of morality and 
the particular will of the empirical subject because he rules out particular contents as 
susceptible of being universalized. And it can apply to Habermas because he set strict limits 
to what can count as a content which may bleed into the justification of moral norms and, 
following Kenneth Baynes – in his interpretation of Habermas‘s theory –, of legal and 
political norms. To be justifiable, – according to Habermas – these norms need to embody 
generalizable interests and they cannot be based on particular interests. However, 
Habermas infers from this that norms can only be justified with impartial, that is agent-
neutral reasons, and cannot be justified with agent-relative reasons. From this, emerges the 
question whether and to what extent a theory of this sort can successfully include particular 
contents (for example a particular agents‘ real interests, inclinations and needs). The strict 
version of the generalizability of norms seems to occlude this possibility. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to rebut this criticism by slackening the strong version of normative justification 
that Habermas has built into the theory. By means of an analysis of two elements that he 
incorporates into his reconstruction of the normative point of view, namely, the concept of 
ideal role taking and the notion of mutual recognition, it is possible to argue that the 
loosening of the strict notion of generalizability is a modification that does not contradict 
and actually coheres with Habermas‘s Kantian concept of moral reason, and this operation 
fortifies the theory in the face of the Hegelian criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. To 
develop these issues, this work is divided in two parts with two chapters each part. Part I is 
an analysis of Habermas‘s notion of moral reason and autonomy and it reconstructs its 
normative Kantianism. After that, it discusses Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s moral 
theory. Part II focuses on Habermas‘s political Kantianism in Between Facts and Norms 
and in the debate with Rawls and it examines Hegelian criticisms of that Kantianism.    
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many scholars working Habermas, the so called second generation Frankfurt School 
thinker, ask whether his critical theory is best seen as Kantian or Hegelian (or both). 
Among other things, some of them aim to rectify the shortcomings that they claim to have 
found in Habermas‘s theory by emphasizing either its Kantian or Hegelian components. 
Others criticize Habermas because he is a Kantian or because he is a Hegelian. Finally, 
some contribute to the understanding of which is the best possible interpretation of 
Habermas‘s project of social criticism as a Kantian or a Hegelian theory. Robert Brandom 
is not a philosopher who is normally associated or recognized for his contributions on 
these debates. At least, he is much better known for his work on other areas. However, in 
my view he is absolutely correct when he states that ‗Habermas himself keeps a wary, 
careful distance from the Hegel of 1806 and after, and is far more comfortable associating 
himself with Kant when the ―Kant oder Hegel?‖ question arises‘. (2015: 34)  
 
In light of this issue, in this work I claim that the normative foundations of Habermas‘s 
critical theory are Kantian, even while they have taken on board Hegel‘s critique of Kant. 
At first blush this claim might seem paradoxical. However, it makes more sense, when one 
knows the particular understanding of Hegel‘s critique of Kant that we endorse. For this 
purpose I rely on Robert Pippin (1991, 1997) and Terry Pinkard (1994, 1997) who propose 
the Post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel‘s critique of Kant, in which Hegel does not intend 
to eliminate Kant´s concept of moral autonomy (a view that to a certain extent is 
developed by Robert Brandom too). Rather, the issue is that pure reason cannot define the 
autonomy of the will independently of the institutions and practices of modern ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit]. I take this reading of Hegel‘s critique as the ground, which helps me to 
understand Habermas‘s complex, indeed somewhat fraught relationship with both Hegel 
and Kant.  
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That said, Habermas gives priority to the Kantian component in the reconstruction of the 
normative foundations of his critical theory. In this respect, Habermas‘s theory really is 
part of the Kantian family as Habermas himself, and various commentators have 
acknowledged. (MCCA, 195-197; Rehg, 1994: 2; Forst, 2011: 154; Baynes, 2016: 102; 
Laden, 2011: 135) And this means that a Kantian notion of moral reason takes the central 
stage in Habermas‘s moral and political theories. (Habermas, 2011: 284) This raises the 
question whether and to what extent Habermas can successfully rebut Hegelian criticisms 
inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. At first appearance, as long as Habermas takes on 
board Hegel‘s critique, it seems that he can respond, if not to all, then to most of the 
Hegelian objections to his position. Habermas himself addresses this issue, insofar as it is 
levelled at his moral theory, in his article ‗Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel‘s critique 
of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?‘ and of course the gist of his answer is that Hegel‘s 
critique does not apply to Discourse Ethics. (MCCA, 195-215; Finlayson, 1999: 29)1   
 
Habermas has several convincing arguments to back up his claim. Among them, his notion 
of moral reason is a modified version of Kant‘s moral philosophy. Habermas‘s moral reason 
is based on a pragmatic notion of autonomy, whereas Kant‘s is grounded on a logical or 
metaphysical form of necessity. In Habermas, morality takes place in social space and 
historical time (T&J258), whereas in Kant is based on a metaphysical view which splits 
human agency between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self: the first, oriented only by 
the representation of practical principles and laws; the second, by the concrete person with 
her needs, inclinations and desires. (MCCA, 203; Apel 1983: 597) Kant‘s concept of 
autonomy discard the phenomenal self as a proper source of moral guidance, and argues that 
we ought to act from duty, and will maxims of action in virtue of their universal form. 
Certainly, in Kant we can act according to duty insofar as we are not only phenomenal selves, 
but also noumenal and as such fully rational and transcendentally free) selves. Habermas 
rules out this alternative because in his theory only concrete participants in discourse can 
legislate norms that can have moral worth. (MCCA, 130, 198) Roughly speaking, Kant‘s 
moral reason takes place in the bifurcated consciousness of the moral agent, so to speak, 
whereas in Habermas morality is based on intersubjective practices of mutual 
understanding between concrete individuals. 
 
                                                          
1 According to Bohman and Rehg, ‗Habermas‘s discourse theory of morality generally goes by the name 
―Discourse Ethics,‖ a somewhat misleading label given that ―ethics‖ has a distinct non-moral sense for him‘. 
(2014) In this work I use the two labels because Habermas‘s moral theory has been largely labeled with the 
term ‗Discourse Ethics‘ and this does not lead to misunderstandings 
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In his critique of Kant‘s moral philosophy, Hegel claims that the split between the noumenal 
self and the phenomenal self – between the moral will and the empirical will – discards the 
contents of the empirical will. (Hegel, 1991: §135) This is the criticism of the will as a tester 
of maxims2 which pertains to a twofold dilemma: on the one hand, insofar as Kant‘s moral 
philosophy does not show how concrete content can be included in moral reasoning, then 
how can morality provide us with concrete guidance? On the other hand, due to this lack 
of content, how can morality explain the real motivation of empirical agents? Concerning 
the question of the lack of content, Kantians could answer this by reference to the formula 
of humanity. (4: 428-429, 435, 440) In this regard, humanity is the last source of all our 
moral actions, and humanity itself is a proper content: it is not a mean, or a principle, 
rather, it is the objective end of practical reason. And to answer the motivational question, 
Kantians have argued that good moral reasons seem to be enough to motivate concrete 
people to do what they ought to do. As Korsgaard asserts, ‗the reasons why an action is 
right and why you do it are the same‘. (1986: 10, see also Mackie 1977, 23–24) 
 
In this work, I do not examine in detail the Kantian answers to Hegel‘s objection of the 
will as a tester of maxims. Rather, I ask whether a version of this criticism does apply after 
all to Habermas. The latter advances a lot when he develops the view that normative 
practices take place in social space and historical time. Therefore, when he deflates and 
socializes Kant‘s notion of moral reason he underpins his theory and this made it less 
vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms. Nevertheless, things get more complicated when 
Habermas asserts that moral norms can only rest on impartial and hence agent-neutral and 
not on agent-relative reasons. (IO, 7, 43) Bearing in mind this strict condition, I claim that 
Hegel‘s latter criticism applies to Habermas because he cannot give a full account of how 
the concrete contents of particular wills can be included in practical discourse. Hence, the 
aforementioned twofold dilemma returns. Still, in this work I aim to develop a defence of 
Habermas, which demands only that he slacken the strict distinction between agent-relative 
and agent-neutral reasons.  He can do this because of the familiar point that some agent-
relative reasons are universal.  
 
According to Kenneth Baynes, Habermas‘s Kantian notion of moral reason not only 
pertains to his moral theory, but also has a central place in his political theory. (2016: 170, 
                                                          
2 Of course, Hegel‘s criticisms of Kant as a moral philosopher are many. In this work, I do not only focus on 
the criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. Among other challenges, I develop the charge of the empty 
formalism of the categorical imperative as well. 
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179) Then, I bring a version Hegel‘s criticism of the will against both theories. Concerning 
the moral theory, I rebut the criticism by the modification already mentioned, namely, I 
argue that Habermas needs to loosen the strict distinction between agent-relative and 
agent-neutral considerations. With regard to Habermas‘s political theory, I propose a 
version of the same solution (namely, the slackening of the strict distinction between agent-
relative and agent-neutral considerations in the justification of legal and political norms) to 
a slightly different problem. Now, it might be thought that the solution I propose is 
invalidated by the fact of reasonable pluralism. This is because, in the present historical 
context it is difficult to expect that all citizens are going to put into practice a particular 
notion of communicative reason, that is to say, that they will engage in discourse, and 
hence presuppose it pragmatically. To rebut this challenge, I end up claiming that it is 
reasonable to presume that citizens can act according to Habermas‘s notion of autonomy, 
and in doing so they are able to recognize themselves not only as addressees but also as 
authors of their legal and political community. Moreover, the thin and weak features of the 
concept of rational discourse in Habermas make the allegiance of the citizens to the 
normative core of legal and political legitimacy more tenable. This is because this practice is 
unavoidable in communication and it does not demand the commitment of the citizens to 
a particular religion, ideology or ethical doctrine.   
 
In Part I of this text, I examine Habermas‘s notion of practical reason and autonomy. I 
show that these concepts are based on a re-working of Kant‘s practical philosophy. This re-
working relies on a modified and attenuated version of Kant‘s moral reason, because it has a 
much weaker form of necessity than the latter. Additionally, the Kantian normative 
component furnishes not only Habermas‘s moral theory, but also a central plank of his 
legal and political theory. After I have developed this basic framework in Chapter One, in 
Chapter Two, I discuss Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s moral philosophy. At first blush, 
the modified and attenuated Kantianism of his theory allows Habermas to claim that he can 
rebut, if not all, then most of the objections that arise from Hegel‘s critique. However, I 
show that Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims can still apply to Habermas‘s 
moral theory. This criticism states that Kant cannot connect the universal will of morality 
and the particular will of the empirical subject because he rules out particular contents as 
susceptible of being universalized. In Habermas´s theory something similar happens 
insofar as he sets strict limits to what can count as a content which may enter into practical 
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discourse. I show, however, that Habermas can rebut Hegel‘s criticism of the will if he 
introduces the modification already mentioned above.  
 
In Part II, I focus on Habermas‘s political Kantianism in Between Facts and Norms and in the 
debate with Rawls. In Chapter Three, I show that Habermas´s theory of constitutional 
democracy gives a central place to a Kantian notion of normative justification contained in 
the principle of Discourse (D). (BFN, 107-108) Moreover, I examine Habermas´s co-
originality thesis between private and public autonomy and I claim that, as Kant does, 
Habermas gives normative priority to the ‗system of rights‘ before the concrete practical 
work of public autonomy is carried out. (RH, 63, 76; Habermas, 2001: 766-782; Habermas, 
2011: 295) In Chapter Four, I show that, as with his moral theory, Habermas incorporates 
Hegelian components in his legal and political theory also. (BFN, 59, 63, 129, 132-133, 421) 
Nonetheless, according to Baynes, the Kantian notion of autonomy and morality enjoys a 
certain priority in Habermas‘s political theory. On the one hand, the incorporation of 
Hegelian components strengthened Habermas‘s political philosophy in the face of 
criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. On the other hand, if Baynes‘s 
interpretation is correct, then the priority of the Kantian component seems to leave room 
for the return of Hegel‘s critique. I examine the criticism of the will as a tester of maxims 
this time in Habermas‘s political theory. I claim that Habermas can solve this criticism if he 
modifies some of the components of his legal and political theory.      
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Part I 
 
Habermas’s Kantianism and Hegelian 
criticisms of Discourse Ethics 
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1 
The Kantian Foundations of Habermas’s 
Discourse Ethics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter sets the basic framework of this thesis in which I examine Habermas‘s theory 
in light of Hegelian criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. This stage is supported 
by the claim that I want to develop, namely, that Habermas‘s notion of normative 
justification relies on a modified version of Kant‘s notion of pure practical reason and 
autonomy.1 Modified, in the sense that Habermas‘s account of communicative reason is an 
attenuated version of Kant‘s concept of pure practical reason because, among other things, 
the former has a much weaker form of necessity than the latter. Habermas‘s communicative 
reason is based on a pragmatic and social notion of justification, whereas Kant‘s is 
grounded on a logical or metaphysical form of necessity. According to Kant we must act in 
accordance with duty because we are rational beings and pure reason demands that we act 
in certain ways, say, we must not lie. For Habermas, as mature moral beings in a post-
conventional society, there is no another functional alternative to regulating our moral lives 
and solving conflicts of interest between agents than by discourse. In this regard, the moral 
ought is a rational demand: we must not lie, because we are the beings for whom it is 
                                                          
1 In this thesis I assume – following Kant and the Kantian tradition – that an autonomous will is shaped and 
coincides with a normative notion of moral reason (or in Kant‘s terms pure practical reason). In other words, 
the autonomy of the will pertains to a rational being who attaches her insights and actions to the procedures 
and rules of normativity. In this regard, Kant asserts in the Groundwork that ‗a free will and a will under moral 
laws are one and the same‘. (4: 447) Also there he states ‗Reason must view herself as the authoress of her 
principles, indepently of alien influences, and must consequently, as practical reason, or as the will of a 
rational being, by herself be viewed as free‘. (4: 448) Henceforth, the reader should not be confused because 
in some parts of this work I refer to pure practical reason (or moral reason) and in others to autonomy. These 
notions are conceptually related in the Kantian tradition. Habermas has a similar view. In Truth and Justification 
he asserts that ‗Reason become ―practical reason‖ insofar as it determines will and action according to 
principles‘. (T&J, 94) Explicitly Habermas claims to follow Kant in the sense that by means of the concept of 
practical reason, moral and political autonomy are reconstructed in Discourse Ethics and in his theory of 
Constitutional Democracy in BFN. (See 2011: 284 where Habermas makes the connection explicit)  
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second nature to act on principle, and because otherwise we would precipitate ourselves 
into social conflicts with other agents. Hence, the moral ought is a social demand. 
Nevertheless, as I will show in this Chapter, Habermas‘s concept still has the Kantian 
hallmarks (what I also call the Kantian presuppositions of Discourse Ethics), namely, the 
Kantian notions of autonomy, equality, universalizability, cognitivism, deontologism and as 
in Kant, Habermas‘s conception of normativity is procedural (although, in this thesis I will 
centre on the notion of autonomy). In order to prove this, I focus on the two principles 
which frame Habermas‘s reconstruction of normativity: the principle of discourse (D) and 
the principle of universalization (U). In what follows, I show that bearing in mind these 
principles, it is possible to examine Habermas‘s Kantianism. These principles state:  
 
(D): Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses. (BFN, 107, See also MCCA, 66; BNR, 
80)2 
 
(U): Valid moral practical norms must satisfy the condition that the foreseeable 
consequences and side-effects of their general observance for the interests of each 
individual must be acceptable by all those possibly affected in their role as 
participants in discourse. (BNR, 80, See also MCCA, 65) 
 
In the early 90s Habermas settles on the view that these principles have a different status. 
(MCCA, 66; BFN, 107, 121; BNR, 84, 89) Albeit, one of his most important colleagues, 
Karl Otto Apel and other critics (Benhabib, 1990: 345; Larmore, 1995: 66-67) claim that 
the content of the moral principle is already contained in the principle of discourse (Apel, 
1998). If this reading is correct, then (U) seems to be redundant and Discourse Ethics is 
well equipped with the principle of discourse. (Benhabib, 1986; 387; Benhabib and 
Dallmayr, 1990; See also Larmore, 1995) To a certain extent, Habermas has some of the 
responsibility for this interpretation. This is because in MCCA he claims that (U) and (D) 
should not be confused but that the principle of discourse already contains ‗the distinctive 
idea of an ethics of discourse‘. (MCCA, 66) As a matter of fact, in earlier versions of 
Discourse Ethics Habermas claims that (D) is the moral principle and (U) is just an 
elaboration of it. (Finlayson, 2016b: 3) Therefore, if (D) contains the essentials of 
                                                          
2 The formulation of this principle in MCCA is identical to the one proposed in BNR in terms of content, 
‗Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse‘. (MCCA, 66) 
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Habermas‘s moral theory, then the question is where is the specific originality of (U) which 
supposedly reconstructs the moral point of view of this same theory. In this Chapter, 
following Habermas, I show that these principles are different. That said, I claim that the 
Kantian presuppositions of Discourse Ethics apply both to (D) and (U).  
 
In Between Facts and Norms and in Between Naturalism and Religion the distinction concerning 
the principle of discourse and the principle of universalization is notably sharpened. (BFN, 
107; BNR, 80) In both books, Habermas states that (U) is a moral procedure of testing of 
norms and the principle of discourse (D) is defined as a weak concept of normative justification 
(IO, 45; BNR, 87) that only incorporates an idea of ‗norm-justification in which individuals 
are viewed as mutually accountable agents‘. (Baynes, 2016: 115) (D) does not include thicker 
components, for example, ‗the equal consideration of interests of all possible affected‘ 
(BNR, 86) which is an element that has been built into the principle of universalization (U). 
Rather, the principle of discourse expresses the post-conventional ‗need of justiﬁcation 
only in very general terms with respect to action norms as such‘. (BNR, 80) This broader 
scope leaves room for further specifications of the domain in which this principle is 
applied – i.e., politics, law and morality. (BNR, 80-81) In this way, concerning the principle 
of discourse, ‗despite its normative content, it lies at the level of abstraction that is still 
neutral with respect to morality and law‘. (BFN, 107) 
 
The difference between these principles has far reaching consequences for the architecture 
of Habermas‘s project of social criticisms, inasmuch as by means of this distinction political 
legitimacy is differentiated from morality. On the one hand, Habermas‘s notion of 
legitimacy derives from the interpenetration [Verschränkung] between the principle of 
discourse and the legal form. (BFN, 82-131)3 On the other hand, Habermas‘s notion of 
moral validity depends on principle (U) which he claims can be derived from the 
combination of the principle of discourse and the rules of discourse. (MCCA, 96-97)   
 
In this thesis, I do not challenge the distinction between (D) and (U) that Habermas 
eventually wants to draw at the centre of the reconstruction of the normative point of view. 
Hence, I do not aim to blur the differentiation of spheres of validity that he asserts he 
                                                          
3 The legal form or the legal medium concerns the institutions and practices which confer legitimacy to upon 
legal and political norms. Among its features we find that modern law: is positive, in the sense that its norms 
‗stem from the changeable decisions of a political lawgiver‘ (IO, 254); ‗it has been passed by a legally body 
correctly, according to its rules […] it is enforceable by various legitimate means‘. (Finlayson, 2011: 10) 
Finally, it protects subjective rights. (Habermas, 2011: 285)  
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builds. Rather, my claim is weaker and I maintain that either we look at (D) or (U) and 
distil their main contents what we have at bottom is a modified and attenuated Kantian 
understanding of practical reason.4 If that statement is correct, then a Kantian notion of 
autonomy frames discourses of justification of moral norms and of legal and political 
norms. In this way, Habermas distinguishes between moral autonomy and civic or political 
autonomy. In the latter realm, he distinguishes between private autonomy and public 
autonomy. Private autonomy refers to doing what one wants provided other people can 
too. Public autonomy concerns to being part of a self-legislating community so one is both 
addressee and author of the law. Finally, moral autonomy is acting deliberatively and self-
consciously on a principle that is universally valid according to (U).  
 
The aim of this Chapter is to examine the appropriation of the Kantian notion of 
autonomy – that is connected to all these forms of autonomy – and the ‗invasive 
intervention‘ (T&J, 87) that it suffers in Habermas‘s theory.5 Therefore, I deny from the 
outset that the Habermasian concept of normative justification is identical to the principles 
developed by Kant, namely, the categorical imperative and the formula of humanity. (4:421, 
429) 
 
In this work, once we have proved that Habermas‘s oeuvre endorses and gives priority to 
modified and attenuated Kantian presuppositions in its concept of normativity and morality 
(Chapter One) and in its notion of legal and political legitimacy (Chapter Three) the second 
movement is to examine criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant of this Kantian 
component in Habermas‘s moral theory (Chapter Two) and in his political theory (Chapter 
Four). Particularly in Chapter One, I examine Habermas‘s re-working of Kant‘s concept of 
pure practical reason and autonomy. To develop this issue, I divide this Chapter into five 
sections.  
                                                          
4 It is possible to give an interpretation of this principle from a Hegelian point of view, in the sense that it 
arises in the medium of social institutions and practices. Honneth speaks of practices of mutual recognition 
where individuals ascribe the status of reason-giver to one another. (Honneth, 2014: 42) This coincides with 
Robert Brandom‘s pragmatism in which rational agency is fundamentally a normative status dependent on 
social practices and the attitudes displayed by individuals in the context of those practices. (Brandom, 1994; in 
Baynes, 2016: 85) These similarities pertain to the analytical reading of Hegel‘s critique of Kant in which 
Hegel is continuing and supplementing Kant but not rejecting him. (Pippin, 1989, 1991; Pinkard, 1994, 1999) 
Hence, the Kantian idea of autonomy finds its expression in the medium of social institutions and practices. 
In front of this interpretation of Hegel‘s critique of Kant it reminds the question whether and to what extent 
Hegel here is more or less an intersubjectivistic version of Kant. Certainly, I cannot examine in detail this 
problem here. This way to put the issue was formulated by Habermas to Terry Pinkard. (Pinkard, 1999) 
 
11 
 
In the first section, I show that the Kantian component sets at the front in Habermas‘s 
oeuvre. This Kantianism arises from his habilitation Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, to one of his less Kantian books Between Facts and Norms.6 In STPS Habermas studies 
the origins of the public sphere in the 18th century, and in this social space Kantian 
concepts such as autonomy, the public use of reason and equality were embedded in the 
medium of institutions and practices of an enlightened society. In BFN, the idea of political 
self-legislation, the tension between Facticity and Validity, the concepts of autonomy and 
equality also show this Kantianism. In this section, I do not only examine these two books. 
I also focus on Discourse Ethics and the program of universal pragmatics, and the 
strategies developed in Truth and Justification to detranscendentalize Kant (1);  
 
In the second section, I claim that this Kantian component has a central place in 
Habermas‘s critical theory. Habermas defines the Theory of Communicative Action as ‗the 
beginning of a social theory that is concerned to validate its own critical standards‘ (TCA1, 
xxxix). According to Honneth, the moral theory developed in the program of Discourse 
Ethics has been built as the justificatory ground of these critical or normative standards. 
(Honneth, 1991: 282) In Discourse Ethics, Habermas has been explicit that his moral 
theory is Kantian. Consequently, if the normative ground of the critical theory is framed in 
Discourse Ethics, then the normative ground of Habermas‘s critical theory is Kantian. In 
other words, the Habermasian Kantian notion of moral reason and autonomy lies at the 
heart of Habermas‘s broader project of social criticisms. Additionally, I initially develop 
some of the essential features of the Habermasian reconstruction of the moral point of 
view, namely, its formalism, cognitivism and universalism; and its relationship with 
Kohlberg‘s model of stages of moral development (2); 
 
In the third section, I expound and report Habermas‘s own view of Discourse Ethics. I 
examine the chief principle of Habermas‘s moral theory, namely, the principle of 
universalization (U), which is the specification of the principle of discourse (D) in the 
moral sphere of validity. According to Habermas, (U) reformulates ‗the basic intuition 
contained in Kant‘s categorical imperative […] to ensure that only those norms are 
accepted as valid which express a general will‘. (MCCA, 63) Nevertheless, the principle of 
                                                          
6 I say that BFN is one of his less Kantian books because there Habermas wants to find the support for the 
justification of the ‗system of rights‘ that compose the Recht-Staat in an intra-legal notion of legitimacy, ‗overly 
immanent to law‘. (Forst, 2011: 173) Forst and Flynn (2003; 2011), are critical of this strategy because for 
them the ‗system of rights‘ necessarily needs moral support. This discussion is going to be at the centre 
especially on the second part of this work.  
12 
 
universalization is an attenuated and modified version of Kant‘s moral principle which is not 
based on the transcendental notion of freedom and agency as it was in Kant. Moreover, 
Kant‘s reconstruction of the moral point of view refers to a monological account of pure 
practical reason, whereas in Habermas relates to a dialogical notion of mutual 
understanding [Verständigung] (3);  
 
In the fourth section, I assert that the principle of discourse and the principle of 
universalization share the Kantian features that I have discussed so far. Interestingly 
enough, according to Habermas the chief difference between these principles is that the 
principle of discourse reconstruct the practice of giving reasons in general – it does not 
have a particular sphere of validity but it is indifferent vis à vis morality and law (BFN, 107, 
121; BNR, 84, 89) – whereas the principle of universalization regulates interpersonal 
relationships that concern the moral domain of normative validity. Nonetheless, the 
essential features of a modified version of Kant‘s concept of practical reason and 
autonomy shapes both principles and assures their normative nature (4);  
 
In the fifth section, I discuss the strategies of deduction of the principle of universalization 
of Discourse Ethics (U). I conclude that at the end Habermas needs to build an historical 
argument to explain the derivation of this principle and this resembles Kant‘s strategy of 
deduction of the categorical imperative as a ‗fact of reason‘. Here I follow Kenneth Baynes, 
who asserts that the doctrine of the ‗fact of reason‘ refers to what, ‗from a practical point 
of view, is already familiar to ordinary humans‘. (Baynes, 2016: 91) Thus, both Habermas 
and Kant use this strategy to justify the moral point of view (5).  
 
1. Kantian and Hegelian components in Habermas’s oeuvre  
 
Kantian components set at the front in Habermas‘s oeuvre, in the sense that he has been 
always committed to some deeply Kantian presuppositions. Certainly, it is not difficult to 
trace this relationship and does not require complex strategies to do so. One obvious 
reason that explains this is that Habermas has openly recognized the connection of the 
version of critical theory that he develops with Kant. (See MCCA, 68) Thus, the latter is 
not an obscure figure or the blind spot of the philosophy of the former. Nevertheless, this 
raises the question of the way in which and the extent to which Habermas endorses Kant‘s 
philosophy. In this thesis, I argue that Habermas builds a modified version of Kant‘s 
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concept of autonomy which among other things has taken on board Hegelian insights, 
namely, the idea that the Kantian component needs the support of social institutions and 
practices of a modern ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. (See PR § 135, 153)  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Habermas tries to take on board Hegel‘s criticisms of Kant, 
in this work I maintain that the Kantian component has priority. In further chapters, I 
discuss this element in light of criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘s moral 
philosophy. In this section, I reconstruct Habermas‘s Kantianism and the incorporation of 
Hegelian components in a preliminary and introductory fashion, considering some relevant 
milestones of Habermas‘s oeuvre.  
 
*** 
 
The 1962 publication of Habermas‘s habilitation The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (STPS) shows an early interest in the domain of civil society, where Kantian values 
like publicity, inclusion, equality and autonomy take a central place. Here, Habermas 
describes a detailed social history of the development of the bourgeois public sphere from 
its origin in the 18th century. In this context, Habermas is neither arguing that at that time 
the values of the enlightenment were fully developed nor that they were merely ideology, as 
a Marxist critique would argue. Rather, in Habermas‘s view modern societies have an 
immanent rationality that affords the possibility of building the critical point of view. In 
this regard, this work develops the view that the Kantian ideals need to be embedded in the 
medium of social institutions and practices. (Hegel, 1991) Henceforth, Habermas‘s 
habilitation shows a central motive of his philosophy, namely, the dialectical relationship 
between Kantian and Hegelian components. 
 
These motives are present three decades later in Habermas‘s second major book Between 
Facts and Norms.7 Here, he develops some of the initial insights that shaped STPS. In this 
way, Habermas argues that constitutional democracy has never been fully developed but its 
rationality is part of the self-understanding of modern societies. This rationality – which is 
expressed in the ideas of self-legislation and equality – is embodied in the legal medium of 
modern democracies. (BFN, 82-131) Thus, considering STPS and BFN, Habermas is 
                                                          
7 It is well known that the first major work of Habermas is the Theory of Communicative Action. (TCA1, TCA2) 
Just to clarify, at this point I am referring to the second major work Between Facts and Norms because there 
Habermas develops forward some of the thesis that were present in an embryonic state in STPS.   
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developing Kantian contents at the centre of his theory of legal and political legitimacy 
which in both works are embedded in the medium of social institutions and practices.  
 
Few years after STPS, Habermas‘s 1968, Knowledge and Human Interest (KHI) shows the 
attempt to appropriate Kant‘s critical philosophy without endorsing some of its more 
controversial claims – i.e., its world-constituting subject and the two world-metaphysics. In 
this regard, KHI ‗in some ways Habermas‘s least Kantian work, opens with an appreciation 
of Kant‘s enterprise‘. (Baynes, 2016: 83):  
 
The critique of knowledge was still conceived in reference to a system of cognitive 
faculties that included practical reason and reflective judgement as naturally critique 
itself, that is, a theoretical reason that can dialectically ascertain not only its limits 
but also its own idea. (KHI, 3) 
 
In the 1976 Communication and the Evolution of Society (CES), Habermas defines universal 
pragmatics by the task of identifying universal conditions of possible understanding. This 
program is similar to the Kantian project which aims to examine the conditions of the 
experience of the objects of thought. However, Habermas distinguishes his own version of 
universal pragmatics from the more fully Kantian one developed by Apel. According to 
Habermas, his theory develops a ‗quasi-transcendental‘ account of universal pragmatics, 
whereas Apel‘s constructs a transcendental one. The latter reconstruction of universal 
pragmatics means, ‗What we must necessarily always presuppose in regard to ourselves and 
others as normative conditions of the possibility of reaching understanding 
(Verständigung); and in this sense, what we must necessarily always already have accepted‘. 
(Apel, in CES, 2) The aprioristic [immer schon: always already] adds a mode of necessity that 
expresses a transcendental constraint to which we are subject when we perform or respond 
to a speech act.  
  
According to Habermas, Apel‘s justification of universal pragmatics is similar to Kant‘s 
transcendental argument for freedom. (See MCCA, 77 & 95 and also BNR, 77) In the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals transcendental freedom and hence noumenal agency 
must be located outside time and space. In contrast, Habermas‘s ‗quasi-transcendental‘ 
argument appeals to what given certain social practices, is extremely difficult to imagine 
doing without. (Baynes, 2016: 91) In this respect, as I am going to develop in the last 
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section, Habermas‘s strategy of deduction of communicative reason bears a strong 
similarity with Kant‘s doctrine of the ‗Fact of Reason‘ to give a foundation to the moral 
law. (Baynes, 2016: 91) By means of this strategy of argumentation, it seems that the 
Hegelian insight that reason is embedded in social practices and historical time also inflects 
Habermas‘s understanding of universal pragmatics.8  
 
In the program of Discourse Ethics the continuities between Kant and Habermas are even 
clearer. Habermas‘s moral theory is located in the Kantian family. (MCCA, 67, 68 & 195; 
Rehg, 1994, 2, 114 & 123; McCarthy, 1978: 326; Forst, 2011: 154; Baynes, 2016: 102) In 
these moral theories, the main task is to construct the moral point of view, as the 
procedure through which norms can be tested for their universal validity. Kant constructs 
the moral point of view as the procedure from which a rational subject can test the 
universal validity of a maxim. Insofar as the maxim does, so accord and the subject acts 
upon it, (and thus acts for the sake of duty) the subject is fully autonomous, because as 
Kant says, the moral will and the autonomous will are one and the same. (4: 447) Likewise, 
the discursive theory of morality builds the Kantian concept of autonomy but based this 
time on an intersubjective account of practical reason.9  
 
This version of autonomy opens up a challenge for Habermas because he needs to show 
how a moral subject can be fully autonomous, and yet form their moral will in the process 
of dialogue. The answer is what Habermas calls, following Mead, ‗the larger self‘ or the 
‗decentred self‘ in which the subject brings her own will into line with what everyone can 
agree in discourse. (MCCA, 65, 121 & 198) This is not a heteronomous process of 
conforming to what everyone thinks, but a process of determining what the particular 
agent has most reason to do. This notion of intersubjective autonomy is going to be 
developed in this Chapter. (See Section 2 and 3) 
 
In the following sections, I examine in detail the continuities between Habermas and Kant 
concerning their moral theories. Nevertheless, at this point I would like to mention that 
Habermas‘s theory is Kantian not only because it aims to build the moral point of view to 
reconstruct universalizable norms and because puts at the centre the concept of autonomy. 
Rather, it is also Kantian because Discourse Ethics is formalist, cognitivist and 
                                                          
8 The strategies of deduction of the moral point of view in Discourse Ethics are going to be discussed in 
detail in the last section of the Chapter.  
9 This connection is examined in detail in further sections of this Chapter.  
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deontological.10 Concerning the Hegelian components of Discourse Ethics, they are 
examined in detail in Chapter Two. For the sake of my argument at this point I limit myself 
to refer to Habermas‘s MCCA where he argues that post-conventional moralities need the 
support of a life-world context that meet them halfway. (MCCA, 207) 
 
Certainly, it requires further analysis to find the coherence between these continuities in 
Habermas and Kant, and the fact that the former has a critical reading of the philosophy of 
the subject or consciousness that is present in the latter. Baynes rightly states the dilemma 
because the relationship amid these philosophers ‗at least raises the questions of the extent 
to which one can follow Kant without likewise embracing the philosophy of the subject‘. 
(Baynes, 2004: 195) However, every relevant philosopher is engaged critically with the 
tradition that he/she elaborates in an original way. Otherwise, there would not be progress. 
To my mind, this is what Habermas does with Kant.  
 
Habermas endorses a Kantian pragmatism which aims to ‗detranscendentalizing‘ Kant. 
(T&J, 84, 175-176; Fultner, 2003: xii) Among other things, this means that Kantian notions 
like autonomy are this time embedded in the medium of social space and historical time. In 
this way, Habermas (again) incorporates a Hegelian insight that fortifies his theory in front 
of criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. Albeit, as I will argue in this thesis, I 
claim that the Kantian component of Discourse Ethics has priority over the Hegelian one.  
 
Moreover, in Truth and Justification Habermas addresses the post-Kantian – and Hegelian – 
task of ‗detranscendentalizing‘ Kant. Moreover, he wants to avoid the pitfalls of other 
forms of pragmatism in which, he claims, lifeworlds or linguistic frameworks are given too 
much constitutive authority – i.e., Heidegger‘s ‗Being‘ or Hegel‘s ‗spirit‘. Habermas 
attempts to accomplish this by means of his notion of communication. Via Thomas 
McCarthy (1991), Habermas argues that there are ‗genealogical‘ connections between 
idealizing presuppositions of communicative action and the Kantian ‗ideas of reason‘. I 
propose two interpretations to read the idea of ‗genealogical‘ connections. A weak reading 
implies that there is a family resemblance between the presuppositions of communication and 
Kant‘s concepts. (T&J, 87) A strong interpretation would mean that these presuppositions 
are identical to the Kantian concepts. In Habermas‘s theory the latter interpretation cannot 
apply, because he works with a modified and attenuated view of reason compared with Kant. 
                                                          
10 These features are described in more detail in the next section of this Chapter.  
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Where pure practical reason in Kant is based on the philosophy of the subject, 
communicative reason in Habermas is grounded on an intersubjective paradigm which 
pertains to practices of mutual understanding  [Verständigung] that are explained within the 
framework of the linguistic turn. (PT, 6, 21; T&J, 1, 220) 
 
In what follows, I develop these ‗genealogical‘ connections. According to Habermas, 
Kant‘s idea of the ‗cosmological unity‘ of the world, the idea of ‗freedom‘ as a postulate of 
practical reason, and the idea of the ‗unconditioned‘ (or God) correspond to three formal-
pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action, namely, the common supposition of 
an objective world, the rationality that acting subjects mutually attribute to one another, 
and the unconditional validity they claim for their statements with speech acts. (T&J, 87) 
 
Concerning these presuppositions of communicative action, Habermas asserts that they 
‗refer to one another and form aspects of a desublimated reason embodied in everyday 
communicative practice‘. (T&J, 84) In other words, they are not fully Kantian in the sense 
that transcendental ideas are necessary constructs of pure reason, that structure and 
regulate the empirical world. Rather, they are practical presuppositions embedded in the 
medium of social space and historical time. Habermas describes these ‗genealogical‘ 
connections in the following terms. (T&J, 87):  
 
(1) between the ―cosmological idea‖ of the unity of the world (or the totality of in 
the sensory world) and the pragmatic presupposition of a common objective 
world;  
(2) between the ―idea of freedom‖ as a postulate of practical reason and the 
pragmatic presupposition of the rationality of accountable agents;  
 
(3) between the totalizing movement of reason that, as a ―faculty of ideas,‖ 
transcends all that is conditioned toward an unconditioned and the 
unconditionality of the validity claims raised in communicative action; and 
 
(4) finally, between reason as the ―faculty of principles,‖ which takes on the role of 
the ―highest court of appeal for all rights and claims,‖ and rational discourse as 
the unavoidable forum of possible justification. 
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In this section, I focus mainly in the first and the second relationship. The third is referred 
as long as it helps to explain these two. We can ignore the fourth, since it is not relevant to 
our purposes.  
 
The first genealogical connection, the common objective world, alludes to the totalizing 
anticipation of the entirety of objects of possible experience. (T&J, 88) This idea of reason 
does not make cognition possible, but guides it. This cosmological idea is a methodological 
principle of completeness and is a regulative idea. Metaphysical thinking, argues Habermas, 
falls victim to the dialectical illusion of hypostatized world order because it uses this 
regulative idea constitutively. The reifying use of theoretical reason confuses this idea of 
reason with an object that is accessible to experience. According to Habermas, the 
difference between the ‗world‘ and the ‗innerworldly‘ must be preserved ‗even if the 
transcendental subject loses its position outside time and space and is transformed into a 
multitude of subjects capable of speech and action‘. (T&J, 88) The process of 
detranscendentalization implies that knowing subjects are socialized in the context of a 
shared life-world, and the pragmatic thesis that knowledge of the world is entwined with 
speech and action.  
 
The second genealogical connection, the idea of the accountability of the subjects, refers to the 
interpersonal relationships of language users who take one another ‗at their word‘ and hold 
one another to ‗be answerable‘ for their words and deeds. In their cooperative 
relationships, they must mutually expect one another to be rational, at least provisionally‘. 
(T&J, 94) This presupposition could be unwarranted and contrary to this expectation, it 
may happen on any particular occasion, that an agent does not (and cannot) give reasons 
for her action or claims. However, in contexts of communicative action ‗this kind of 
frustration can occur only against the background supposition of rationality that anyone 
engaged in communicative action must assume‘. (T&J, 94) This supposition of rationality is 
connected with pure practical reason that determines the agency of the subject according to 
principles. In Kant‘s view, by means of the categorical imperative, the idea of freedom 
acquires its own causality.  
 
In Kant‘s philosophy freedom is transcendental, a force that originates beyond social space 
and historical time, but that is supposed to have observable causal effects in the empirical 
social world. The condition of possibility of this notion of freedom is based on the 
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doctrine that the causality of the autonomy of the subject depends on the respect for the 
moral law. This account of freedom acquires legislative force for every rational being. 
Moreover, in Kant‘s account of agency there is a distinction between freedom of choice 
[Willkür] and free will [Wille]. The former is related to actions in general, namely, moral, 
pragmatic, prudential and even evil acts. The latter, obeys universally binding norms that 
have been constructed from the moral point of view.  
 
In Habermas, autonomy is understood as the accountability of the subjects to render 
validity claims in discourse. Furthermore, communicative action is connected with a 
broader spectrum of reasons than in Kant. In Habermas, not only pragmatic and moral 
reasons but also epistemic, ethical and legal considerations are included in practical 
discourses. Another difference between Habermas‘s Kantian pragmatism and Kant‘s 
philosophy is that in the former the autonomy of the agents is a defeasible claim which 
means that experience can contradict this presupposition. In contrast, in Kant it is an apriori 
claim that human beings have a natural capacity to cognize the moral law and therefore to 
recognize themselves as autonomous beings.11  
 
In all these various respects, we can see that the Kantian component is essential in 
Habermas oeuvre, in the sense that he has been always committed with Kantian 
presuppositions. This component arises from in his early works on the public sphere 
(STPS), his project of universal pragmatics (CES), in Discourse Ethics (MCCA, JA), in his 
political theory (BFN) and in the presuppositions of communicative action. (T&J) In this 
regard, in this section I have examined two ‗genealogical‘ connections between the 
idealizations of communicative action and Kant‘s ‗ideas of pure reason‘. Albeit, Habermas 
has taken on board the Hegelian insight that the Kantian element needs the support and be 
embedded in the middle of social institutions and practices. However, as I have shown, 
Habermas has been committed at a deep level to a broadly Kantian notion of autonomy. In 
this way, in a relatively recent formulation Habermas openly admits to follow Kant in 
assuming that, with the concept of autonomy, ‗the practical reason shared by all persons 
                                                          
11 It is important to notice that in Kant‘s moral philosophy there is an internal relationship between freedom 
and the moral law. In the Groundwork the strategy was to deduce the moral law from a non-moral notion of 
freedom. Nevertheless, in the Second Critique Kant appeals to the doctrine of the ‗fact of reason‘ which 
pertains to the claim that ‗the moral law neither allows nor needs a deduction in his technical sense. [Rather], 
on reflection we do accept the moral law as an authoritative standard‘. (Reath, 1997: x) Thus, as far as I know 
the existence of the moral law - as a fact of reason - I know the possibility of freedom.  
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offers a reliable guide both for morally justifying individual actions and for the rational 
construction of a legitimate political constitution for society‘. (2011: 284) 
 
After the discussion of these connections, in the following sections of this Chapter I focus 
on Habermas‘s moral philosophy. Somehow, this theory was referred in this section when I 
examined the second ‗genealogical‘ connection. The accountability of the subjects refers to 
the capability of them to render validity claims in discourses of justification. Certainly, this 
accountability can take place in discourse of moral justification.  
 
Henceforth, in the next parts of this Chapter I examine the specification of the 
competence to render validity claims in moral discourse. Nevertheless, before I move into 
that discussion, a preparatory section is needed to illuminate the place that Discourse 
Ethics has in Habermas‘s broader project of critical theory. Otherwise, the decision of 
developing Habermas‘s moral theory would have been a merely contingent choice to 
discuss his Kantianism. Rather, my claim is that Discourse Ethics is central in Habermas‘s 
oeuvre because there he develops the basic components that furnish the normative element 
of his critical theory. If it is true that Discourse Ethics is central to Habermas‘s ouvre, and it 
is presupposed for example by his political theory, then arguments that apply to Discourse 
Ethics will also apply to BFN and to his debate with Rawls. In the next section, I develop 
the place that Discourse Ethics has in the broader project of social criticism of Habermas 
and I examine in further detail arguments that show the underlying Kantianism in his moral 
theory.   
 
2. The place of Discourse Ethics in Habermas’s critical theory   
 
The Kantian component in Habermas‘s theory is a modified version of Kant‘s notion of 
pure practical reason which becomes visible in Habermas‘s moral theory. In this respect, 
Habermas asserts:  
 
In recent years Karl-Otto Apel and I have begun to reformulate Kant‘s ethic by 
grounding moral norms in communication, a venture to which I refer as ―discourse 
ethics‖. (MCCA, 195. See also MCCA, 67 & 68) 
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The relationship between Kant‘s moral philosophy and Discourse Ethics can be examined 
bearing in mind the question for the normative grounds of Habermas‘s critical theory. As I 
will show, this issue shows the place of Discourse Ethics in Habermas‘s broader project of 
social criticism.   
 
The problem concerning its own normative foundations is one of the central tasks of the 
theory of communicative action. (TCA 1, xli) In this respect, Habermas‘s relationship with 
the tradition of critical theory is one of continuity through rupture. On the one hand, 
Adorno and Horkheimer – the first generation of critical theory – laboured over the issue 
concerning the justification of the foundations of their critical theory. (TCA 1, 374) On the 
other hand, in Habermas‘s view they did not succeed in doing this.  He explains this failure 
because Adorno and Horkheimer were caught in a model of rationality based on the 
philosophy of the subject. The first generation of critical theory was trapped in a paradox, 
namely, their concept of rationality could not explain the point of view from which their 
theory was able to elaborate the social criticisms of modern societies. In other words, they 
could not reconstruct the concept of reason from which their critical theory was grounded. 
Rather, it was not rationality but its radical ‗other‘ – i.e., the body or aesthetics – the source 
of resistance and critique. (PDM, 285, 291) 
 
According to Honneth and Benhabib, Discourse Ethics is the answer to the problem of the 
normative foundations of Habermas‘s critical theory. (Honneth, 1991; 282; Benhabib, 
1986: 224-335; Rehg, 1994: 21; Finlayson, 2013: 519-520)12 Therefore, if the moral theory is 
essentially framed in Kantian terms, then the normative standards of Habermas‘s broader 
project of critical theory belong to this family. As I am going to show, the normative kernel 
of Habermas‘s philosophy embodies Kantian ideals like autonomy, equality and 
universalizability.13  
 
                                                          
12 In the opening Chapter of Truth and Justification Habermas asserts that ‗the pragmatic approach to language 
[Sprachpragmatik] helped me to develop a theory of communicative action and of rationality. It was the 
foundation for a critical theory of society and paved the way for a discourse-theoretic conception of morality, 
law, and democracy‘. (T&J, 1) The reading of this passage seems to cast some doubts over Benhabib‘s and 
Honneth‘s thesis because here Habermas claims that his theory of language is the ground of the critical 
theory and of everything else he has written. Although, I think that this way of putting things does not 
necessarily overshadow Benhabib‘s and Honneth‘s claim because Habermas‘s moral theory has been framed 
considering the essentials of his pragmatic approach to language.  
13 See this and the following sections. There are other Kantian ideals that are incorporated in Habermas‘s 
theory. For example, the concept of Human dignity. (2010) In this thesis, I focus mainly on the concepts of 
practical reason and autonomy.  
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Habermas‘s moral theory is part of the Kantian tradition. (MCCA, 195-197; Rehg, 1994: 2; 
Forst, 2011: 154; Baynes, 2016: 102) Among other Kantian features, Discourse Ethics is 
formalistic, cognitivist and deontological. (MCCA, 196-197) It is formalistic, in the sense 
that it does not produce or defend any substantive content, but only reconstructs a 
procedure through which norms of action can be morally justified. It is cognitivist in 
various senses. It shows morality to be a kind of knowledge.  According to Habermas the 
justification of moral norms has an analogous structure to the validation of scientific 
statements: there is a thoroughgoing analogy between truth and rightness. (MCCA, 196). 
That said, it is not cognitivist in the strict sense that moral statements can be literally true 
or false. (See on this Finlayson, 2005) In both types of discourses it is possible to speak of 
progress in learning. Finally, it is deontological because it assumes the priority of the right 
over the good. And the procedure of moral justification does not presuppose a specific 
conception of the good life.  Rather, moral theories  within the Kantian tradition – i.e., 
Scanlon, Rawls and Habermas – assume the fact of the plurality of worldviews and the 
impossibility of grounding a universalistic morality in particular conceptions of the good 
life.14  
 
These features of Habermas‘s moral theory of discourse are exhibited by the principle of 
universalization (U) which is formalist, cognitivist and deontological. In further sections, I 
examine in more detail this principle. Now, what interest me is to show that the 
reconstruction of the moral point of view in Habermas presupposes the post-conventional 
level of normative justification which is a re-working of Kohlberg‘s theory of moral 
development. (1981, 1984) 
 
According to Habermas, Kohlberg explicitly endorses Rawls‘s Theory of Justice, Kant‘s moral 
theory and the modern tradition of natural law. (MCCA, 119) However, these relationships 
need more careful treatment because Kohlberg used to think that Kant‘s categorical 
imperative was the best model of the post-conventional level 6, given the formal criteria 
that defined it – universalizability, reversibility and formalism. Afterwards he switches to 
Rawls‘s model of the choice of principles in the original position. (Kohlberg, 1981: 197)15 
Certainly, this shift is not too problematic because Rawls himself understands his own 
                                                          
14 According to Finlayson, Habermas only begins to address the question of pluralism and different 
conceptions of the good in the late 80s and the early 90s. (Finlayson, 2016b: 11)  
15 Nevertheless, Kohlberg Mistakenly reads Rawls‘s theory of justice as a moral theory, namely, as a general 
theory of right conduct. According to Finlayson, Theory should be read as a political theory. (Finlayson, 2010: 
6) 
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theory as Kantian. (TJ, xviii, 11 &221) Particularly, in Kohlberg‘s theory the Kantian moral 
point of view becomes the highest stage of moral development that the agents can reach 
and refers to the post-conventional level. Kohlberg argues that truly moral reasoning 
involves Kantian features – which are present in Rawls‘s theory too – equality, autonomy, 
universalizability, reversibility and prescriptivity. (1981; 1984) At this point, when 
Habermas was working on Discourse Ethics in the 80s he gets embroiled in a debate with 
Kohlberg over the structure of Stage 6 of moral consciousness. Habermas proposes a 
modification of Kohlberg‘s model through the filter of the theory of communicative 
action. For Habermas, this reworking is necessary because he thinks it is not clear whether 
‗Kohlberg‘s social perspectives can be linked with stages of interaction in such a way as to 
permit a plausible grounding of moral stages in a logic of development‘. (MCCA; 156) It 
seems that the reformulation was necessary because Habermas persuaded Kohlberg to 
change his view and built into the theory the standpoint of practical discourse as the post-
conventional level of justification. (See Kohlberg, 1986) For that reason, I examine the 
post-conventional level as Habermas understands it, and its relationship with Kant‘s notion 
of pure practical reason.    
 
Habermas has built into his moral theory the essential features of Kohlberg‘s model of 
moral development. Thus, the moral point of view proposed by Discourse Ethics: 
 
Reflects the very operations Kohlberg postulates for moral judgement at the 
postconventional level: complete reversibility of the perspectives from which 
participants produce their arguments; universality, understood as the inclusion of all 
concerned; and the reciprocity of equal recognition of the claims of each participant 
by all others. (MCCA, 122) 
 
Henceforth, the post-conventional level of justification, both in Kohlberg‘s and in 
Habermas‘s version, endorses Mead‘s pragmatism and Kantian concepts. In this respect, it 
is important to notice that Kohlberg was always influenced by Mead, but Habermas claims 
that his shift to the Rawlsian model of the moral point of view loses sight of the social 
dimension of Mead‘s conception of the self that is socialized into individuality. (MCCA, 
119) Concerning the post-conventional level of normative justification, the idea of 
reversibility refers to Mead‘s ‗ideal role taking‘– which is going to be discussed in detail in the 
following section –; the notion of universality – which is going to be discussed in detail in 
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the following section as well – relates to the notion that moral norms should be valid for all 
affected by it; and finally, reciprocity means equal treatment.  
 
The notion of agency that Habermas advances concerning the post-conventional level 
assumes that agents adopt a hypothetical and reflexive attitude towards norms of action. 
Additionally, the norms that can be justified at the post-conventional level are shaped in 
the actual practice of discourse. In other words, they are not pre-given moral norms. 
Despite Lafont‘s interpretation of Discourse Ethics (Lafont, 2004), Habermas is not a 
moral realist. (Finlayson, 2005: 342) Rather, the practical discourse shaped by the moral 
point of view offered by Discourse Ethics ‗are not just heuristic aids but, on the contrary, 
―constitute‖ or establish the status of a norm as a moral norm‘. (T&J, 258; Baynes, 2016: 
106) In this regard, Habermas asserts: 
 
Our moral convictions must ultimately rely on the critical potential of self-
transcendence and decentering that […] is built into the practice of argumentation 
and the self-understanding of its participants. (T&J, 109) 
 
At this post-conventional level of normative justification, which is Habermas‘s re-working 
of the Kantian moral point of view, the agents move towards a ‗progressively decentered 
understanding of the world‘. (MCCA, 168) And agents at Stage 6 (the post-conventional level) 
do not so much pursue their own interests and good, but rather understand their deepest 
interests as entwined with the interests of all others, and so they resolve conflicts on the 
basis principles that are in the equal interests of all. At this stage, the validity of moral 
norms is reconstructed in the light of procedures of justification. Discourses Ethics, 
proposes the principle of discourse and the principle of universalization to reconstruct or 
‗constitute‘ (Baynes, 2016: 107) the moral point of view that establishes procedures of 
justification. Having described some of the main Kantian features of Habermas‘s 
reconstruction of the moral point of view, in what follows I examine in detail one of the 
central components of its Kantianism, namely, its procedural character.  
 
3. The categorical imperative and the principle of universalization 
 
We have established that Discourse Ethics is a moral theory in the Kantian tradition. 
(MCCA, 195; JA, 1, Rehg, 1994, 2, 114, 123; Forst, 2011: 154; Baynes, 2016: 102) Among 
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other components, Habermas‘s Discourse Ethics and Kant‘s moral philosophy share a 
proceduralist or formalist character. This means that both propose principles to assess the 
moral validity of norms. Nevertheless, an important difference arises between the statuses 
of these principles. Kant‘s categorical imperative has the structure of a basic or 
fundamental norm, whereas (U) just spells out the conditions of validity of a moral norm. 
In other words, Habermas‘s principle of universalization is not a specific norm but a 
procedure by which norms are selected as valid. Indeed, both principles work as criterions 
to assess the moral worth of norms of action.  
 
To open this discussion, it is important to notice that the formal or proceduralist nature of 
these moral philosophies takes us into an historical argument. According to Habermas, the 
development of modern societies takes place in the course of an historical process in which 
at the post-conventional level the unity between morality [Moralität] and ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit] – that is immanent to the traditional order – crumbles. (TCA 2, BFN, 84) 
Thus, a critical attitude frames the practices of mutual understanding [Verständigung] and the 
social world and its norms are open to questions concerning their validity. More precisely, 
the social world is divided between norms in general and justified norms. By means of this 
historical argument, Habermas is not giving an account of morality per se, or a definition of 
it. Rather, he is offering a reconstruction of actually existing modern morality.  
 
In this historical setting, moral theories in the Kantian tradition, Habermas maintains, aim 
to reconstruct moral objectivity in a posttraditional order in which is no longer tenable to 
defend an overarching moral authority agreeable to all. In a modern context, a proper 
moral theory has to come to terms with diverging views of the good life and the challenge 
of cultural pluralism. (Rehg, 1994: 33) Kantian moral theories in general and Habermas‘s 
Discourse Ethics in particular, acknowledge the fact of an increasingly pluralist and 
fragmented world. (Forst, 2007: 92) 
 
As it is well known, Kant elaborates the categorical imperative as a formula of 
universalization of norms because he observes as a fact the impossibility to ground 
morality in a particularistic view. Otherwise, norms would not be universally binding. It is a 
consequence of the enlightenment the recognition of different positions and doctrines 
regarding the status of the good and the reasonable pluralism of traditions and beliefs that 
seek to give answers to these questions. Practical philosophy has to pursue universality in 
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the grounding of norms, otherwise, persons that do not share the same particularistic 
positions might not have reasons to recognize these norms. The categorical imperative is a 
procedure that neither defines norms a priori nor grounds them from a particularistic 
position. Rather, it works as a way to assess the universalizability of norms.  
 
Kant‘s categorical imperative is stated in the following terms:  
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law without contradiction. (4: 34) 
Habermas claims that Kant‘s Categorical Imperative bases the authority of morality on 
pure reason, and assumes that rational subjects (who are also finite and sensible) can work 
out individually whether a maxim can be a universal law, be seeing whether it can be 
universally applied consistently. In the face of Kant‘s formulation of the moral point of 
view, Habermas develops the principle of universalization of Discourse Ethics. In Kant‘s 
theory, morality is based on the philosophy of the subject. In other words, Kant‘s 
categorical imperative is grounded on a monological notion of pure practical reason and 
Habermas‘s principle of universalization in a dialogical conception of communicative 
reason. (RPR, 32) In Kant normativity depends on the autonomy of the moral agent to give 
a law to herself. And individual subjects are autonomous if they, using their reason, 
rationally prescribe a law to themselves, and act on the law solely because it is rational. 
Although Kant‘s notion of autonomy involves consideration of the relations to others (i.e. 
assessing the universality of the maxim) it is a matter of the rational self relation of the 
individual subject. 
 
In contrast, in Habermas, normativity is embedded in social practices of mutual 
recognition, where agents ascribe the status of reason-giver to one another. (Baynes, 2004: 
197) This practice supposes a Hegelian and Meadian insight which has been incorporated 
in Habermas‘s moral philosophy: only in social space and historical time the agents accept 
and recognize a moral norm as valid. (T&J, 258) Despite this difference, in Kant and 
Habermas autonomy is at the centre. (Habermas, 2011: 284; Forst, 2011: 154; Baynes, 
2016: 108) In the former understood in a monological way, in the latter, as a competence 
of the agent that is performed in intersubjective practices of mutual understanding and in 
which participants in discourse as moral subjects are also authors of their moral norms.   
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The principle of universalization in Habermas is not exhausted by the requirement that 
moral norms must take the form of unconditionally universal statements. In Discourse 
Ethics, the idea of generalization of maxims intends that valid norms must deserve 
recognition by all those that are concerned. And Discourse Ethics appeals to the 
impartiality that takes place only in a standpoint where ‗one can generalize precisely those 
norms that can count on universal assent because they perceptibly embody an interest 
common to all affected. It is these norms that deserve intersubjective recognition‘. (MCCA, 
65) In this regard, Habermas‘s theory supposes a modified version of Kant‘s notion of pure 
practical reason because the former grounds morality in a dialogical account of reason and 
the latter in a monological one. Here Habermas agrees with Apel, for whom argumentation 
is the reference point of unavoidable rules of the communicative practice. These rules of 
communication frame the moral point of view in Discourse Ethics.16    
 
The intuition behind Discourse Ethics is that a monological application of the categorical 
imperative does not guarantee the intersubjective validity of moral judgements.  Hence, in 
Habermas ‗it does indeed seem an obvious step to formulate Kant‘s assumption in the form 
of a postulation of the sort, ‗Act in such a way that your way of acting could be willed by all 
as a universal one‘‘. (Wellmer, 1991: 154) To a certain extent, this understanding of the 
principle of universalization of Discourse Ethics shows that it has built an 
intersubjectivistic notion of practical reason. In Habermas, moral validity points to an 
intersubjective structure linguistically mediated which frames the unconditional character of 
the moral ‗ought‘ and even shapes our identity as human beings. (Wellmer, 1991: 152) 
 
 This recognition of the fundamental place that intersubjectivity has in morality leads to a 
version of the universalizability of norms in which impartiality is expressed in a principle 
that constraints ‗all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of 
interest‘. (MCCA, 65) This is G. H. Mead‘s concept of ‗ideal role taking‘ which expresses a 
situation that ‗requires that any morally judging subject put itself in the position of all who 
would be affected if a problematic plan of action were carried out or if a controversial 
norm were to take effect‘. (MCCA, 198, See also T&J, 105) 
 
                                                          
16 This needs more careful treatment because in Habermas‘s theory the rules of discourse have to be 
combined with the principle of discourse (D) to reconstruct the moral point of view (U). This discussion is 
developed in detail in the two next sections.  
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According to Rehg, without the introduction of this notion of moral perspective-taking it 
would be difficult to distinguish this principle of universalization from the strategic 
considerations underlying marriages of convenience, ‗hardly a palatable result in any moral 
theory, least of all in a neo-Kantian one‘. (Rehg, 1994: 40) However, according to 
Habermas Mead‘s ideal is still monological because it can be practiced by the agent 
privately. (MCCA, 198) Discourse Ethics transforms the notion of ‗ideal role taking‘ into a 
principle that is performed communicatively by all those involved. Thus, the principle of 
universalization shifts Kant‘s emphasis from the individual what I ought to will to become 
a universal law to the collective what we ought to will.17  
 
Another important feature of (U) is that it is not a first order moral norm resulting from an 
actual instance of successful moral discourse ‗but a second order principle that captures the 
practice by which actual moral norms are selected‘. (Finlayson, 2013: 524)18 This is the chief 
respect in which Discourse Ethics is procedural and not substantive.  
 
Moreover, this version of the principle of universalization explains an important difference 
between Habermas and Rawls. It also may help to understand what Habermas is expressing 
with the term ‗dialogical‘. He argues that Rawls‘s theory of justice is monological because it 
allows that a single individual, reasoning carefully, could arrive at a proper understanding of 
the requirements of morality. (MCCA, 66) In contrast, Habermas‘s moral theory claims 
that the identification of correct moral norms is a result of practical discourses actually 
carried out by the participants.  
 
However, it has been argued that dialogicality admits of a weak and a strong interpretation 
and in that respect Habermas‘s notion of dialog opens an ambiguity. (McMahon, 2000) The 
first interpretation which McMahon calls ‗weak dialogicality‘  
 
Involves a simple requirement to consult everyone who might have evidence 
germane to the identification of the correct principles of morality. Strong 
dialogicality provides in addition that judgements identifying the correct principles 
                                                          
17 This obligation to include all individuals as potential participants in discourse – as long as they are involved 
– ‗presupposes a universalistic commitment to the equality, autonomy, and rationality of individuals‘. 
(Benhabib, 1986: 319) Thus, Habermas‘s moral theory demands that the participants have to regard ‗every 
being as equal‘. (Benhabib, 1986: 320) 
18 As I have shown, this is clear with U but it is not clear with Kant‘s categorical imperative which is 
formulated as a command. Therefore, it looks like the categorical imperative is a basic norm or fundamental 
norm whereas U just expounds the conditions of moral validity of norms.  
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of morality must be made collectively by all those potentially affected. (McMahon, 
2000: 514) 
 
In the weak interpretation of Discourse Ethics according to McMahon, which is the only 
defensible one, there is no difference in principle between dialogical and monological 
approaches, and if he is right in this, Discourse Ethics is no different from other moral 
philosophies in the Kantian tradition – i.e., Rawls. The weak interpretation implies that 
every subject on its own decides what is morally justified and the communicative process is 
a mean to gather all the relevant information to reach an agreement.  
 
On the contrary, in the strong interpretation, autonomy is now practiced collectively by all 
those possible affected by a norm and it implies a strong assumption about the capacity of 
persons for moral dialogue. According to McMahon (2000: 526) strong dialogicality is 
incoherent, because no individual has any basis for judging which norms are valid until the 
moment when everyone as it were casts their vote and agreement is unanimous. But that 
robs participants of all basis of judgement about whether a norm is valid nor not, which 
makes it impossible to see why discourse would arise in the first place.  
 
Nevertheless, Habermas – and also Rehg – continues to endorse and defend the strong 
interpretation. (JA, 47-50; Rehg, 1994: 39-40, See also Baynes, 2016: 122-123) On his view, 
justified norms are shaped in a collective process of mutual understanding and here 
Habermas departs from Kant and Rawls concerning the distinction between monological 
and dialogical. In this way, Habermas‘s version of the moral point of view represents a 
modified and intersubjective version of Kant‘s concept of pure practical reason.  
 
Henceforth, Habermas‘s moral theory belongs to the Kantian family because puts at the 
centre a Kantian notion of autonomy. And regardless of which reading is right the strong 
or the weak version of dialogicality, Habermas still defends a basically Kantian idea of 
autonomy. This is obvious in the first case since there is no difference in principle between 
Kant‘s categorical imperative and Habermas‘s principle (U). That said, if the strong 
interpretation is the correct one, then a Kantian version of autonomy is in play because in 
discourse each participant, as a decentred self, has made norms that are in the equal interest 
of all affected their own.  
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4. The derivation of the principle of universalization 
 
In the previous sections – mainly in sections two and three –, I examined the essential 
components of Habermas‘s moral theory and its relationship with Kant. So far, I have 
discussed the intersubjective character of the principle of universalization of Discourse 
Ethics. This principle belongs to the Kantian family but certainly should be distinguished 
from Kant‘s categorical imperative. This is because the latter is based on an understanding 
of practical reason grounded on the philosophy of the subject and the principle of 
universalization depends on Habermas‘s notion of communicative reason which is based 
on the philosophy of language. In despite of this substantial difference, Habermas is still an 
heir of Kant because Discourse Ethics incorporates several Kantian features.  
 
Nonetheless, the description of this relationship does not explain yet how Habermas 
grounds or derives his version of the moral point of view in the principle of 
universalization. The derivation had its first formulation in ‗Discourse Ethics: Notes on a 
Program of Philosophical Justification‘ and elsewhere (MCCA, 43-109; IO, 43-45) and it 
has been commented and examined by more or less sympathetic critics of Habermas. 
(Rehg, 1994: 56-69; Benhabib, 1986: 306-309; Baynes, 2016: 114-120; Finlayson, 2013: 523-
525) Habermas‘s early formulation suggested that one could ‗derive‘ (U) by material 
implication from two not uncomplicated premises. The first refers to ‗what it means to 
discuss hypothetically whether norms of action ought to be adopted. The second 
summarized the pragmatically unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation, as Alexy had 
spelled these out‘. (Rehg, 1994: 40) Thus, the two premises from which (U) is derived are:  
 
(1) the normative, (but non-moral) preconditions of argumentation in general. 
(MCCA, 89)  
 
(2) a ‗weak idea of normative justification‘ or ‗the conception of normative 
justification in general as expressed in (D)‘. (MCCA, 66, 93) 
 
The first premise, the principle of discourse (D), guarantees normative validity in general. 
Albeit, (D) originally was introduced as the leading principle of Discourse Ethics, 
Habermas soon given it a broader (pre-moral) interpretation because ‗it demands a post-
conventional justiﬁcation of norms of action in general, but without specifying a particular 
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respect in which the consensus-generating force of reasons is supposed to be mobilized‘. 
(BNR, 109; Rehg, 1994: 30) In the more recent formulation, the principle of discourse can 
be described as ‗what it means to discuss hypothetically whether norms of action ought to 
be adopted‘. (BNR, 89; Rehg, 1994: 58) In other words, it pertains to the justification of a 
‗norm of action‘ in general. (MCCA, 198)  
 
It is important to notice that in both the early and the more recent formulation of the 
nature and the scope of the principle of discourse, (D) belongs to the Kantian family. In 
this respect, in his very influential book Insight and Solidarity19 Rehg points out that (D) is 
deontological, formal, cognitivist and universalistic. (Rehg, 1994: 31) Henceforth, it shares these 
features with Kant‘s reconstruction of the point of view of morality.20 Nevertheless, this 
might raise the question whether Rehg is referring here only to the early account of (D) – 
which sets it as the leading principle of Discourse Ethics – or to both the early and the 
more recent formulation – the latter position gives a wider scope to (D) than the early one. 
If Rehg is bearing in mind only the early account it is possible to conclude that these 
Kantian features only frame the principle of discourse when it is specified in the moral 
domain of Discourse Ethics – when it becomes U –. This argument can be rejected 
because Rehg explicitly acknowledges that the principle of discourse has a broader scope in 
writings after MCCA and it goes beyond morality. (Rehg, 1994: 30)21 Therefore, the 
principle of discourse both in the early and in the more recent formulation is deontological, 
formal, cognitivist and universalistic. Moreover, in BNR Habermas explicitly connects (D) with 
‗the postconventional level of justification of norms of action in general‘. (BNR, 89) This 
level of normative justification systematically has been connected to a re-working of Kant‘s 
concept of autonomy and of practical reason. In this regard, Habermas claims that:  
 
I follow Kant in assuming that, with the concept of autonomy, the practical reason 
shared by all persons offers a reliable guide both for morally justifying individual 
actions and for the rational construction of a legitimate political constitution for 
society. (2011: 284) 
                                                          
19 I say very influential because this book even helped Habermas to clarify his own theory concerning the 
status of his notion of dialogicality (See section 3 of this Chapter). Moreover, this contribution has been 
widely referred to explain some of the most difficult components of Habermas‘s theory, for example, the 
derivation of the principle of universalization. (See for example Baynes, 2016: 115) 
20 See section of this Chapter.  
21 Nevertheless, this is a matter of controversy because it has claimed that in Habermas‘s moral theory, the 
principle of discourse is a substantial principle (Benhabib, 1990: 345) based on an essential postulate of the 
respect for persons. (Larmore, 1995: 66-67) 
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This statement clearly shows that the justification of moral norms and of legitimate laws 
concerns the Habermasian Kantian notion of practical reason. Insofar as the principle of 
discourse is the normative kernel of both spheres of validity – and bearing in mind 
Habermas‘s passage referred above – this shows that (D) fundamentally belongs to the 
Kantian family and presupposes the Kantian idea of autonomy. Henceforth, here 
Habermas implies that the Kantian idea of autonomy is contained already in (D) and thus 
also in (U) and in the principle of democracy.22   
 
Notwithstanding, the previous argument needs further clarification. In Kant, both moral 
validity and legal legitimacy stem from the moral principle.23 In Habermas the argument is 
more complex because the principle of discourse has a broader scope than the moral 
principle or the principle of legal and political legitimacy. In this regard, Habermas has 
firmly rejected Karl Otto Apel‘s argument, which claims that the principle of discourse is 
already a moral principle and Benhabib and Larmore agree. (BNR, 77-97, Apel, 1998: 689-
838; Benhabib 1990: 345; Larmore 1995: 66-67)24  
 
He rejects it, as already mentioned, on the grounds that ‗despite its normative content, it 
lies at a level of abstraction that is still neutral with respect to morality and law, for it refers 
to action norms in general‘. (BFN, 107; See also BNR, 84, 89) The idea behind this claim is 
that not all forms of normative behaviour can be examined in moral terms – i.e. legal 
norms and political norms.  Norms in general regulate the actions of the subjects that share 
a common life-world. Thus, Habermas‘s view is that (D) is more and less than a moral 
principle. According to Rehg, ‗It is more in that it covers more areas of social action, less in 
that it does not tell us what distinguishes the validity of moral norms from that of other 
kinds of action norms‘. (Rehg, 1994: 31) Then, the principle of discourse is more general 
than the principle of universalization. The latter results from (D) and the preconditions of 
argumentation in general and it is a specification of normative validity concerning questions 
of morality.  
 
                                                          
22 The principle of democracy states that ‗Only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the 
assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted‘. (BFN, 110) 
For a detailed discussion on this principle see Chapter Three, Part I, section 3.  
23 This discussion is going to be broached in detail in the second part of this thesis.  
24 In the face of this issue, up to this point I am going to assume only that the principle of discourse derives 
from a Kantian notion of practical reason. Nevertheless, in following chapters I will draw the conclusion that 
it is not really clear whether (D) is or is not a moral principle. Henceforth, it seems that some concessions 
need to be made to Apel‘s claim.  
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After this description of the principle of discourse (D) and its scope, it is necessary to 
examine the second set of norms that explain the derivation of the principle of 
universalization: the normative, (but non-moral) preconditions of argumentation in general. 
These conditions refer to the commitments that involve to a person to engage in an 
argumentative discourse. Among these commitments Robert Alexy claims that whoever 
gets involved in a discourse of justification accept others as speaking partners with equal 
rights, at least to what concerns the justificatory practice. Moreover, he adds that in 
discourses coercion is ruled out. (Alexy, 1990) 
 
According to Habermas, these commitments or norms of discourse can be outlined in 
three pragmatic presuppositions which he regards as one of the components of the 
derivation of the principle of universalization (U): 
 
 Anyone who enters argumentation must take the following presuppositions: 
(a) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse.  
(b) i. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
ii. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.  
iii. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.  
(c) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his 
rights as laid down in (a) and (b) above. (MCCA, 89)  
  
Up to this point, I have described the elements that take place in the derivation of (U) but I 
have not explained the derivation as such. Whether the logical derivation of (U) was even 
possible was indeed a matter of controversy. In this regard, Benhabib broached the 
dilemma in which Discourse Ethics is trapped. Either the moral principle is redundant or 
inconsistent. (Benhabib, 1986, 307; Benhabib, 1990; Finlayson, 2000, 2013)  
 
The first part of the criticism means that the principle of universalization does not go 
beyond the principle of discourse. In other words, (U) is redundant because it does not add 
anything relevant to what is already contained in (D). The second part of the criticism – 
and the one from which Benhabib develops his program of justification of Discourse 
Ethics – is that ‗a derivation can be had, but it would require supplementary, normatively 
more robust premises‘. (Finlayson, 2013: 524, See Benhabib, 1986: 298-309) In response to 
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this potentially devastating criticism, in a later formulation Habermas ‗now claims that the 
argument for Principle U is best construed as an ‗―abduction‖ or ―argument from the best 
explanation‖ rather than a strict logical derivation‘. (Baynes, 2016: 114. See also Finlayson, 
2000: 331) 
 
In Habermas‘s revised formulation – which Rehg offers in a parallel account (Baynes, 2016: 
115) – ‗it is precisely the combination of the two premises, in a modern context of 
commitment to argument, that leads to a notion of universality exceeding the content of 
either premise by itself‘. (Rehg, 1994: 66, See IO, 45) According to Rehg, Habermas 
successfully derives the principle of universalization of Discourse Ethics. And the principle 
is more than the sum of the two premises, it goes beyond them. As I have shown, on the 
background of this interpretation lies the early criticism made by Benhabib. (1986: 308) In 
the final section of this Chapter I discuss in detail this criticism. The issue that I want to 
examine in more detail in the rest of this section is Habermas‘s and Rehg‘s argument for 
the reconstruction of the principle of universalization.  
 
According to Rehg, what makes the difference and allows Habermas to successfully build 
the moral point of view is ‗the semantics of the moral ‗ought‘‘. (Rehg, 1994: 68) Then he 
continues:  
 
Following the results of our earlier analysis of norms, normative expectations must 
be seen as extending to anyone who could possibly come under the roles defined in 
the norm. If the suggestions regarding broader consequences and side effects are 
not mistaken, we can further extend this to include ‗all those affected by its general 
observance. (Rehg, 1994: 68) 
 
Hence, in Rehg‘s interpretation, (U) can be regarded as a principle of universalization and it 
is properly derived from the two premises. That said, it is also necessary to assume the 
existence of a pluralistic group that decides to resolve its conflicts of interests cooperatively 
by reaching argued agreement on a norm. Rehg recognizes that this argument is similar to 
Benhabib‘s program of justification of the moral point of view which is based on more 
robust premises based on social and historical arguments. (Rehg, 1994, Benhabib, 1986, 
Finlayson, 2013) In this respect, Benhabib develops a Hegelian justification to underpin the 
procedures of Discourse Ethics:  
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The interest in rational discourse is itself one which precedes rational discourse, and it 
is embedded in the contingency of individual life histories and in collective patterns of 
memory, learning, and experience. (Benhabib, 1986: 319) 
  
If this commitment – which is embedded in historical time and social space –  is combined 
with the two premises – (D) and the preconditions of argumentation in general – then, 
every moral norm ‗must rest on reasons all those subject to (and affected by) the 
expectation can accept in open debate, for otherwise the norm is not justified for those 
subject to it, and thus its observance may not be expected of them (nor may the non-
interference of other affected parties be expected)‘. (Rehg, 1994: 66-67) 
 
After this exposition of the reconstruction of the moral point of view, in the next section I 
develop in more detail Benhabib‘s criticism of the derivation of (U). Up to this point and 
for the sake of my argument I have examined briefly Benhabib‘s criticism. In what follows, 
I argue that even though Discourse Ethics incorporates a Hegelian insight, namely, the 
social and historical commitment of a group to participate in discourse, I will show that 
Habermas‘s strategy of ‗abduction‘ or ‗argument for the best explanation‘ (IO, 43) of the 
moral point of view resembles Kant‘s deduction of the categorical imperative as a ‗fact of 
reason‘. (Baynes, 2016: 85, 91)    
 
5. The Kantian strategies of justification of (U)  
 
In this last section, I examine in more detail the derivation of the principle of 
universalization of Habermas‘s moral theory, which refers to the specification of the 
principle of discourse in the domain of morality. (BNR, 80-81, BFN, 109) To discuss this, I 
keep examining Benhabib‘s criticism of Habermas, which asserts that the moral point of 
view of Discourse Ethics is either redundant or inconsistent. I understand the first part of 
this claim in the sense that (U) does not add anything relevant to the principle of discourse 
(D). (Benhabib, 1986: 308) And the second, to mean that (U) is not redundant but it is 
inconsistent with the premises. In other words, it cannot be derived from them. Thus, in 
order to give a justification of the moral point of view, Habermas needs the support of 
other components.  
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According to the first part of Benhabib‘s criticism, insofar as the principle of 
universalization (U) is redundant (1986: 308), then is not necessary for discursive ethics. 
(Benhabib and Dallmayr, 1990; Wellmer, 1991) Thus, for Benhabib ‗discourse ethics is 
sufficiently equipped with its basic principle (D) and the pragmatic rules of argument‘. 
(Rehg, 1994: 65) 
 
In a first reply to this charge someone might say that (U) adds to (D) the condition that 
‗the common interest of all concerned means taking into account the satisfaction of the 
interests of each single individual, such that a naïve collectivist interpretation of the common 
interest which would violate minority interests is precluded‘. (Benhabib, 1986: 307) 
However, from the general premise which takes the form of the principle of discourse (D), 
that states, ‗what it means to discuss hypothetically whether norms of action ought to be 
adopted‘, it is possible to deduce that the interest of each individual cannot be ruled out if a 
norm can claim validity. Then, the principle of universalization seems to be redundant 
because it is not adding anything that it was not already present in the principle of 
discourse.  
 
This is important because if (U) is redundant, if (D) is already given, then it is not clear 
what the differences between diverse domains of validity are. Habermas argues in BFN that 
legitimacy derives from the interpenetration of the principle of discourse and the 
institutional features of modern law. So, if (U) is redundant, then the difference between 
legitimacy and morality in Habermas seems to be only a matter of institutional application 
of (D). In other words, if this part of Benhabib‘s criticism hits the mark, it is possible to 
draw the conclusion that legitimacy is equivalent to morality adding the functional features 
of modern law. From the reading of BFN and BNR, this is at odds with Habermas‘s 
understanding of moral validity and legal and political legitimacy. As a matter of fact 
Habermas has been criticized for giving an intra-legal notion of legitimacy, ‗overly 
immanent to law‘ and for not taking into account the moral support that the ‗system of 
rights‘ requires. (Forst, 2011, 173, See also Flynn, 2003, 2011) In this respect, Habermas 
asserts that 
 
Although legal norms may also be selected under the aspect of justice and must not 
contradict morality, the principle of democracy that empowers the citizens to create 
legitimate law is not subordinate to the moral principle. (BNR, 90) 
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For Habermas both levels of justification are different – moral validity and legal and 
political legitimacy. That said, bearing in mind Benhabib‘s criticism it is still not clear 
whether (D) is or is not a moral principle. Either way, in this thesis I show that both (D) 
and (U) share an essential structure which pertains to a modified Kantian notion of 
practical reason.   
 
From a different angle, it is possible to argue that the moral point of view contained in the 
principle of universalization connect norms to consequences and interests. This is 
something that does not seem to be included in the principle of discourse (D). Thus, ‗The 
moral principle first results when one specifies the general discourse principle for those 
norms that can be justified if and only if equal consideration is given to the interests of all 
those who are possibly involved‘. (BFN, 108) However, the standpoint from which 
Habermas defines norms (in general) is that of social coordination. And according to Rehg:  
 
This point of departure already contains a certain semantics linking norms to 
consequences and interests, though not in an unduly consequentialist or utilitarian 
fashion. (Rehg, 1994: 45)  
 
Thus, as the task of the principle of discourse (D) is to define the validity of norms of 
action in general, then when Habermas adds to the principle (U) the consideration of 
consequences, side effects and interests, he is adding something that was already implicit in 
(D).  
 
The second part of Benhabib‘s criticism of the derivation of the Habermasian moral point 
of view makes a twist and consequently has different consequences. In this position, (U) is 
different from (D) and it goes beyond. However, the principle of universalization is 
inconsistent with the premises. In the same vain, Finlayson argues that neither Habermas 
nor any of his followers have ever managed to derive (U) formally or as he says 
‗immanently‘ from the premises. (Finlayson, 2013: 518; See also Rehg, 1994: 40) Although, 
Habermas continues to maintain that such derivation is possible. (Finlayson, 2013: 523) 
Therefore, (U) is different from (D) and it adds something relevant, but it does not follow 
from the premises. Instead, it depends on other components which require further 
justification.  
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One difference between (D) and (U), according to Finlayson, is that the principle of 
discourse establishes that amenability to rational consensus is a necessary – but not 
sufficient condition – for a norm to be valid. Then, bearing in mind (D) it is not the case 
that every norm on which participants in discourse can agree, is therefore valid. Hence, 
with (D) the question concerning the actual validity of a norm remains open. On the other 
hand, (U) defines a procedure that refers to a necessary condition for the validity of a norm 
but also a sufficient one. (Finlayson 2000: 329; Ingram 2010: 133) If a norm is accepted by 
all participants in discourse then is valid. Consequently, (U) goes beyond (D). But nothing 
in either of the premises shows why this is so.25 As I have shown, neither Habermas nor 
any of his followers have not managed to derive (U) from the premises.26  
 
Habermas has been aware of this problem and he has proposed a weaker justification of 
the principle of universalization that rests much more firmly on an historical argument 
based on considerations of the modernization theory. This specific component refers to 
the commitment of a group to rational argument. Rehg recognizes that this justification of 
the derivation shares much in common with Benhabib‘s Hegelian ‗weak justification 
program‘. (Rehg, 1994: 68) In this respect, morality is anchored on the development of an 
enlightened consciousness. And the grounding of morality, of discursive ethics and even of 
critical theory depends on a theory of modernity and not in the rules of discourse. 
Consequently, there is not a logical or transcendental-pragmatic justification of the 
principle of universalization because (D) as a premise in the argument for (U) presupposes 
modernization theory. Hence, the derivation is not itself a transcendental-pragmatic 
argument. Rather, what is taking place is the modern self-understanding of what it means 
to be rational and autonomous subjects in a posttraditional order of justification.  
                                                          
25 However, William Rehg seems to claim that (D) is biconditional and amenability to consensus in discourse 
is necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of a norm. As I have shown above, U is a biconditional 
principle as well. Therefore, if both principles share this feature then this seems to undermine Rehg‘s defense 
of Habermas‘s position in the sense that (D) is not a moral principle. In this way, if (D) is so close to (U) – 
because both principles are biconditional – then this may as well amount to the fact that (D) is the moral 
principle of Discourse Ethics. (See Rehg, 1991) 
26 As a matter of fact, Habermas‘s latest considered position seems to be that only one premise (the rules of 
argumentation) can strictly speaking be given a transcendental-pragmatic justification. Of course, this is a 
slightly different issue than the one we are discussing at this point. Nevertheless, if the justification of the 
premises does not fully proceed in transcendental-pragmatic terms, then the idea that the principle of 
discourse can have this sort of derivation gets blurred. The notion of a pragmatic-transcendental justification 
proceeds by way of demonstrating that the denial of any of the rules of argumentation involves a 
performative self-contradiction. This is the case of the sceptic because she implicitly, by virtue of the 
performative act of making a statement, invokes rules that she explicitly by the propositional content of his 
claim, denies. According to Habermas the transcendental-pragmatic justification is based on those rules that 
every participant in a process towards reach understanding has to follow. Even the sceptic that denies them is 
making use of them when she is incurring in a performative contradiction. However, ‗no one has actually 
succeeded in carrying out such a justification of the rules of discourse‘. (Finlayson, 2013: 523) 
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In this interpretation, the principle of universalization is not superfluous or redundant and 
the combination of the two premises – in a modern context of commitment to argument – 
leads to a notion of universality exceeding the content of either premise by itself. (Rehg, 
1994: 66) And the derivation succeeds only if it takes place in the background of a social 
space constituted by the commitment of a group towards the post-conventional level of 
normative justification embedded in the historical dimension of a posttraditional order.27  
 
In light of this discussion I would like to state few conclusions. First, the actual measure 
and substance of the difference between the principle of discourse (D) and the principle 
(U) is problematic and constitutes an important issue that must be addressed by Habermas 
and his followers. Second, at the end Habermas‘s (IO, 43), Rehg‘s (1994), Benhabib‘s 
(1987) and Finlayson‘s (2013) interpretation conclude that Discourse Ethics is not based on 
a transcendental-pragmatic justification, but it is based on a theory of modernity. Third, it is 
not clear whether (D) or the rules of discourse could be justified by a transcendental-
pragmatic argument. Habermas tried to give this justification in MCCA and he assumes 
that Alexy has done this concerning the rules of discourse. (MCCA, 88-89)  Nonetheless, 
following Finlayson, it must be that some hidden premises of the derivation of (U) also are 
supplied by modernization theory. Four, even in the case that (U) goes beyond (D), then 
this contribution establishes not just a necessary condition for the validity of a norm but 
also a sufficient condition. By (U) the validity of norms can be actually assessed, whereas 
(D) contributes to stating the condition the norms that can claim validity must meet.  
 
However, in either case, the question whether the principle of discourse is or is not a moral 
principle remains unanswered. In BFN and BNR Habermas strongly denies that (D) is a 
moral principle. I do not want to argue against Habermas in this respect, others have done 
so (too a certain extent Benhabib, 1986; and Larmore, 1995). Rather, for my purposes I 
claim that whether we look at (D) only, or also at (U), the Kantian component prevails in 
Habermas‘s concept of normative validity. Hence, Discourse Ethics is still basically 
Kantian, and wedded to a Kantian conception of autonomy and equality. As long as the 
principle of discourse is specified in the moral, the legal and the political domain, then, the 
                                                          
27 In despite of this defence, it is interesting to notice that this element is the contribution that (D) gives to 
the derivation. The universalization of a norm happens when we include ‗all those affected by its general 
observance‘. If one recall (D) a norm is valid when it can meet ‗with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse‘. Then (D) itself includes the component ‗all affected‘ and 
when in (U) is added the ‗general observance‘ of a norm, it does not seem to be adding something new that 
was not already present in (D). 
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Kantian notion of practical reason concerns both the moral theory and the theory of 
legitimacy.  
 
Once I have showed that Discourse Ethics endorses strong Kantian presuppositions, in 
Chapter Two I challenge this component from the point of view of Hegel‘s critique of 
Kant‘s moral philosophy. Concerning the political theory, in the second part of the thesis I 
examine the political Kantianism of Habermas – which he defines as Kantian 
republicanism (MW, 94) – in light of criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘s moral 
philosophy.  
 
It is important to remark that here I am not saying that morality and politics are the same, 
but just that they are grounded in the same Kantian components. The difference comes 
from the side of the structural features of modern law and of the democratic state that does 
not furnish morality. Up to this point, certainly this discussion is not conclusive and it aims 
to illuminate a difficult issue in Habermas‘s theory. Although, the claim is that at the end 
normativity, morality and legitimacy in Habermas all rest on a modified Kantian concept of 
practical reason, which has a weak-transcendental status. It is transcendental inasmuch as 
refers to the factual counterfactual presuppositions of justification, but it is weak because it 
needs the support of an historical argument provided by the theory of modernity. In other 
words, it depends of a Hegelian component, namely, a set of institutions and practices of 
modern Sittlichkeit.  
 
It has been pointed out that a similar argument takes a central place in Kant‘s practical 
philosophy in the doctrine of the fact of reason. (Baynes, 2016) Due to this stance, he 
abandons the attempt to provide a transcendental deduction of freedom:  
 
In the second Critique he instead treats it as a ―fact‖ to which appeal can be made to 
help make explicit what is already implicitly known in practice or, in Kant‘s words, 
already known by ―common human understanding‖. Thus, rather than a 
transcendental argument for freedom, the doctrine of the ―fact of reason‖ helps us 
to better understand (and to resist naturalist or sceptical objections) what, from a 
practical point of view, is already familiar to ordinary humans‘. (Baynes, 2016: 91)  
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I cannot analyse in detail if Kant was successful or not with this strategy. My focus is 
Habermas‘s Kantianism and the weaker alternative proposed by Discourse Ethics to give a 
justification to the moral point of view. As I have shown, Habermas appeals to a more 
modest or weaker type of argumentation to reconstruct the principle of universalization. 
He refers to ‗what is (nearly) unimaginable from a practical point of view‘, and this ‗is more 
clearly seen in his remark that we are all ―children of modernity‖, that is, products of 
historical and thus contingent traditions which are, nonetheless, practically inescapable for 
us‘. (Baynes, 2016: 91) Here, the contingent nature of these practices is remarked – their 
dependence on an historical context – but at the same time they become non-contingent 
because as we are within a life-world we cannot avoid these rules.  
 
These practices give a central place to a notion of autonomy and it is here where the 
Kantian heritage echoes in Habermas‘s Discourse Ethics. This Kantian concept occurs at 
every stage in this theory because normative validity claims only have a binding force 
among individuals who consider themselves accountable – and to that extent are 
autonomous – persons. Roughly speaking, this accountability involves the possibility of 
giving reasons. Also, as I stated in the first section, rational agents start from the 
presupposition of the accountability of the other subjects, and they demand each other this 
capability to give reasons.   
 
Consequently, if there is a commitment to argument, that implies treating all the competent 
speakers as equal dialogue partners. Henceforth, I read this commitment in terms of the 
Kantian notion of autonomy, which in both Kant and Habermas goes alongside the 
equality that the agents mutually grant to each other. Moreover, autonomy means that 
different members of a life-world may be expected to observe a norm precisely because its 
validity can be made evident to their reason. (Rehg, 1994: 35) This time a norm is evaluated 
and it obtains its validity in a concrete communicative practice of exchange of reasons. This 
actual carrying out of discourse is fleshed out through the validity claims raised by real 
participants in communication and it is not decided in a monological fashion as it is the 
case in Kant. This is how the Kantian concept of autonomy takes place in the discursive 
theory of morality. Moral agents must give reasons for their action and accept or reject 
justifications in a collaborative process of mutual understanding [Verständigung] and they 
can do this because they are autonomous. This intersubjective concept of autonomy 
grounds an orientation to resolve conflicts of interests by reaching argued agreement in 
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discourse. According to Discourse Ethics, autonomous subjects co-constitute the validity 
of the norms by which they act and they make these norms their own. This is because, they 
are decentred selves at the post-conventional level of normative justification which I have 
already discussed (stage 6).  
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2 
Hegelian criticisms of Discourse Ethics   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter One I have shown that Habermas‘s account of normativity and morality relies 
on a modified Kantian notion of pure practical reason and autonomy. As far as Habermas 
incorporates this component, it seems relevant to discuss whether and to what extent his 
moral theory can rebut Hegelian criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. Habermas 
addresses this issue in his article ‗Does Hegel‘s critique of Kant apply to discourse ethics?‘. 
(MCCA, 195-215) There, he elaborates several arguments to show that his Kantian moral 
theory can respond, if not to all, then to most of the objections that stem from Hegel‘s 
critique. Now, before I examine Habermas‘s stance on this debate, in this introduction I 
need to begin describing, at least in broader brushstrokes, Hegel‘s critique.  
 
In its early formulation, Hegel claims that the empty formalism of Kant‘s moral philosophy 
does not allow him to give a proper account of the phenomenology of the moral life. This 
objection was developed from his early essay on Natural Law (1802), his Phenomenology of 
Spirit from the middle period in Jena (1807) and in Elements of the Philosophy of Right in the 
late period (1820). In the latter book, Hegel not only criticizes the so-called empty formalism 
of Kant‘s moral philosophy, but also he develops an objection to the will as a tester of 
maxims. In this Chapter, I show that this charge does challenge Kant‘s moral theory and 
Habermas‘s Discourse Ethics as well. However, I maintain that with minor modifications, 
Habermas can successfully refute the criticism of his moral theory. In this Chapter I will 
spell out what these modifications of Habermas‘s theory are. Before I examine these 
problems, now I have to develop the criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. In a 
nutshell, Hegel‘s argument is that Kant cannot connect the universal will and the particular 
will because he rules out particular contents as susceptible of being universalized. Due to 
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this break Kant cannot explain one of the conditions that show how an empirical will can 
be motivated and have a reason to be moral. In this respect, in the Philosophy of Right (1820) 
Hegel asserts:  
 
If a duty is to be willed merely as a duty and not because of its content, it is a formal 
identity which necessarily excludes every content and determination. (§135) 
 
The main reason that explains this problem is that Kant was trapped in the doctrine of the 
two realms. It is important to notice that Hegel interpreted Kant‘s transcendental idealism 
as positing two metaphysically distinct worlds, rather than as describing one and the same 
world under two aspects.1 In this metaphysical view, the law giving self is fully noumenal 
(hence transcendentally free) while the law receiving and respecting self is also phenomenal. 
The issue is that this distinction might imply that the noumenal self lays down the law 
leaving unaffected the phenomenal self. Moreover, the distinction supposes that in Kant the 
contents that morality allows are strictly separated from the contents that the empirical 
agents can endorse (inclinations, interests). To my understanding, in light of this strict limit 
two questions arise that Kantians should address: on the hand, does Kant‘s view on 
morality includes any content and therefore can it tell us that we ought to do this or that, 
and not just tell us to respect the moral law? On the other hand, whether and to what 
extent in Kant‘s moral philosophy the empirical self can be motivated to act according to 
the demands of morality (in this Chapter I focus on giving an answer to the former 
question).2 These questions are different but they are related. This is because it is 
reasonable to expect that morality has to include contents such as particular inclinations 
and interests to motivate particular agents. Of course, it is possible to maintain that good 
moral reasons might be enough to motivate empirical agents to perform moral actions. In 
this respect, Christine Korsgaard claims that ‗the reasons why an action is right and why 
you do it are the same‘ (Korsgaard, 1986: 10; in Forst, 2007: 23) and in the same Kantian 
spirit Rainer Forst asserts that: 
 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion on this issue see Allison 2004.  
2 Let us say that the former concerns to a question of ‗moral phenomenology‘ or how morality can include 
proper content. And the latter refers to an issue of ‗moral motivation‘ or how morality can motivate real 
people. They are related questions but they are different. I assume that to answer the latter first we have to 
give a complete answer to the former. In this Chapter I aim to provide that response.  
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The reasons that normatively speak for the action also speak for it in a subjective 
motivational way, since within the given normative context no justifiable 
counterreasons have to be found. (2007: 23-24) 
 
Nevertheless, that position might still be not convincing and leave the door open for the 
objection that the strict distinction between moral contents and particular contents 
supposes that Kant (and also the Kantian tradition) cannot tell moral agents what they 
ought to do. In this regard, the issue is why should the empirical phenomenal self accept and 
obey laws imposed by the rational noumenal self? Let us remember that in the Kantian view 
of morality, the rational noumenal self discards particular contents.  
 
Habermas endorses a Kantian pragmatism (T&J, 83-130; Baynes, 2016: 82-97), which 
among other things discards the two realms distinction. In this way, in his theory the strict 
distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves is abandoned and what takes its place is 
an intersubjective procedure of moral discourse. Additionally, in Discourse Ethics 
Habermas as built the view that the development of post-conventional moralities depend 
on processes of socialization in which the moral agents have learnt to respect others and 
their capability to perform validity claims in discourse. Henceforth, not only the intrinsic 
power of moral reasons from above, but also both the rejection of the two realms doctrine 
and the consideration of the relevance of processes of socialization and dispositions to act 
on good reasons from below, ensure that the agents are going to act according to the rules 
of morality. At first appearance, if Habermas can make good on his claim that moral 
reasons and adequate socialization, suffices to show how agents can respect the contents of 
morality then Discourse Ethics can successfully rebut Hegel‘s critique of Kant. 
 
However, in Habermas‘s version of the universalizability of norms he claims that norms 
embody universalizable interests and that these are distinct from particular interests. He 
also claims that moral reasons are impartial, and hence that they are not agent-relative, and 
seems to imply that no agent-relative reasons whatsoever have any moral validity. (IO, 7, 
43) In Discourse Ethics, the principle of universalization (U) works as a criterion of moral 
validity by distinguishing between generalizable and particular interests, and filtering out 
the latter from the process of reaching agreement in moral discourse. (MCCA, 64-65) 
Therefore, the question still arises of whether, given his conception of the impartiality of 
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morality, he has convincingly answered Hegel‘s later criticism of Kant that targeted the will 
as a tester of maxims; this in light of what Habermas proposes.  
 
In this Chapter, I show how Habermas could respond to this objection by means of an 
analysis of Mead‘s concept of ideal role taking which has been incorporated in the 
reconstruction of the moral point of view offered by Discourse Ethics. That said, my 
reading supposes that Habermas needs to slacken his notion of impartiality, leaving room 
for generalizable interests (moral contents) that can be at the same time particular interests 
(particular contents), that is agent-relative interests. Yet to my mind, this is actually what 
takes place with his concept of ideal role taking.   
 
Now, there is an additional issue in Habermas‘s theory that has to be addressed. It is 
connected with Hegel‘s strategy of answering the problems he found in Kant: the 
dialectical relationship that Hegel proposed between Moralität and Sittlichkeit. According to 
this perspective, the break between universality and particularity could be solved by 
blurring the distinction between moral norms and ethical values. Then, the argument goes, 
moral norms (moral contents) can be at the same time ethical values (particular contents).3 
Henceforth, throughout Sittlichkeit the individual can be at home with himself and he can 
find his own particular way of being universal. (Pinkard, 1999: 227) In this regard, the point 
of contention is whether is it necessary or not for Habermas in Discourse Ethics to blur 
the distinction between moral norms and values. I argue that there is an additional point in 
Discourse Ethics to solve the problem, which is neater and does not involve blurring the 
distinction. It stands in an interpretation of Kant‘s formula of humanity of the categorical 
imperative to respect others as not only means but always also as ends in themselves. (4: 
429) In this formulation, one particular content, the interest of an agent to be respected as 
an end in herself, coincides with the universal content of everybody to be also respected as 
end in themselves.  
 
In order to develop these issues, I divide this Chapter into five parts. In the first, I examine 
Hegel‘s objections to Kant. It is true that Hegel praises Kant‘s concept of morality and 
autonomy. (see §135) However, according to Hegel, Kant‘s account of pure practical 
reason needs to be supplemented with a consideration of the dimension of ethical life 
                                                          
3 Habermas himself endorses the view that ethical values have a particularistic nature opposed to the 
universalistic scope of moral norms. (JA, 1-17) Ethical values pertain to a particular way of life of one 
individual and/or of her community and they cannot claim universal recognition. See section 5 of this 
Chapter. 
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[Sittlichkeit]. In Hegel‘s view this absence in Kant supposes an empty formalism and this 
resulted in a barrage of objections against Kant‘s reconstruction of the categorical 
imperative. I show that most of them can be successfully rebutted. Nonetheless, a later 
objection, which does not target the categorical imperative but the conception of the will as 
a tester of maxims, poses a real challenge to the Kantian position (1);  
 
In the second section, I examine Habermas‘s response regarding the question of whether 
and to what extent Hegel‘s critique applies to Kant and to Habermas‘s moral theory. On 
some points Habermas argues that Hegel‘s criticisms of Kant are mistaken. On others, he 
argues that Hegel has good arguments that challenge Kant‘s moral philosophy. That said, 
Habermas claims that Discourse Ethics incorporates elements that fortify its position 
against these Hegelian criticisms. In this section, I reconstruct these argument and I begin 
to delineate the contours of a Hegelian objection that can apply to Kant and to Habermas 
as well (2);   
 
In the third section, emerges in sharp relief the Hegelian criticism of the will as a tester of 
maxims this time applying to Discourse Ethics. In this regard, I examine Habermas‘s 
notion of the universalizability of maxims, and I discuss whether the strict conditions that 
he imposes to the contents that can claim moral worth leaves room to the inclusion of 
particular contents. In my interpretation, if that is not the case, then it is difficult to argue 
that Habermas has closed the gap between the moral will and the particular will (3);  
 
In the fourth section, I develop a Habermasian response to Hegel‘s later criticisms of the 
will as a tester of maxim. The argument here is that the process of ideal role taking, 
properly understood, already contains a potential answer to the Hegelian objection. 
However, this demands that Habermas slacken the strict distinction that he has proposed 
between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons (generalizable interests and particular 
interests). I maintain that this modification is coherent with Mead‘s concept of ideal role 
taking which has been built into Discourse Ethics (4);  
 
Finally, I discuss a further Hegelian challenge, this time to the distinction that Habermas 
draws between morality and ethics. I claim that there are several reasons why Habermas 
should not blur this distinction. Additionally, I maintain that Habermas has a second 
argument to solve the Hegelian challenge, this time relying on a Kantian insight: the 
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recognition of persons as ends in themselves. Discourse Ethics incorporates this element 
by means of the idea of relations of mutual recognition and understanding. In this regard, 
Habermas can still endorse the distinction between moral norms and ethical values, and at 
the same time answer the Hegelian challenge (5).   
 
1. Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Moral Philosophy 
 
In this section, I examine Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘s moral philosophy, from his early essay 
on Natural Law (1802), his Phenomenology of Spirit from the middle period in Jena (1807) and 
the later formulation in Philosophy of Right. (1820) In this regard, Habermas rightly states that 
‗The criticisms Hegel levelled against Kant as a moral philosopher are many‘. (MCCA, 195) 
In this section, I focus mainly in two sets of criticisms: the first set concerns the empty 
formalism of the moral point of view; the second the criticism of the will as a tester of 
maxims.4  
 
Now, it is important to notice that according to a quite influential interpretation of Hegel, 
he can be regarded as a post-Kantian philosopher. This could just mean a philosopher after 
Kant, but also a kind of Kantian philosopher after Kant. In light of the analytical reading of 
Hegel‘s critique of Kant offered by Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard, I claim that Hegel is 
of the latter type. (Pippin, 1989; 1991; Pinkard, 1994; 1999: 222) This is because Hegel did 
not reject Kant‘s concept of pure practical reason and autonomy in favour of something 
else. Rather, Hegel in fact is best seen as extending Kant‘s rationalist morality by critiquing 
it and supplementing it, but not rejecting it.   
 
Hegel agrees with Kant that the moral will is autonomous. (See Freyenhagen, 2011: 164) 
For example in §133 he states, ‗In doing my duty, I am with myself [bei mir selbst] and free. 
The merit and exalted viewpoint of Kant‘s moral philosophy are that it has emphasized this 
significance of duty‘. In this way, Hegel argues that Kant has to be praised because in his 
moral philosophy, the knowledge of the will first gained a firm foundation and point of 
                                                          
4 For some Kantians, the charge of empty formalism is misplaced. (See O‘Neill, 1989: xi) In this regard, I do not 
take for granted that Kant‘s moral philosophy is empty and formal. (MCCA, 204-205. See also Freyenhagen, 
2011 for a detailed discussion of the Empty Formalism Objection) Nevertheless, as I am going to show, 
Hegel‘s later criticisms of Kant of the will as a tester of maxims cannot be consistently rebutted if one 
remains inside Kant‘s philosophy. This is because Kant‘s notion of pure practical reason makes a 
metaphysical claim that suppose a strict distinction between the requirements of morality and the features of 
real agents. This claim is the doctrine of the two realms between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self. (For 
discussions of this criticism see MCCA, 207-208; See also Benhabib, 1986; and Finlayson, 1999)  
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departure through the thought of its infinite autonomy. (see §135) Moreover, Hegel‘s 
critique of Kant does not imply that the former pleads for a return to an ethical theory, like 
the one advanced by, say, David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature. (1739-1740) That is 
to say, it does not amount to the claim that the will could only be shaped by particular 
inclinations, desires and feelings.5 In this respect, Hegel asserts: 
 
What constitutes right and duty, as the rationality in and for itself of the will‘s 
determinations, is essentially neither the particular property of an individual, nor is 
its form that of feeling [Empfindung] or any other individual – i.e. sensuous – kind of 
knowledge, but essentially that of universal determinations of thought, i.e. the form of 
laws and principles. (§137) 
 
For all these reasons, Hegel could be considered as a post-Kantian philosopher. However, in 
the Philosophy of Right, specifically in §135 he also claims ‗to cling on to a merely moral point 
of view without making the transition to the concept of ethics reduces this gain to an empty 
formalism, and moral science to an empty rhetoric of duty for duty’s sake‘. In other words, the 
moral standpoint in Kant‘s philosophy does not recognize the dimension of ethical life and 
that is why it is charged with the empty formalism objection. Therefore, it is a theory based on 
formal reasoning that is divorced from the real life and its values, practices and institutions. 
In this regard, the relationship between Moralität and Sittlichkeit is going to be Hegel‘s main 
focus of the problem and also of his proposal of solution of the empty formalism in Kant‘s 
moral philosophy. (Pinkard, 1999: 227) To my mind, if this objection hits home, Kant‘s 
concept of pure practical reason and autonomy are put into question and they become 
problematic. According to Hegel, the philosophy of Kant needs to be supplemented 
because the former asserts that the moral theory of the latter cannot claim jurisdiction over 
the substantive problems of daily life. Consequently, the Kantian moral will does not seem 
to have concrete content.  
 
Moreover, there is a second criticism which is connected with the charge of empty formalism, 
although, its focus now it is not the Kantian reconstruction of the categorical imperative. 
Rather, its target is the concept of the will as a tester of maxims. Specifically, this criticism 
targets the distinction that Kant proposes between the noumenal will and the phenomenal will. 
                                                          
5 In this regard, Hume famously wrote that ‗Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them‘. (1975: 415) For a contemporary account of 
Hume‘s moral theory see Bernard Williams. (1981) Of course, with important modifications of Hume‘s view.  
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This supposes a break between the moral will – which is the articulation and imposition of 
pure reason – and the empirical will – which is the real individual with her actual desires 
and interests. Due to this, it is not clear whether and to what extent the rational noumenal 
self allows the inclusion of particular contents.  
 
In what follows, I will sketch Hegel‘s criticisms from the early formulations up to its later 
expression in the Philosophy of Right. I will maintain that there are good Kantian arguments 
to rebut the objection to the empty formalism of the categorical imperative, insofar this 
amounts to the charge that it cannot give any content. Nevertheless, Kant‘s metaphysics of 
the two realms between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self makes difficult to refute 
the charge against the will as a tester of maxims. If this criticism is correct, then the moral 
subject cannot achieve autonomy, because she cannot have her own reasons to be bind by 
pure practical reason. If pure practical reason discards the inclusion of particular contents 
then morality does not seem to be able to tell moral agents what they ought to do.  
 
*** 
 
The objection to formalism starts with the claim that the categorical imperative6 is a logical 
test of the universalizability which any maxim can pass. Thus, as Hegel points out in the 
Phenomenology, Kant‘s reconstruction of the moral point of view cannot perform its function 
as a proper test of universalizability. As he indicates, ‗The criterion of law which Reason 
possesses within itself, fits every case equally well, and is thus in fact no criterion at all‘. 
(1977a: 259) Since the moral standpoint is not a criterion at all, then the ground for 
autonomous agency is futile. On this point one needs to remember the basics of Kant‘s 
moral philosophy in which there has to be an equivalence or identity between the 
autonomous (moral) will and the particular will or as he asserts ‗a free will and a will under 
moral laws are one and the same‘ (4: 447) – See footnote 1 in Chapter One. And this 
identity is problematic too, because if only the moral will is autonomous that might imply 
that the empirical will is heteronomous or unfree. This cannot be right because then agents 
would not be responsible for their empirical actions. Kant overcomes this issue drawing 
the distinction between freedom of choice [Willkür] and free will [Wille]. An agent might 
seem to be heteronomous insofar as its freedom of choice [Willkür] is governed by 
morality, but her autonomy depends on its free will [Wille] which is the legislative function 
                                                          
6 Kant‘s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative states, ‗Act only according to that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law‘. (4:421) 
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that Kant equates with pure practical reason. (See Allison, 1990: 129-36)  Moreover, ‗Wille 
is the source of the laws that confront the human Willkür as imperatives [and] it seems 
clear that this must include both the categorical and hypothetical imperatives‘. (Allison, 
1990: 130) Hence, for Kant the categorical imperative is the self-given law of an 
autonomous will. Therefore, if this test is not criterion at all, then there is not a basis for 
morality and for autonomy.  
 
In despite of this, it is possible to answer satisfactorily this charge. It is not difficult to find 
maxims that fail the test as Kant himself does in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
(See also O‘Neill, 1989: 158) There, Kant considers an example in which a person needs 
money and at the same time knows that she will not be able to pay it back. The maxim of 
the action for that person could be, ‗when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall 
borrow money, and promise to repay it. Even though, I know that it will never happen‘. 
(4:422) The question now is what would happen if this maxim becomes a universal law. 
Kant asserts that if this were then the practice of promise making itself would cease to 
exist. (Snare, 1990: 40) Hence, it would not be possible even to break a promise. Thus, the 
maxim fails as it contains what is often called a ‗contradiction in conception‘. (Korsgaard, 
1985: 2, O‘Neill, 1989: 89) Consequently, it is wrong to claim that any maxim can be made 
to past the test of universalizability. Moreover, the negation of an unsuccessful maxim 
expresses a strict duty. Following the example we are examining, the negation of the maxim 
‗I should make false promises‘ results in the strict duty ‗I should not make false promises‘.  
 
However, there are a lot of counterexamples to the view that we have a strict duty not to 
act on whatever maxims fail the test of Universalizability. For example ‗Always open doors 
for other people‘. This is a plausible example of a maxim, however ‗given the fact that two 
people cannot open the same door, the maxim clearly fails the test of universalizability‘. 
(Finlayson, 1999: 38) Nevertheless, Onora O‘Neill introduces a scope restriction on what 
can count as a candidate maxim. She distinguishes between ‗underlying intentions‘ and 
‗ancillary intentions‘. The former offers cases of morally relevant maxims – for example, ‗I 
should not make a false promise‘ –, the latter refers to cases than are not relevant in the 
moral domain – for example, ‗I should open doors for other people‘ or ‗I have to offer tea 
to my guests. (O‘ Neill, 1989: 145-46) Ottfried Höffe offers a defence of Kant in this point 
as well. He draws a distinction between general maxims – those that pertain to the moral 
domain – and rules or precepts of action – that refer to one‘s way to order her particular 
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life. (Höffe, 1994: 149-151) From these two arguments I draw the conclusion that Kant still 
can rebut Hegel‘s criticism.  
 
Hegel has a second more careful objection to the empty formalism of the categorical 
imperative, developed in the essay on Natural Law and in the Phenomenology. In this criticism, 
he argues that the maxims can succeed the test of universalizability because in Kant‘s moral 
theory there is presupposed the existence of substantive moral values that shape our social 
life. This means that any maxim is successful or failed depending on its coherence with 
certain institutions and the values and practices that underlie them. This challenges Kant‘s 
account of morality, because the doctrine of the two realms marks a clear distinction 
between the conditions of possibility of an autonomous will, which is noumenal, and the 
phenomenal world of social institutions. In other words, according to Hegel, Kant should 
have been aware that in his theory substantive contents were incorporated. In this criticism, 
Hegel discusses Kant‘s argument in the Critique of Practical Reason concerning the case of a 
person who wonders whether she should or not return a deposit ‗the owner of which has 
died and left no record of it‘. (5:27) The maxim that could guide this sort of action would 
be that it is morally right to try to ‗increase my wealth by every safe means‘ (5:27), for 
example keeping a deposit that no one will claim as it is unrecorded and the owner passed 
away. Now, this person may wonder whether that maxim could also hold as a universal law. 
Kant argues that when that person begins to wonder whether that maxim could become an 
universal law she will realize that ‗I at once become aware that such principle, as a law, 
would annihilate itself since it would bring it about that there would be no deposits at all‘. 
(5:27) 
 
According to Hegel, the maxim that we are discussing fails the test of the categorical 
imperative, not because it might have a self-contradictory character, but because it goes 
against substantive moral values and institutions, such as property. Thus, one could 
imagine a world in which those institutions are not present and therefore the maxim would 
succeed the test. In this way, Kant‘s argument shows that a system without deposits is 
contradicted by a system with deposits. As Hegel asserts, ‗Property, simply as such, does 
not contradict itself it is an isolated determinateness, or is posited as merely self identical. 
Non property, the non ownership of things, or a common ownership of goods, is just as 
little self-contradictory‘. (1977a: 258) Hegel‘s claim is that one element that plays a role 
when the moral worth of any maxim is assessed is the social context in which the agents 
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are placed. However, due to the theory of the two realms, in Kant‘s moral philosophy the 
deontological worth of any maxim has to be independent of the context and be based only 
in the autonomy of a subject that is rational and gives itself universal laws. The autonomy 
of morality would be undermined if it depends on the institutional setting in which the 
moral assessment takes place.   
 
The conclusion that one has here is that Kant‘s conception of autonomy is failed. If 
Hegel‘s is right in this criticism, then it is impossible to conceive autonomy beyond the 
realm of the institutions and practices of a particular ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. Thus, what 
confers moral validity is not the logical structure of maxims (pure reason) but the 
coherence of those maxims and the underlying values, institutions and practices of a 
particular form of life. Therefore, pure practical reason and autonomy are always already 
social. However, there are arguments to counter Hegel‘s challenge in this respect, but to a 
certain extent the answer relies on a Hegelian insight.  
 
Hegel has an interesting point as he already has the beginnings of a good argument that is 
improved in the Philosophy of Right. (1820) Nonetheless, as in the case of the false promise 
the problem with the deposit example is that it implies a ‗contradiction in conception‘. The 
contradiction does not depend on envisioning a society in which there are no deposits; the 
problem arises when someone wills a world in which, the appropriation of a deposit 
becomes a universal law and at the same time that person also wills the existence of a 
world, in which there are deposits. (Finlayson, 1999: 37) As a result, the contradiction is 
not generated by the reasons Hegel argues for. At this point, in his defence of Kant 
Christine Korsgaard asserts that the contradiction ‗is generated when the agent tries to will 
his maxim and the universalization of his maxim at the same time, or tries to will it for a 
system of which he is to be a part‘. (Korsgaard, 1985: 13) 
 
Consequently, Korsgaard‘s defence agrees with Hegel at least in one respect: moral agency 
has to be understood in a phenomenal social context. The contradiction in conception is 
caused not because the maxim is contradictory with a set of institutions. The contradiction 
depends on the will of a particular subject that wills her maxim and at the same time wills 
institutions that are contradictory with that maxim. In this respect, Korsgaard‘s defence of 
Kant from Hegel‘s criticism is both based on an Hegelian insight and it already advances 
the later objection to the will as a tester of maxims which is examined in what follows.  
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In the later objection which is developed in the Philosophy of Right, specifically in the 
discussion of ‗Moralität‘ (3rd Section, ‗The Good and Conscience‘), Hegel asserts:  
 
From this point of view, no immanent doctrine of duties [Pflichtenlehre] is 
possible. One might indeed bring in material from outside and thereby arrive at 
particular duties, but it is impossible to make the transition to the determination of 
particular duties from the above determination of duty as absence of contradiction, 
as formal correspondence with itself, which is no different from the specification of 
abstract indeterminacy; and even if such a particular content for action is taken into 
consideration, there is no criterion within the principle for deciding whether or not 
this content is a duty. On the contrary, it is possible to justify any wrong or 
immoral mode of action by this means. — Kant‘s further form — the capacity of 
an action to be envisaged as universal maxim — does yield a more concrete 
representation [Vorstellung] of the situation in question, but it does not in itself [für 
sich]. (Hegel, 1991: §135) 
 
This passage has several elements that need to be examined. Here, Hegel claims that to 
cling on to the moral point of view without making the transition to the concept of ethics 
has the effect that ‗no immanent theory of duties is possible‘. (§135) This means that Kant 
cannot try to deduce a whole repertoire of maxims just from the categorical imperative 
procedure and from logic. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to respond to this objection. In 
the Groundwork and in the Second Critique Kant‘s principal task is to provide a justification 
for the moral law. It is in the Metaphysics of Morals (the ‗Doctrine of Virtue‘) where Kant 
provides a doctrine of duties in the sense of a repertoire of concrete duties. 
 
Moreover, Hegel maintains his early criticism that the categorical imperative is not a proper 
criterion to assess the universalizability of the maxims. Therefore, even wrong and immoral 
contents could successfully pass the test for consistency, and the mere lack of 
contradictoriness of a maxim does not yield enough information about what morality 
should demand. (See Freyenhagen, 2011: 165) Henceforth, it is the wrong kind of 
normativity as long as formal rationality does not rule out moral wrongness. This is because 
it is not possible to derive the normativity of morality from the normativity of rationality. 
As I have shown, however, this objection could be rebutted by Kant because there are 
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maxims that contain a ‗contradiction in conception‘ and consequently that actually fail the 
test. For example, the maxim ‗I will make lying promises when it achieves something I 
want‘, contradicts itself once made into a universal law. Therefore, the categorical 
imperative is a proper criterion to evaluate the validity of norms that as long as they fail the 
test they are morally prohibited.  
 
Notwithstanding, it is still a worry here because it seems that there are not many of these 
maxims which actually fail the categorical imperative. Therefore, there is some, but not 
enough moral content to regulate our daily life. Also, there is no strict correlation between 
maxims that fail the categorical imperative test and strict duties – as I have shown the 
maxim ‗Always open doors for other people‘ fails the test and there is surely no duty not to 
do it –. Certainly, O‘ Neill and Höffe might be right when they propose scope restrictions 
on what can count as ‗morally relevant‘ contents and the aforementioned example should 
be discarded. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the issue that I am analysing now these 
restrictions are equally unrewarding: if O‘ Neill‘s and Höffe‘s arguments are sound then 
even less content can be susceptible of being tested by the categorical imperative. This 
discussion allows sharpening the reply to Hegel‘s criticism of the categorical imperative: the 
Kantian test is a proper criterion to reject norms that are not morally valid, but still Kant 
cannot guarantee that his moral philosophy includes enough moral content. 
  
There is a further objection that only emerges in sharp relief in the later objection, namely, 
the criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. Roughly speaking, Hegel claims that Kant‘s 
philosophy supposes a gap between the noumenal self (moral will) and the phenomenal self 
(empirical will). The first refers to the noumenal rational being who follows the rules of pure 
practical reason, and the second is the phenomenal real agent with her inclinations, interests, 
and located in a particular space and time. Hegel arrives at this conclusion in the previous 
passage when he states that Kant‘s conception of the moral will is characterized by ‗formal 
correspondence with itself, which is no different from the specification of abstract 
indeterminacy‘. The moral will (noumenal self) is both only identical with itself and only 
incorporate maxims that have an abstract form. Henceforth, particular contents and 
interests remain alien to the moral will and Kant‘s concept of autonomy is incomplete. In 
other words, the empirical will, which has substantive contents and interests, however it be 
made up, cannot be united with the moral will. Thus, Kant‘s moral philosophy cannot give 
an answer to the question of how moral insights can be realized in practice. (MCCA, 196) 
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This is because, as I have shown in the introduction of this Chapter, due to this break, 
Kant‘s philosophy cannot explain how morality will motivate real agents if the contents 
that they might endorse are filtered out, due to the bounds that the moral point of view 
imposes. If the moral law must override or abstract from all particular interests there 
remains no reason for the empirical will to act in accordance with it. The moral self splits 
into a noumenal self that makes demands and an empirical self that is supposed to obey. 
 
In this regard, one of the tasks, ‗arguably the most important one‘ (Finlayson, 1999: 41), of 
Hegel‘s philosophy of the objective spirit, is to show how the particular interests acquire 
universal form or how the empirical will acquires a moral form. In §153 of the Philosophy of 
Right Hegel asserts ‗the right of individuals to their subjective determination to freedom is 
fulfilled in so far as they belong to ethical actuality‘. This means that through Sittlichkeit, 
freedom (or the moral will) and the right of the individual to be free for her own reasons 
(or the particular will) can be joined together. Later in that paragraph, Hegel explicitly 
argues that this can be achieved in a state with good laws:   
 
When a father asked him for advice about the best way of educating his son in 
ethical matters, a Pythagorean replied: ‗Make him the citizen of a state of good 
laws‘.  
 
In summary, the point is that Hegel‘s early formulation of his criticism of Kant‘s empty 
formalism can be countered. However, the later and more mature argument shows a strong 
case against Kant‘s moral philosophy and it represents a challenge to the notions of pure 
practical reason and autonomy. The impossibility of reconciling the moral will and the 
particular will poses a clear difficulty for Kant‘s concept of moral autonomy. If Hegel is 
right, then in Kant‘s moral philosophy the empirical subjects are subjugated to a universal 
moral will. Therefore, they do not have their own reasons to obey the moral law and it 
would not be the moral law in Kant‘s sense either, as in his account the will has to be 
autonomous to be moral. A first step to give an answer to this Hegelian challenge consists 
in discarding the theory of the two realms. This is something that Hegel already did in his 
philosophy, through the dialectical relationship that he proposed between Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit. By means of this relationship, in the Philosophy of Right it was possible to conceive 
the reconciliation between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self. According to Hegel the 
projects and contents of the particular agent were embedded in its particular form of life. 
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Consequently, as far as Moralität was embedded in Sittlichkeit, then the real agent could be at 
home with herself and be moral at the same time.  
 
Habermas too discards the doctrine of the two realms, however not by blurring the 
distinction between Moralität and Sittlichkeit, between moral norms and evaluative 
statements. That said, however, Habermas has a good argument to rebut this Hegelian 
criticisms, by means of the concept of ideal role taking.  Nevertheless, before I move into 
that issue, I need to discuss Habermas‘s position concerning Hegel‘s critique of Kant. 
 
2. Habermas on Hegel’s critique of Kant 
 
In what follows, I examine Habermas‘s account of Hegel‘s critique of Kant and I begin to 
delineate the Hegelian criticism of the will as a tester of maxims this time applying to 
Discourse Ethics. In the previous section, I argued that this criticism actually cannot be 
rebutted by Kant. According to Hegel, in Kant‘s moral philosophy there is a separation of 
universal form and particular content which supposes a break between the universal will 
and the particular will. Habermas replaces Kant‘s rigid division of universal form and 
particular content for the distinction between universal and particular content. 
Nevertheless, the result could be equally problematic. This is because, if as in Kant, in 
Discourse Ethics the universal will and the particular will cannot be joined together, then 
also Habermas theory can be charged of being formal. Consequently, if the objection hits 
the target, then it seems that Habermas is not able to give an account of how particular 
content might bleed into moral discourse. This Hegelian criticism of Habermas‘s moral 
theory is developed mainly on section 3. In response to this objection, in section 4, I show 
that it can be successfully rebutted by means of an analysis of the concept of ideal role 
taking. However, in order to do this Habermas has to slightly modify or slacken some 
components of his theory. First, though, more preparatory work needs to be made in order 
to set the stage to address that issue.  
 
In Habermas‘s view, on some points Kant‘s moral philosophy is simply immune to Hegel‘s 
criticisms. On others, it is vulnerable to Hegel‘s criticisms. Now, by contrast, the neo-
Kantianism that Habermas develops in Discourse Ethics has the resources to rebut these 
Hegelian criticisms. This is because Habermas has incorporated a modified version of 
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Kant‘s notion of pure practical reason and autonomy which fortifies and shields his theory 
from the contemporary version of Hegel‘s critique of Kant.  
 
In his article, ‗Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel‘s Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse 
Ethics?‘ Habermas gives a response to this question and also he examines the pertinence of 
Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘s moral philosophy. The criticisms that Habermas considers are 
(MCCA, 204-210): i) the formalism of the moral principle; ii) the abstract universalism; iii) 
the objection to the impotence of the ‗Ought‘; iv) the subject of ‗Virtue and the Way of the 
World‘. In what follows, I examine Habermas‘s stance on the first three (1, 2, 3) criticisms.7 
At the end of this section, I outline in a preliminary way what I think it is the centre of a 
Hegelian criticism that can challenge Habermas‘s moral theory (4).    
 
1. Concerning the first criticism, that refers to the formalism of the moral principle 
Habermas argues that: ‗Neither Kantian ethics nor discourse ethics lays itself open to the 
charge that since it defines the moral principle in formal or procedural terms, it can only 
make tautological statements about morality‘ (MCCA, 204). Kant‘s Categorical Imperative 
and Habermas‘s principle of universalization (U) are formal but not empty. (Finlayson, 
1999: 34) In this respect, Hegel is wrong when he argues that Kant‘s formulation of the 
moral point of view just postulate logical and semantic consistency and nothing else. For 
Habermas, these principles refer to a substantive reconstruction of the inner structures of 
practical reasoning and consequently they are not purely formal. As we have seen, if at least 
one maxim passes the categorical imperative, then the test is not empty and merely formal 
(See section 1). There is another worry here because Habermas is supposed not to say 
anything about what the norms are that pass the test of (U), he leaves that up to 
participants themselves. This may mean that Habermas‘s principle of universalization does 
not include content. Nevertheless, I think that this is an advantage because the participants 
themselves are the ones that are in the best position to regulate their conflicts of action by 
means of moral discourse.  
 
Notwithstanding, it has been argued that the principle of universalization imposes very 
demanding conditions to what can count as a moral norms. The reason that explains why 
Discourse Ethics sets these strict limits is because (U) aims to cohere with an historical 
context determined by a plurality of forms of life, in which moral norms appeal to be 
                                                          
7 For the sake of my argument, I do not consider Habermas‘s fourth reply.  
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binding universally. Due to this, very few norms pass this test. Habermas admits this, for 
example when in JA he says that:  
 
To be sure, the sphere of questions that can be answered rationally from the moral 
point of view shrinks in the course of the development toward multiculturalism 
within particular societies and toward a world society at the international level. (JA, 
91; See also IO, 3-46) 
 
Baynes addresses the issue of the burden that is imposed to the norms to reach the status 
that is demanded by (U). Fundamentally, he refers to factical constraints of practical 
discourses – i.e., space and time.  As a consequence of this, there would be very few norms 
that can be identified as the outcome of a practical discourse. In this way, Baynes correctly 
claims that ‗At most, perhaps, basic moral norms will come to resemble a core set of basic 
human rights‘. (2016: 104) Habermas does not reject this reading. Now, if very few norms 
pass the test of (U), can morality play the central social role that Habermas assigns to it? 
Let us remember that in Discourse Ethics and in TCA Habermas argues that morality is 
the basis of social integration.  
 
Habermas appears to assume that, it is not a problem if very few norms pass the test of (U) 
in the context of a pluralism of forms of life and progressively greater individualization of 
life projects. (JA, 90-91, OI, 41) I agree with this position, because a basic set of moral 
norms can successfully regulate the essential conflicts of our lives in common. Particular 
issues can be regulated by specifications given by contextual features of the conflicts at 
hand – i.e., the scope of those who are affected, cultural particularities and so on. That said, 
however, these norms need to recognize and respect a core set of basic norms morally 
justified. Perhaps, this position is more tenable once Habermas has specified the role 
played by ethical discourses and by democratically legitimate law, because they take up the 
burden of social integration. Nevertheless, morality in Habermas never has lost his role for 
social integration and in this respect positive Law and morality have a complementary 
relation. (IO, 256-258)  
 
Habermas has another argument to show that the principle of universalization of 
Discourse Ethics is not empty and purely formal. Moral norms emerge as normative and 
morally right answers to the conflicts of action that ‗grow out of everyday life‘. (MCCA, 
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204) Hence, moral discourse takes place as a way in which social agents solve conflicts in 
everyday (lifeworld) contexts. In other words, these disputes and the norms that regulate 
them are products of our social life and not the speculative inventions of the philosophers. 
Habermas‘s claim here is that moral content arises from the lifeworld in the form of 
conflicts of interest and the norms that allow their discursive resolution. 
 
However, this response is a little misleading, because even if the norms (maxims) ‗grow out 
of everyday life‘, Hegel‘s claim is that the categorical imperative fails as a criterion to 
evaluate the maxims, because it is a test to evaluate the logical and semantic consistency of 
the maxims and nothing else. The point is not really whether the maxims come from the 
everyday life or the philosophers create them. Rather, Hegel‘s criticism asserts that the 
categorical imperative is not an adequate criterion to evaluate the universalizability of the 
maxims, no matter if they come from the noumenal sphere of reasons or from the phenomenal 
realm of the everyday life. The response that Habermas is giving here is not relevant to 
answer this criticism but it is useful to respond to the charge that Kant‘s cannot provide an 
immanent doctrine of duties.8 If at the end Kant can show that the maxims come from our 
phenomenal social life, then he does not need to provide a doctrine of duties at all.  
 
Habermas also claims that it is not correct to state that the categorical imperative can only 
make tautological statements. I agree with this position, but not for the reasons that 
Habermas gives. In this respect, it is enough to show that there are maxims that can fail the 
test, and for Kant they are crucial because they yield strict negative duties not to do them. 
In the case of Discourse Ethics, it is the norms that pass the test of U that are important 
because they tell us what we ought to do. Nevertheless, according to Habermas there is a 
sense in which Hegel‘s charge of formalism could apply to any procedural ethics. These 
sort of moral theories need to segregate ‗from among the general mass of practical issues 
precisely those that lend themselves to rational debate‘. (MCCA, 204) As a result, there is a 
strict distinction between normative statements and evaluative statements, norms and 
values. On the one hand, norms are the objects of morality because they are 
universalizable. On the other hand, values refer to particular ways to orient the existence of 
a community or a person‘s particular projects towards a specific conception of the good 
                                                          
8 Freyenhagen (2011) discusses three Kantian replies to this charge. The first concerns an interpretation in 
which Kant is a moral realist. This means that he does not need to provide a doctrine of duties because they 
come from the social world. The second Kantian reply argues that Kant provides this doctrine in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. The third argues that the second formulation of the categorical imperative (the formula 
of humanity) properly interpreted allows a doctrine of duties.  
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life.9 According to Hegel, this distinction results in the abstraction of moral norms, in the 
sense that they become detached from the good life and ‗that made impossible for morality 
to claim jurisdiction over the substantive problems of daily life‘. (MCCA, 204) 
 
Habermas argues that Hegel has an interesting point here. However, the former asserts that 
Human Rights are an example in which normative statements have at the same time an 
evaluative character. Human rights can be thought dialectically as a group of moral norms 
that both convey generalizable interests and also are ethical values. Therefore, they are part 
of the dimension of Moralität and are part of the Sittlichkeit of modern life. As Habermas 
asserts:  
 
Human rights obviously embody generalizable interests. As such they can be 
morally grounded in terms of what all could will. And yet nobody would argue that 
these rights, which represent the moral substance of our legal system, are irrelevant 
for the ethics (Sittlichkeit) of modern life. (MCCA, 205) 
 
Then, human rights are both moral entities and ethical entities. Moreover, I read this 
passage in the sense that in Discourse Ethics moral norms (as embodied in human rights) 
are not so abstract that they have no relation to the legal and ethical framework of modern 
society. Therefore, they are not completely unrelated to the substance of our social life. So, 
in this way Habermas can rebut Hegel‘s critique that Kantian morality cannot claim 
‗jurisdiction over the substantive problems of daily life‘. (MCCA, 204) 
 
2. Regarding the objection to the abstract universalism, for Habermas neither Kant nor 
Discourse Ethics can be charged with the criticism that ‗the generalizability of norms 
necessarily leads to the neglect, if not the repression, of existing conditions and interests in 
a pluralistic society‘. (MCCA, 205) Modern societies have more differentiated interests and 
value orientations; therefore moral norms necessarily become more general and abstract. 
However, this does not mean that these interests and values are discarded, at least not by 
Habermas‘s moral philosophy. Nevertheless, Habermas‘s position here could be challenged 
                                                          
9 This insight is part of the Eudemonist tradition since Aristotle. (Aristotle, 2009) In this perspective, the aim is 
not to address the questions concerning the deontological worth of moral norms. Rather, the issue is how to 
guide the human existence towards the good life which certainly appeals to substantive contents. In the 
Nicomaquean Ethics Aristotle argues that the Telos or function of the human being is to live rationally well. 
Moreover, to achieve this human function it is necessary for the agent to lead a life according to the virtues of 
ethics.   
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because there is a specification of the sort of interests that can be part of a rationally 
motivated consensus. He asserts that these interests need to be universalizable and agent-
neutral. (IO, 7, 43) 
 
Thus, the same problem arises here concerning the later Hegel‘s criticism of Kant. Does 
Habermas‘s moral theory close the gap between the moral will (universalizable interests) 
and the empirical will (particular interests)? There are many cases in which a particular 
agent has an interest that is not universalizable. For instance, the free rider wants to get a 
benefit of the collective and at the same time she does not contribute to the creation of 
those goods. If Discourse Ethics cannot answer this case, this seems to be detrimental to 
its position.10 This point is going to be developed further in the next section and here is 
where I think Hegel‘s objections still have purchase on Discourse Ethics. However, in 
section 4 I argue that Habermas‘s moral philosophy has arguments to rebut this objection.   
 
Hegel‘s objection to abstract universalism sometimes takes the form of a criticism of 
rigorism.  As he construes the charge, procedural ethics fails to take account of the 
consequences and side effects ‗that may flow from the generalized observance of a justified 
norm‘. (MCCA, 206) In his lecture Politics as Vocation (1919) Max Weber was moved by this 
objection to counterpoise an ethics of responsibility for consequences and side effects 
against Kant‘s ethics of conviction. For Habermas, this criticism applies to Kant but not to 
Discourse Ethics, since the latter breaks with Kant‘s idealism and monologism (MCCA, 
206). The procedure of Discourse Ethics is formulated in the principle of universalization 
(U) that explicitly requires sensitivity ‗to the results and consequences of the general 
observance of a norm for every individual‘. (MCCA, 206) In this way, Habermas builds a 
consequentialist consideration into the heart of his deontological moral theory.11  
 
According to Habermas, Hegel is right in another respect too: ‗Moral theories of the 
Kantian type are specialized. They focus on questions of justification, leaving questions of 
                                                          
10 However, from early on Habermas has traced a distinction between instrumental, strategic and 
communicative modes of action. (CES, TCA) The case of the free rider refers to the instrumental or strategic 
type of action.  
11 I think that it is possible to connect the consideration of consequences and the contents that are relevant 
for the agents. If that connection is correct then Habermas has another argument to respond to Hegel‘s later 
charge. Consequences may be the contents of the empirical will. In other words, they may be the particular 
reasons that explain whether the agent follows or rejects moral norms. Nevertheless, again one might argue 
that these considerations need to recognize contents that have to be universalizable and agent-neutral. 
Therefore, although Discourse Ethics incorporates the consideration of consequences, does still Habermas‘s 
position can close the gap between the moral and empirical will?   
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application unanswered‘. (MCCA, 206) Due to the abstractions that any procedural ethics 
have to make to justify norms the questions concerning the application of these norms are 
dismissed. In this regard, the application of general norms to particular cases seems to 
require an Aristotelian faculty of prudence. This would tend to weaken the universalistic 
claim of pure practical reason because it would be tied to a particular form of life. For 
Habermas, his moral philosophy does not need to go back to a philosophical position prior 
to Kant, and in Discourse Ethics ‗even in the prudent application of norms, principles of 
practical reason take effect‘. (MCCA, 206-207) These principles of application are not 
based on a faculty of prudence but are part of the moral point of view. In Habermas‘s 
concept of autonomy not only the questions of justification but also of application are 
attended from the point of view of practical reason. (JA, 35-39)  
 
Thus, the guidance that any moral theory has to provide for the autonomy of the subject is 
considered in Discourse Ethics. To achieve moral autonomy, the question not only 
concerns the justification but also the principles of application of a norm. Otherwise, the 
consequences and side effects of the observance of a norm are not taking into account and 
the agent‘s actions cannot reach moral autonomy. This distinction is another reason to 
argue that Habermas‘s concept of autonomy cannot be charged of being certain form of 
abstract universalism. According to Habermas, ‗Kant neglects the problem of application‘. 
(JA, 35) In contrast, Discourse Ethics makes a careful distinction between the validity of 
norms and the correctness of singular judgments that prescribe some particular action on 
the basis of a valid norm. (JA, 35-36) Henceforth, the inclusion of this element guarantees 
that the autonomy of the moral agent in discourse is not a form of abstract universalism. It 
is still Universalist, but not abstract, in the sense that takes into consideration the norms of 
application of a valid norm, and therefore the results are more likely to be moral.  
 
3. Concerning the criticism that refers to the impotence of the ‗Ought‘, Habermas argues 
that Kant is actually vulnerable ‗to the objection that his ethics lacks practical impact 
because it dichotomizes duty and inclination, reason and sense experience‘. (MCCA, 207) 
In the view built in Discourse Ethics, the participants in communication are real people 
who are not split between noumenal selves and phenomenal selves. Therefore, in Habermas‘s 
theory there is not a rupture between duty and inclination. To accomplish this result, 
Habermas discards the doctrine of the two realms. This refers to the distinction between 
things in themselves and appearances. Instead of this, Habermas adheres to a Kantian 
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pragmatism in which reason is desublimated and it is embedded in the everyday 
communicative practice. (T&J, 84) The rejection of this doctrine allows that the particular 
interests of the empirical agents can be included in the justification of a moral norm. 
Henceforth, the contradiction between the universal will and the particular will that Hegel 
encountered in Kant‘s moral philosophy is rebutted in Discourse Ethics. Moreover, there is 
not a break between the phenomenal self and the noumenal self and Discourse Ethics can 
include inclinations and interests. That said, however, these particular contents need to be 
universalizable. A good example in this point is that everyone has reason to avoid pain to 
themselves. Therefore, a particular inclination (avoid pain to me) can be the object of a 
moral discourse because it embodies a generalizable interest (everyone has an interest to 
avoid pain to themselves). However, this is more problematic because this content is not 
agent-neutral, but agent-relative. As I discuss in the next section, Habermas discards agent-
relative contents as susceptible to justify moral norms, even if they are universal.  
 
According to Habermas, in another respect Hegel is also right, ‗Practical discourse does 
disengage problematic actions and norms from the substantive ethics (Sittlichkeit) of their 
lived contexts‘. (MCCA, 207) This is because in the process of justification it is necessary to 
make abstractions from existing motives and institutions. Otherwise, morality would not be 
a critical inquiry.   
 
Notwithstanding, Habermas claims Hegel correctly argues that moral insights should 
become part of the concrete duties of everyday life. In this respect, Habermas asserts that:  
 
There has to be modicum congruence between morality and the practices of 
socialization and education […] between morality and socio-political institutions. 
(MCCA, 207) 
 
For Habermas, morality occurs in a social context in which post-conventional ideas of law 
and morality have been already institutionalized at least to a certain extent. Moreover, the 
moral agents are socialized in the practices of reaching agreement through discourses 
which are shaped by principles and procedures that aim to reach universalizable contents. 
In Kohlberg‘s terms, they have attained level six of a post-conventional moral judgment.12 
                                                          
12 However, in Habermas‘s reformulation of Kohlberg‘s model level six is related with the procedures that the 
former advances in Discourse Ethics (MCCA, 116-194) and not with Kant and Rawls‘s moral philosophies as 
Kohlberg argues. (Kohlberg, 1981; 1984) 
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In this way, to confront the impotence of the ‗ought‘ Habermas argues that ethical life – 
through socialization – has to meet post-conventional moralities halfway. (MCCA, 207)13 
As I have shown, people need to be in a social context in which the post-conventional level 
of morality (in Kohlberg‘s sense) has been achieved and then they take to heart, and 
identify with universal moral norms, and are committed to resolve conflicts of interest by 
means of discourse. Certainly, in these conditions the odds that morality can be effective 
increases.  
 
Furthermore, Habermas argues that this is only possible in the context of a modern society 
in which law and morality are organized by formal procedures that do not suppose the 
preference of particular substantive contents – i.e., principle (U), principle (D), the 
principle of democracy and even the legal form.14 Morality is an historical result connected 
with the Enlightenment and therefore it refers in Habermas‘s Discourse Ethics to a theory 
of modernity. However, it is important to notice that while Habermas endorses this 
Hegelian insight in his theory, the weight of the validity of moral norms is based on the test 
of universalizability. Post-conventional moralities need to be met halfway by 
accommodating life-worlds. (MCCA, 207) Nevertheless, the normative validity of moral 
norms does not depend on these forms of life. Rather, that worth is grounded on the fact 
that they embody universalizable interests.  
 
4. In this final part of this section, I want to assess whether and to what extent Hegel‘s 
critique of Kant can apply to Habermas‘s moral theory. As a general conclusion, it seems 
that Habermas rebuts if not all, then most of these criticisms. In this way, there are several 
points in which he has advanced good arguments to respond to these objections. That said, 
the objection that still can challenge Discourse Ethics is the criticism of the will as a tester 
of maxims. This issue needs to be addressed because every moral theory has to explain 
how the agents can be bind by morality. This is what Hegel describes in §153 of the 
Philosophy of Right as ‗The right of individuals to their subjective determination to freedom‘. 
 
                                                          
13 Interestingly enough, this argument is also made in Between Facts and Norms. In this respect, Habermas 
asserts, ‗What is more, deliberative politics is internally connected with contexts of a rationalized lifeworld 
that meets it halfway‘. (BFN, 302; see also 358; 461; 471; 487; IO; 252) 
14 The principle of democracy states that ‗Only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the 
assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted‘ (BFN, 110). 
For a detailed discussion on this principle see Chapter Three, Part I, section 3. The legal form refers to the 
institutional framework of modern law. It comprises these three features: i) it is positivistic (depends on the 
will of the sovereign; ii) it is enforceable (its norms are backed by sanctions); iii) it protects subjective rights. 
(IO, 254) In Chapter Three, part I, section 2 I examine in detail the legal form.  
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As I have shown, this criticism applied to Discourse Ethics could be convincingly 
answered bearing in mind that Habermas has discarded the doctrine of the two realms. 
From the point of view of Habermas‘s Kantian pragmatism, reason is not opposed to the 
empirical world but it is located in the everyday practices of giving reasons. For Habermas 
morality is not abstract and noumenal as for Kant is. Henceforth, morality is concrete and 
part of the phenomenal and it is not necessarily opposed to the empirical will of the moral 
agent. Moral reasoning is not performed, as it is for Kant, by noumenal selves in the 
kingdom of ends, but by real social agents. Additionally, Habermas argues that his moral 
philosophy incorporates in questions of morality particular interests, inclinations and 
consequences and side effects. Therefore, apparently Habermas‘s concept communicative 
reason has incorporated several components that fortify and shield his moral theory in 
front of the Hegelian criticisms of the will as a tester of maxims. 
 
In spite of this, in the next section I maintain that the problem arises again because 
Discourse Ethics set strict conditions on the features that moral norms need to meet to be 
universalizable. Habermas argues that the particular interests that can pass the principle of 
Universalization (U) need to be universalizable contents and never particular contents. In 
this way, the limits that moral discourse establishes open again the question whether and to 
what extent particular contents can be included in practical discourse. As I will show in the 
fourth section of this Chapter, in light of the concept of ideal role taking, which is built 
into the procedure of universalization of norms in Discourse Ethics, it is possible to rebut 
this Hegelian challenge. However, before I develop that, in the next section I examine in 
detail Habermas‘s notion of the universalizability of norms.   
 
3. The universalizability of norms and the return of Hegel   
 
So far, Habermas has advanced good arguments to rebut Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘s moral 
philosophy this time applied to Discourse Ethics. Nonetheless, the question whether and 
to what extent Habermas can refute Hegel‘s later criticism of Kant concerning the break 
between the moral will and the particular will needs further elaboration. Habermas‘s 
version of the universalizability of moral norms set strict limits in what can count as the 
proper contents of a practical discourse and it filters out particular contents and interests. 
Considering this notion of universalizability, the issue if Habermas can convincingly (or 
not) respond to the Hegelian criticisms of the will as a tester of maxims still remains 
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nebulous. In what follows, I begin developing this issue examining Habermas‘s version of 
the universalizability and I conclude that Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims 
applies to Discourse Ethics.  
 
*** 
Throughout the concept of universalizable or generalizable interests, Habermas has 
included in the contents that could claim moral worth, the interests and inclinations of the 
moral agents. In this way, it is possible to envision the union between the rational self and 
the empirical self. However, Habermas rules out agent-relative interests. He appears to 
disqualify agent-relative interests as reasons that are apt to justify moral norms, even if they 
are universal. He claims rather that the contents that are susceptible of being universalized 
have to be solely agent-neutral. (IO, 7, 43)15 Additionally, a moral norm has to be in 
‗everyone‘s interest‘. (MCCA, 65) Therefore, it aims to the universalizability of the moral 
contents and rejects particular interests.16 This is explicitly stated by Habermas in the 
principle of universalization, in which valid norms have to achieve the following condition:  
 
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests. 
(MCCA, 65) 
  
In order to expound Habermas‘s position, it is possible to distinguish some aspects of his 
version of the universalizability of norms. One weak interpretation could state that validity 
‗is conferred on a norm only if everyone has an interest in its general observance, but not 
necessarily the same interest‘ (Finlayson, 1999: 42), so this would be agent-relative but not 
universalizable. In that case, such interest could be particular, not common to all, and 
different people could agree to a norm for different reasons.17 From the point of view of 
                                                          
15 In this respect, Habermas is following Thomas Nagel‘s distinction between agent neutral and agent relative 
reasons for action. (1986: 153) Agent-relative interest is one that refers back to the subject and her on 
interest. In general terms, in the Kantian tradition agent-relative interests are explicitly ruled out. Although, 
endorsing Kantianism, Christine Korsgaard criticizes the distinction because for her it does not cohere with 
an intersubjectivistic account of morality. (1993) Nevertheless, Habermas upholds the distinction.  
16 There is also in Moral Consciousness and Communicative action another formulation of the principle U, which 
reads: ‗For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction 
of each person’s particular interests must be acceptable to all‘. (MCCA, 197) This formulation captures an 
ambiguity, because it implies the idea that Discourse Ethics could include particular interests. Nonetheless, this 
translation of U from the original German version is plausible (Finlayson, 1999: 51), as I am going to show is 
not coherent with what Habermas has been arguing systematically.  
17 To understand the weak condition of universalizability, I draw attention in the following example. In a 
particular community some people wants to protect a building for its historical worth and others because it is 
good to have that building as many tourists visit the area to see that heritage and they spend money in the 
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Hegel‘s criticisms, this version seems to have a clear advantage. In this case, the agents 
have their own particular interests to follow a moral norm. The particular will and the 
universal will are joined weakly through a contingent overlap of particular interests, what 
Rehg refers as strategic ‗marriages of convenience‘. (Rehg, 1994: 40) Then, it looks as 
Hegel‘s criticism can be answered. Notwithstanding, neither Hegel‘s account of the will nor 
of Sittlichkeit could be read in this loose sense.  
 
Moreover, it is not difficult to show that Habermas does not endorse this version in his 
understanding of the universalizability of norms. This is because, as said in previous 
paragraphs, a norm that can claim to have moral worth should be based on agent-neutral 
reasons and never on agent-relative reasons. Additionally, it has to be underpinned by the 
same reason. Conversely, in the weak version a norm could be in everyone‘s interest but 
different agents might have different interests and agent-relative reasons to uphold it. As I 
have shown, in Habermas‘s view of the universalizability, norms have to be in everyone‘s 
interest but at the same time they have to be based on agent-neutral reasons. Thus, they 
cannot be grounded on particular interests, as the weak version allows. In this regard, 
Habermas asserts,  
 
Particular interests are those that prove on the basis of discourse testing not to be 
susceptible of generalization and thus to require compromise. (Habermas, 1982: 
258)18  
 
Secondly, a weak version could mean that any content is agreed by a compromise or by the 
contingent overlap of particular interests. This description is similar to a contractualist 
position, which reduces ‗the validity of moral norms to a conventional agreement 
[Vereinbarung] among rational egoists, that is, to a happy coincidence of their respective 
interests‘. (T&J, 241) According to Habermas, this type of agreement does not possess the 
requisite stringency that moral validity demands. Hence, in Discourse Ethics, the 
deontological worth that moral norms claim it is not coherent with this version of the 
universalizability. In this weak version, everyone one has some reason to agree to a norm, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
local shops and restaurants. The different members share a content, which can be stated as protecting that 
particular building, but for different reasons. Here, more than a rational consensus one faces a merely de 
facto consensus or compromise.  
18 This formulation raises the following question: Is the norm on which people compromise in everyone‘s 
interest to some extent? In other words, can compromise rest on everyone‘s interest? If Habermas means 
everyone‘s interest with generalization, then compromise does not rest in everyone‘s interest.  
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but each person does not have the same one. So everyone has some interest in abiding by 
the norm, but not the same one in each case.  
 
Henceforth, Habermas‘s version of the universalizability is stronger than the weak 
conception stated before. In his account (U) means that the moral validity of a norm 
depends on everyone‘s accepting it for the same reason on the basis of the same interest. As 
he states in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action:  
 
True impartiality pertains only to that standpoint from which one can generalize 
precisely those norms that can count on universal assent because they perceptible 
embody an interest common to all affected. (MCCA, 65)  
 
Norms are impartial and that means that agent-relative interests are not susceptible of 
being universalized, because they refer back to the particular subjects whose interests they 
represent. A norm is universalizable, Habermas claims, when it embodies ‗everyone‘s 
interest‘ in a stronger sense. In other words, it is valid if the interest that is served by the 
norm, and hence the reason why different people agree to it, is one and the same for all. 
Habermas‘s moral theory establishes its aim as a rational consensus and not a compromise. 
In Discourse Ethics, Habermas holds, normative rightness is analogous with epistemic 
truth, and this implies that, in both cases a consensus is based on the agents sharing or 
having the same reasons.  
 
However, the stronger version of the universalizability can have two interpretations 
because it is possible to distinguish more than one form of sharing or having the same interest. 
(Finlayson, 1999: 43) In this regard, consensus ‗might be understood in either of two 
senses, the one a distributive sense, as I shall say, the other a collective one‘. (Pettit, 1982: 
215) Therefore, an interest can be collectively or distributively universalizable. Interestingly 
enough, in both cases different moral agents share the same interest in some sense, and 
therefore both versions could count as Habermas‘s notion of the universalizability of 
norms.  
 
Now, in order to understand both versions I rely on the following example. It is possible to 
argue that everyone has an interest in avoiding suffering. However, this is still an 
ambiguous formulation because someone might have an interest in her avoiding her own 
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suffering but not in everyone avoiding their suffering. This is the distributive or relaxed 
case. In contrast, everyone might share the interest in avoiding not only his or her own 
suffering but in preventing suffering per se, her and everybody else‘s. This is the collective 
or more stringent version of the universalizability of norms. 
 
In light of Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims the relaxed version seems to 
provide a straightforward response, because the agent-relative interest of the agent can be 
included in practical discourse. Thus, apparently in the distributive interpretation it is 
relatively easy to attain moral autonomy and reconcile the particular will and the universal 
will. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to argue that Habermas endorses the second 
more stringent formulation. First, as I have shown, he rules out agent-relative interests as 
being germane to the moral domain, and in the relaxed version a consensus can rest (partly 
or wholly) on the basis of universally distributed agent-relative interests. Habermas appear 
to assume that all agent-relative interests are particular, and that all moral norms are 
impartial and agent-neutral. In this respect, he asserts that, ‗in contrast with empiricist 
varieties of contractualism, this view holds that these reasons are not conceived as agent-
relative motives, thereby leaving the epistemic core of moral validity intact‘. (IO, 7) 
Secondly, the distributive more relaxed version could be coherent with a monological 
notion of moral autonomy which is at odds with Habermas‘s dialogical approach. In the 
former case, whether the participants engage in discourse or not, and whether they actually 
know what others‘ interest are, is a contingent matter, provided it is true that the norms 
serves an interest that each individual has, and that this interest is the same in each case. 
(Pettit, 1982: 215) 
 
In summary, Habermas neither endorses the view that a moral norm could rest on a 
compromise of particular reasons, nor the more relaxed version of the universalizability of 
norms in which they rest on agent-relative but universal interests. Rather, Discourse Ethics 
presuppose the collective more stringent version of the universalizability of norms in which 
they rest only on agent-neutral reasons. Consequently, bearing in mind that Habermas 
endorses this version it is still necessary to find in Discourse Ethics a proper answer, or at 
least the beginnings of a plausible response to the Hegelian criticism of the will as a tester 
of maxims. That is going to be the focus on the next section, by means of an analysis of the 
concept of ideal role taking, which is at the centre of the procedure of universalization of 
Habermas‘s moral theory.  
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4. The process of ideal role taking  
 
This section develops a Habermasian answer to Hegel‘s later criticisms of Kant‘s moral 
philosophy by analysing Mead‘s process of ideal role taking. In this concept one can find an 
additional reason to argue that a rational consensus in Discourse Ethics is different from 
compromises or strategic ‗marriages of convenience‘. (Rehg, 1994: 40) Both the stringent 
and the relaxed version of universalizability are stronger than compromise. Nonetheless, in 
light of the process of ideal role taking I will show that Habermas endorses the stringent 
version of the universalizability of norms. Moreover, through this concept it is possible to 
find the beginnings of an answer to the Hegelian challenge, namely, ideal role taking is an 
adequate account of how particular wills, in discourse, become moral wills. Consequently, it 
accomplishes what Kant‘s moral theory does not seem to be able to do. Thus, on the one 
hand, the process is evidence that Habermas uphold the stringent version of the 
universalizability (See the previous section), and on the other hand, could help to answer 
the Hegelian challenge.19   
 
This process refers to the post-conventional level of morality, in which the participants in 
discourse take a universalistic perspective. Moreover, it rules out any attempt to ground this 
procedure on the philosophy of consciousness, because it is a collective practice that has to 
be performed in public discourse. (JA, 49; BFN, 109-110) In Discourse Ethics, specifically 
in the principle of universalization (U), Habermas ‗picks up Mead‘s notion of ideal 
perspective-taking and demands that participants take an interest in each other‘s interests‘. 
(Rehg, 1994: 39) Here the participants both recognize their own interests and the interests 
of everybody else, throughout ‗the expansion of a reversible exchange of interpretative 
perspectives‘. (T&J, 105) Elsewhere, Habermas has defined this process as the ‗complete 
reversibility of participant perspectives that unleashes the higher-level intersubjectivity of the 
deliberating collectivity‘. (BFN, 228)  
 
Here I maintain that in this concept it is possible to find an answer to Hegel‘s later 
objection of Kant. In the process of ideal role taking, particular wills are channelled into 
the concept of the will – in Hegel‘s parlance. In other words, the interests and inclinations of 
the participants are shaped so as to take into consideration everybody else‘s particular 
                                                          
19 As it is well known, Mead is indebted to the Hegelian tradition. Therefore, it is understandable that 
Habermas could solve some Hegelian challenges by means of his appropriation of Mead‘s concepts within 
the frame of his Kantian pragmatism. (See Mead, 1967)  
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perspectives. This means that in discourse the agent is brought to the insight that her own 
interest matters equally to the interest of everybody else. Hence, bearing in mind this 
process it is possible to claim that in Habermas‘s version of the moral point of view 
throughout public discourse agent-relative interests can be combined, coincide and be 
shaped in terms of agent-neutral interests or generalizable interests. In other words, agent-
relative interests are shaped so people take an interest in the agent-relative interests of all 
others. 
 
In this way, Habermas can successfully answer Hegel‘s later criticism of Kant by means of 
the introduction of the process of ideal role taking. That said, although, this process implies 
to slacken the strict distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons that is the 
view of impartiality that Discourse Ethics seems to build. (See section 3) As I have shown, 
in the process of ideal role taking, agent-neutral reasons can be at the same time agent-
relative reasons. Now, it is important to remark that it is not the case that agent-relative 
interests merely overlap with agent-neutral (moral) reasons. Rather, the concept of agent-
neutral interests needs to be slackened and leave room for the inclusion of agent-relative 
interests within its formulation. To my mind, this is what happens when we examine the 
dialectical concept of ideal role taking.   
 
Kant was not able to accomplish this. His version of autonomy was monological and it was 
stymied by his two world metaphysics. These are the main reasons why he could not solve 
the later criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. It is not possible, Habermas claims, that 
the expansion of interchangeable perspectives – which is what the process of ideal role 
taking performs – can be made by every individual privately. Only another real participant 
in discourse can make me realize that her interest matters. Moreover, in Kant‘s moral 
theory it was difficult to envision the inclusion of inclinations and interests into the shaping 
of the moral will. These contents for Kant were ruled out from the domain of pure 
practical reason, because they were part of the phenomenal self and not of the noumenal self. 
After all, this was the condition to arrive to universal and unconditionally binding norms. 
In Kant‘s conception of pure practical reason, ‗if there is such an unconditional, categorical 
imperative, then it must be one that binds all rational agents necessarily independently of 
what particular purposes they will‘. (Pinkard, 2002: 50) In Discourse Ethics, this two realms 
distinction is ruled out. Due to this, practical discourse can go to work on contents of the 
empirical will – particular interests – that on Kant‘s conception have to be excluded or 
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overridden. In Habermas, the contents that could be part of a rational consensus include 
inclinations and interests. They can be binding as long as they are shaped by means of a 
procedure of universalization that reconstructs generalizable interests.  
 
5. Moral norms, values and the formula of humanity  
 
The previous section showed that throughout the process of ideal role taking – which is 
forced on participants by discourse – Habermas has a good argument to rebut the Hegelian 
criticism of Kant‘s moral philosophy which concerns the break between the moral will and 
the particular will. There is another distinction that Habermas sets out in Discourse Ethics, 
namely, between moral norms and values (MCCA, 103-104; JA, 1-17; T&J, 213-235; 
Baynes, 2016: 104; Finlayson, 1999: 47), which can be the object of a further Hegelian 
criticism. This criticism states that Habermas needs to blur the distinction (McCarthy; 1991; 
Putnam; 2002), and due to this he would be in a better position to refute Hegel‘s criticism 
of the will as a tester of maxims. In despite of this, I agree with those who claim that the 
distinction is necessary and can be convincingly defended. (See for example Forst, 1994: 
44; 2007: 62-78) 
 
In what follows, I maintain that the distinction between moral norms and values does not 
have to be blurred as Hegel and Hegelians assert. Still, the interplay between them may be 
more complex than Habermas allows (1). Then, I examine a Habermasian answer to 
Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims, which does not imply that the distinction 
between moral norms and values should be overcome, as Hegel suggests. Rather, this reply 
is connected with a Kantian insight, the recognition of others as ends in themselves in 
Kant‘s second formulation of the categorical imperative (4:429) (2).   
 
1. Hegel‘s strategy to complete Kant‘s moral philosophy, considering the problems that he 
found in the latter, namely, the break between the empirical will and the concept of the 
will, was throughout the dialectical relationship that he proposed between Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit. In light of this, the issue is whether and to what extent Habermas can rebut the 
objection to the will as a tester of maxims, while at the same time endorsing the distinction 
between moral norms and ethical values. To understand Hegel‘s solution it is important to 
explain what role he grants to Sittlichkeit. According to Pinkard, in Hegel‘s philosophy: 
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What gives legitimacy […] to each of these forms of Sittlichkeit is that in each, the 
individual can be ‗at home with himself‘ in that he can find his own particular way of 
being ethical (‗universal‘), his own particular way of orienting himself in ‗social 
space‘ in the light of a determinately structured ‗whole‘ that nonetheless embodies 
within itself reasons that can be shared by all. (Pinkard, 1999: 227)  
 
Hence, in order to adopt reasons that can be shared by all, that is to say, to endorse the 
moral standpoint, it is necessary to recognize the point of view of ethical life. In Hegel‘s 
philosophy Sittlichkeit refers to the institutions and practices that surround Moralität, which 
allows the agents to be at home with themselves and at the same time respect the moral 
point of view. In other words, through the tension between Moralität and Sittlichkeit the 
agents can be moral for their own reasons and this was Hegel‘s solution to the deficits that 
he found in Kant‘s moral philosophy. By means of this dialectic, it is possible to envision 
the reconciliation between the universal will and the particular will because ‗ethical life‘ is 
the domain and the medium of socialization, which enables the agents to be bound by 
morality.   
 
Against Hegel‘s alternative, Habermas supports the strict distinction between moral norms 
and ethical values. For example, he asserts that ‗particular values are ultimately discarded as 
being not susceptible to consensus‘. (MCCA, 103) To put it briefly, ethical values are not 
the objects of morality because they are not universalizable. Ethical values are of a different 
nature. Habermas distinguishes at least two types of ethical values. First, the ethical-
existential justification of life decisions that one can vindicate in relation to oneself and 
‗significant others‘. (JA, 1-17) This level already has an intersubjective dimension, since 
such values are justified in the context of ethical communities. Second, the ethical in his 
theory can have a political meaning. The form of life of the political community ‗that is in 
each case our own‘ constitutes the reference system for justifying decisions that are 
supposed to express an authentic, collective self-understanding. (BFN, 108) Both types are 
connected because, ‗The ―existential‖ question of who I am and would like to be, which is 
posed in the singular, is repeated in the plural — and is thus given a different meaning‘. 
(BFN, 160) 
 
In his Hegelian reading of Discourse Ethics, McCarthy asserts that implicitly Habermas 
blurs the distinction because ‗the articulation of needs in practical discourse will draw upon 
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existing standards of value; as interpreted, needs are internally related to, and thus 
inseparable from, cultural values‘. (1991: 183) Thus, he proposes that Habermas should be 
clearer and slacken the distinction between moral norms and ethical values. To my mind, 
Habermas can accept the premises of McCarthy‘s argument but not the consequence that 
the latter draws from them.  
 
Taking into account the unambiguous version of the contents that are susceptible of 
rational consensus20, it is clear that ethical values are not the expected outcomes of the 
procedure of universalization (U) of practical discourses. From the definitions given above, 
ethical values have a particular dimension which is connected with the person and her 
community. Henceforth, they cannot reach the universal level of all those possible affected 
by a moral norm which characterizes morality in Habermas. Values might bleed into the 
process by which interests are shaped in discourse, but they are then tested throughout the 
principle of universalization of norms. As long as they can claim moral validity these 
elements can successfully pass the principle of universalization (U) and underpin the 
justification of norms. In order to have the moral status demanded by Discourse Ethics 
these considerations have to rest on universalizable and agent-neutral interest.21 Otherwise, 
if their content cannot be universalizable, they are filtered out.22 In my interpretation, moral 
norms can come in the language and the form of values, but that does mean that they can 
have deontological worth if they are not at bottom moral norms. In this way, certainly 
conceptions of the good and values could contribute to carry out moral discourses but as 
Baynes correctly asserts:   
 
Insofar as it is not reasonable to expect that a given conception of the good will 
meet with the agreement of all in a discourse, that conception itself can no longer 
serve as a moral norm or be invoked as the basis for a moral norm. (Baynes, 2016: 
120) 
 
Consequently, even if it is true that interests (qua need interpretations) are initially formed 
in the light of values, even these are subject to further interpretation in intersubjective 
discourse. So it is wrong of McCarthy to assume that because the values that feed into 
                                                          
20 See section three of this Chapter.  
21 See section three of this Chapter.  
22 For instance, certain values like generosity or respect for others could be seen as both moral norms and 
they also can be justified in light of a modern ethical life Sittlichkeit. Nonetheless, if they can be universalizable 
this depends on the fact that they convey a moral content and not because they are ethical values.  
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discourse are individual or group specific, that so will the norms that are the outputs of 
discourse. Hence, in my view, Habermas does not endorse the solution proposed by Hegel 
and McCarthy and does not need to do it. Notwithstanding, this analysis have shown that 
the interplay between norms and values seems to be more complex than Habermas allows.  
 
In summary, in this section I have expounded and defended Habermas‘s distinction 
between moral norms and ethical values. However, I have not answered yet if this strict 
condition allows Habermas to respond to Hegel criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. 
In the next section, I examine a further reply which relies on a Kantian inside, namely, the 
recognition of me and others as end in themselves.  
 
2. In what follows, I develop an answer to the Hegelian challenge from a Kantian 
interpretation of Discourse Ethics. In Habermas‘s justification of the principle of 
universalization (see Chapter One), one of the elements is a claim of what it means to 
‗justify a norm of action‘ or what he names a weak ‗concept of normative justification‘ (IO, 45). 
In simple terms, this refers to the obligation to give an account on validity claims. 
According to Baynes, ‗It is a thin, but non-negligible, idea of norm-justification in which 
individuals are viewed as mutually accountable agents‘. (Baynes, 2016: 115) To my 
understanding, if in an interpretation of this component it is possible to find a response to 
Hegel‘s charge, then Habermas‘s moral philosophy in its Kantian reading also stands. 
 
In his interpretation of practical reason and autonomy, Rainer Forst has argued that, 
‗whenever an ethical or instrumental reason for being moral is asked for, the moral 
standpoint simply cannot be found‘. (2007: 76) Of course, Habermas agrees with this 
definition, namely, when he draws the distinction between norms and values and earlier 
when he distinguishes between communicative and instrumental reason. Thus, morality is 
based in itself and it does not need to find its ground anywhere else.  
 
This autonomous foundation of morality needs the support of a moral conception of the 
selves. If that is the case, then there is another alternative to close the gap between the 
universal will and the particular will: ‗communicative subjects have a moral interest in 
recognizing universalizable interests‘. (Finlayson, 1999: 48-49) In a first reading, this seems 
to be circular. For some reason, the subjects are moral and it just happens that they have a 
particular interest to recognize universalizable interests. Henceforth, morality is effective 
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because the moral agents have their own reasons to follow and respect moral norms that 
are in ‗everyone‘s interest‘.  
 
I maintain that this argument is not circular in a negative way and it is justifiable. The 
reason is that in order to be a moral agent at all it is necessary to recognize others as valid 
agents too. This insight can be found in Kant‘s second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, the formula of humanity to respect others as not only means but always also as 
ends in themselves. Also in Fichte‘s theory of recognition (2000), in Hegel‘s struggle for 
recognition in the Phenomenology (1977a), and also in Habermas weak ‗concept of normative 
justification‘ (IO, 45) broached in the principle of discourse (D). Here, it is an interest of the 
empirical will to recognize everybody else‘s interest. In other words, it is impossible for an 
agent to be moral and to be autonomous means to recognize the right of every other to 
participate in a communicative process of giving reasons. In this respect, Forst asserts:  
 
Perceiving and cognizing others as human beings also means recognizing them as moral 
persons with a right to reciprocal and general justification, and knowing that no 
further reason for this recognition is required aside from this reference to the 
shared characteristic of being human. This is the fundamental insight of an 
autonomous morality of autonomy. (Forst, 2007: 77)  
 
Thus, practical reason is intersubjective. Strictly speaking, it is a common practice of giving 
and sharing reasons. Then, it implies the recognition of the interests of the others. As a 
moral agent I know that my autonomy can only arise in the company of others. Therefore, 
I have an interest to recognize everyone else‘s interests because I am also one of them. 
Somehow, not recognizing their interests means that my own interest cannot be recognized 
as well. Hence, when I am not moral I am not recognizing myself. Kant‘s second 
formulation of the categorical imperative and the respect of persons as end in themselves 
(4:429), goes in this direction. I recognize the autonomy of the other as equal to me and in 
this movement I also recognize myself.23  
 
In this regard, Rainer Forst supports an autonomous conception of morality and in this 
point he certainly agrees with Habermas‘s account of practical reason and autonomy. Put 
                                                          
23 Freyenhagen (2011) also replies to the empty formalism objection adducing the formula of humanity. In that 
formulation of the categorical imperative, ‗we can derive some content from the mere idea of duty for duty‘s 
sake, specifically the objective end of humanity‘. (2011: 168) 
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simply, this conception means that morality finds its ground in itself. Therefore, the general 
will and the particular will can be joined together for moral reasons and it is not necessary, 
as Hegel argues, to blur the distinction between moral norms and values. Accordingly, the 
duty of giving and accepting reasons is the root from which morality is grounded. 
Moreover, justification is the ‗best possible way to philosophically reconstruct the Kantian 
categorical imperative to respect other persons as ‗ends in themselves‘‘. (Forst, 2007: 2) 
  
As I have shown, in Discourse Ethics autonomy is understood in intersubjective terms (see 
particularly Chapter One). This pertains to the insight that the recognition of the autonomy 
of the others is at the same time the recognition of my own autonomy. Therefore, in the 
idea of mutual recognition (and mutual understanding) the gap between universalizable 
content and particular content can be closed. This is because it is in my own interest to 
recognize the agent-neutral interest of everyone being recognized in their autonomy. If that 
argument is tenable, then moral agents can be both moral and autonomous for her own 
reasons. Hence, mutual recognition means that a real person makes a generalizable interest 
– in the sense settled by the stringent condition of the universalizability of moral norms 
(See section three of this Chapter) – his or her own. Of course, this justification proceeds 
from the assumption that ‗the participants do not wish to resolve their conflicts through 
violence, or even compromise, but through communication‘. (IO, 39) In communication, a 
particular person might endorse as hers the agent-neutral interest of everyone else to be 
recognized as a proper participant in practical discourse. To be sure, still this argument 
might sound unappealing. If both, the argument broached in section four concerning ideal 
role taking and the one developed in this section fail, then it seems to me that a 
Habermasian solution to Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims it is simple 
unworkable. In this Chapter I have tried to give reasons to justify the contrary.  
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Part II 
 
Habermas’s Political Kantianism and 
Hegelian criticisms  
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3 
The Kantian Foundations of Habermas’s Political 
Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this Chapter I examine the inner structures of Habermas‘s theory of legal and political 
legitimacy and I conclude that they are framed in Kantian terms.1 On the one hand, this 
statement does not seem to be problematic because Habermas openly recognizes that his 
political theory has a Kantian pedigree. For example, he has argued that his notion of 
legitimacy is based on a Kantian Republicanism. (MW, 94, 113; Forst, 2011: 180) 
Moreover, in the debate with Rawls on Political Liberalism, Habermas claims that the latter 
‗proposed an intersubjectivistic version of Kant‘s principle of autonomy‘ (RPR, 25), and at 
the same time he asserts concerning Rawls‘s Theory of Justice that ‗I share its intentions and 
regard its essentials results as correct‘. (RPR, 25) Due to this, Habermas‘s claims his 
critique of Rawls remains within ‗the bounds of a familial dispute‘ (RPR, 25), a family that 
finds its affiliation in the Kantian tradition. (Forst, 2007: 80; Laden, 2011: 135)  
 
                                                          
1 Habermas‘s theory of legal and political legitimacy gains its concrete shape and substance in works that were 
written mainly during the 90‘s. This topic is developed in Between Facts and Norms, in the Inclusion of the Other 
and in the debate with Rawls. (Habermas‘s RPR and MW) Here I agree with Finlayson (2011, 2016) for 
whom the relevant issue in the dispute is the question for legal and political legitimacy. Otherwise, I would 
not be discussing this quarrel when I am broaching Habermas‘s Kantianism in his legal and political theory. 
In the final Chapter of this thesis I focus more on the debate than I do in this Chapter. Habermas‘s theory of  
legal and political legitimacy is also discussed in further articles and in Habermas‘s replies to critics. See 
Rozenfeld and Arato (1998) and Finlayson. (2011) See also Habermas. (2001) In what follows, I do not 
explore Habermas‘s contributions on international law. Although, the analysis of this theme is helpful to 
understand the relationship between morality and law in Habermas (See Flynn, 2003, 2011), I cannot discuss 
this issue in this work. Habermas‘s position concerning this theme is set out in his ‗Kant‘s Idea of Perpetual 
Peace: At Two Hundred Years‘ Historical Remove‘ in IO (165-202) and the Postnational Constellation (PC). 
Finally and for the sake of my argument I do not discuss Habermas‘s position concerning the project of the 
European Union.  
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On the other hand, the aforementioned claim is controversial because Habermas connects 
Kant with the tradition of natural law (and rational law) which he wants to avoid. (BFN, 44, 
101 & 103; BNR, 102; Baynes, 2015: 135) This is, he claims, because these reconstructions 
lost contact with the reality of contemporary societies (BFN, 42-45; Finlayson, 2011: 7; 
Flynn, 2011: 252) and they have a paternalistic understanding of political philosophy in 
which the political philosopher offers to the citizens the basic frame and the limits of what 
can count as legitimate. (Habermas, 2011: 296; Forst, 2011: 165)  Therefore, they set 
arbitrary and external constrains on the political autonomy of the demos. Then, the 
question whether and to what extent Habermas is developing a Kantian political theory 
cannot be easily answered. Here, I argue that despite what Habermas says to the contrary – 
especially what he wrote in BFN – his political philosophy is essentially framed in a 
modified version of Kant‘s notion of pure practical reason and autonomy (See Chapter 
One). In other words, the inner architecture of Habermas‘s theory of legitimacy is 
grounded on this philosophical element, despite the fact that he includes components 
which supposedly go beyond, and differ from, the Kantian tradition – i.e., the legal form as 
an historical input. (BFN, 82-131; Flynn, 2003: 438-439) In this respect, I side with some 
sympathetic critics of Habermas who argue that a fully immanent – or intra-legal – 
reconstruction of constitutional democracy and the ‗system of rights‘ is not possible. 
(Flynn, 2003; 2011; Forst, 2007) 
The Kantian framework is, I argue, necessary to understand Habermas‘s position properly, 
but he tends to leave it to one side in BFN when he argues that the principle of discourse is 
an immanent reconstruction of a social practice which stands below the threshold of 
morality (BFN, 107, 121; BNR, 84, 89), and by the emphasis that Habermas gives to the 
legal form as a historical and functional input. (BFN, 83, 111-113; 117-130, Finlayson, 
2011: 7-11; Hedrick, 2010: 105-106) In this Chapter I start from one of the conclusions of 
Chapter One, namely, that despite the fact that the principle of discourse is an immanent 
social practice – and in that sense here Habermas is taking on board Hegel‘s critique of 
Kant – it also has a Kantian pedigree, because it is based on a Kantian account of practical 
reason. In light of this claim, I examine Habermas‘s principle of democracy which unfolds 
from the principle of discourse and the legal form. Moreover, in this Chapter I show that it 
is possible to give a Kantian interpretation to the legal form. At the same time, in the 
debate with Rawls, Habermas‘s Kantianism emerges in sharp relief in the justification of 
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legal and political legitimacy.2 The underlying Kantianism of Habermas‘s position as it 
figures in his debate with Rawls is examined in more detail in Chapter Four. In this 
Chapter I set the stage for that discussion (and also for the discussion of Hegelian 
criticisms of Habermas‘s political theory) and I shed light on the question whether and to 
what extent the normative dimension of Habermas‘s theory of legitimacy demands relies 
on the reconstruction of the Kantian notion of pure practical reason and autonomy.  
As I have shown in Chapter One, this Kantian element is a modified and attenuated version of 
Kant‘s concept of autonomy. The normative component in Habermas – the principle of 
discourse – refers to the intersubjective account of the post-conventional level of 
justification (MCCA, JA) whereas in Kant, autonomy is grounded on a metaphysical view 
based on the philosophy of the subject. Conversely, the principle of discourse has a weak-
transcendental status. (MCCA, 75-76) It is weak because it refers to institutions and practices 
of modern Sittlichkeit. Moreover, it is not linked with rational subjectivity, but to the 
specifically human form of life mediated through communication and discourse. That said, 
it also seems to apply universally whenever human beings aim to reach a mutual 
understanding about something.3 Therefore, it is transcendental but at the same time is weak. 
According to Habermas, in the theory of legitimacy these normative components – 
fundamentally the principle of discourse – are clad in the medium of law:  
Once moral principles must be embodied in the medium of coercive and positive 
law, the freedom of the moral person splits into the public autonomy of co-
legislators and the private autonomy of addressees of the law, in such a way that 
they reciprocally presuppose one another. (MW, 113) 
Now, private and public autonomy are protected by the ‗system of rights‘ which arises 
from the relationship of the normative component, the principle of Discourse (D), and the 
factical component, the legal form. (BFN, 82-131) This is the co-originality thesis which 
aims to give equal weight to the liberties of the moderns – whom stressed individual 
                                                          
2 See specially MW. See Forst. (2011) In his reply to Rainer Forst‘s article (2011), Habermas rejects a moral 
argument for the reconstruction of legal and political legitimacy. (Habermas, 2011: 295-298) Habermas 
asserts that the thesis that basic rights ‗are conceptualized in intrinsically juridical terms as individual rights 
that absolve agents from the duty to provide justiﬁcations speaks against a monistic construction of law and 
morality‘. (Habermas, 2011: 298) In order to avoid this controversial and difficult issue, I have preferred to 
state that this support is a normative Kantian component which not necessarily as a moral tinge.  
3 In the Groundwork Kant develops a transcendental argument to justify the moral law (the categorical 
imperative) on the transcendental idea of freedom. However, as I have shown in Chapter One, in the Second 
Critique Kant also develops a second strategy to justify the moral law, namely, the doctrine of the fact of 
reason. (See specially Section 5 of Chapter One) 
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freedom – and the liberties of the ancients – whom stressed collective self-determination 
(Constant, 1988). Habermas systematically claims that no one before him has been able to 
find the balance between both principles (BFN, 84; 100-101; IO, 258). However, in BFN 
and elsewhere Habermas endorses the view that his theory is a ‗two-stage‘ construction. 
(RH, 63, 76; Habermas, 2001: 766-782; Habermas, 2011: 295; Forst, 2011: 171) This 
methodology makes that one of the criticism that Habermas develops against Rawls‘s 
Liberalism, as he understands it, namely, that this doctrine ‗generates a priority of liberal 
rights which demotes the democratic process to an inferior status‘ (RPR, 41), could apply 
also to his own critical theory. Therefore, if this interpretation of Habermas‘s co-originality 
is correct, then he would not be immune to Ingeborg Maus‘s criticism of Kant and 
Kantianism, namely, that this way to reconstruct the co-originality is detrimental to popular 
sovereignty. (Maus, 1995: 825-882) Moreover, as I have shown, according to some critics the 
‗system of rights‘ needs moral support. (Flynn, 2003; 2011; Forst, 2007; Cohen, 1999) In 
light of the co-originality thesis, this means that normative content is included at the 
beginning, before the practice of public autonomy takes place. 
Before I continue, a particular aspect of the idea of a ‗two-stage‘ construction needs 
clarification to avoid misunderstandings. This methodology does not grant in a first step 
the priority only to liberal rights, but also to republican rights.4 Habermas asserts that the 
theory of legitimacy ‗consists of a ―system of rights‖ that at ﬁrst only serves to constitute 
the procedure of democratic law making‘ (Habermas, 2011: 295). In the first stage, abstract 
rights or ‗unsaturated placeholders‘ (BFN, 125) which define private and public autonomy 
are framed. Then, in the second stage, they gain their concrete shape by means of the 
‗exercise, the actual carrying out‘ (Habermas, 2001: 778) of public autonomy. From this, in 
this Chapter I will argue that Habermas relies on a Kantian methodology that gives priority 
to a normative frame of rights (the ‗system of rights‘) which gains its actual shape and 
substance in a second step by means of its embodiment in the institutions and practices of 
modern societies.      
In order to develop these issues this Chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, I 
expound the basic structure of Habermas‘s political theory and I show that it is 
conceptually5 related to Kant‘s Rechtslehre. This part develops the relationship between Kant 
                                                          
4 Kenneth Baynes opens a similar interpretation when he states that ‗the system of rights (including the rights 
of public autonomy) must be institutionalized‘. (Baynes, 2016: 142)  
5 In this work, I use the idea of a ‗conceptual relationship‘ or also ‗internal relationship‘ in the sense that if 
two components are conceptually or internally related it means that their relationship is necessary and not 
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and Habermas concerning the tension between [Faktizität und Geltung]; then, bearing in 
mind this distinction, I examine the legal form. Finally I discuss the principle of democracy 
and its relationship with Kant‘s principle of Universal Right (I).  
In the second part, I examine Habermas‘s co-originality between private and public 
autonomy and I argue that at bottom it relies on a modified Kantian notion of pure 
practical reason and autonomy. At the beginning, I introduce in broader bush-strokes the 
issue of the co-originality in political philosophy and in Kant; then, I discuss the 
Habermasian version of the co-originality thesis and the ‗system of rights‘; and finally I 
assess Habermas‘s thesis from the point of view of some influential critics. (Rawls‘s RH, 
Larmore, 1995, Flynn, 2003, 2011, Forst, 2011, Cohen, 1999) (II).  
I. Habermas’s Kantianism in the theory of legitimacy   
The main book in which Habermas develops his political philosophy is BFN. This 
extremely complex and rich text ranges among several branches of philosophical and 
social-theoretical investigation. (Michelmann, 1996: 307) Despite this wide scope, at the 
core of Habermas‘s theory of legal and political legitimacy lies a modified and attenuated 
Kantian element which pertains to the post-conventional notion of normative justification. 
This Kantian component is broached in the principle of discourse (D) which is embedded 
in the legal medium. By means of this arises the principle of democracy and the ‗system of 
rights‘ (BFN, 82-131) and both together confer legitimacy to the law-making practice. 
Before I examine in detail Habermas‘s ‗system of rights‘ (See second part of this Chapter), 
in this first part I elucidate the basic distinctions that Habermas uses to develop his 
concept of legitimacy and I show that they are fundamentally Kantian.  
I divide this part of this Chapter into three sections. In the first, I show that the distinction 
between Facticity and Validity frames Habermas‘s theory of Constitutional Democracy and 
at the same time has a conceptual relationship with Kant‘s Rechtslehre. In this respect, the 
distinction not only shapes the theories of legitimacy of both philosophers. Rather, the link 
is stronger and refers to the fact that both Kant‘s notion of pure practical reason and 
Habermas‘s concept of communicative reason share in their inner workings the distinction 
between Facticity and Validity. Moreover – continuing the argument I developed in Chapter 
One – Habermas‘s notion of communicative reason has a Kantian pedigree because is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
merely possible. For example, legitimate law is conceptually tied to the notion of political autonomy; 
otherwise it is simply not legitimate law. (See IO, 254) 
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connected to Kant‘s ‗ideas of pure reason‘. Bearing in mind these connections, I conclude 
that the very tension between Facticity and Validity is conceptually related to Kant‘s notion 
of pure practical reason (1).   
In the second section, I examine in light of the tension between Facticity and Validity 
Habermas‘s Kantianism with a focus on the legal form. Here I argue that at bottom, the 
legal medium has an instrumental role in the protection of the autonomy of the subjects 
and the actual carrying out of the practice of exchanging reasons in legal and political 
discourses. In other words, the legal form has a functional place in the theory protecting 
the normative content, namely, either the Kantian notion of pure practical reason or the 
Habermasian notion of communicative reason (2).  
Finally in the third section, having described the essential features of the principle of 
discourse (D)6 and of the legal form7, I study the chief principle of legal and political 
legitimacy in Habermas‘s theory, namely, the principle of democracy. The latter results 
from the interpenetration [Verschränkung] of the principle of discourse and the legal form. 
On the one hand, (following the argument developed in Chapter One) (D) has a weak-
transcendental status and it is fundamentally Kantian. On the other hand, the legal form is a 
functional and historical input. Here I compare Habermas‘s principle of democracy with 
Kant‘s main principle of legitimacy: the principle of Universal Right (3).  
1. Facticity, Validity and Communicative Reason 
The Theory of Communicative Action addresses the sociological question of how social order is 
possible. Habermas argues that the conceptions of reason and agency that have been at the 
centre of the answers proposed to this issue have been incomplete. Neither the model of 
instrumental rationality – familiar in rational choice approaches of agency – nor the notion 
of functional rationality – i.e., the Marxist tradition and Luhmann‘s systems theory – ‗can 
account for the contribution of the normative self-understanding of social actors‘. (Baynes, 
2016: 131) Following Baynes‘s account of Habermas‘s theory, these approaches disregard 
both the normative component and the perspective of the agents from the sociological 
analysis.  
                                                          
6 See Chapter One.  
7 Section two of this Part.  
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That said, however, Habermas recognizes that significant contributions have been made in 
this tradition to integrate both the normative dimension and the point of view of the 
participants – i.e., Durkheim and Parsons. Habermas continues these theoretical trends 
because, as I have shown in Chapter One, the Theory of Communicative Action puts at the 
centre the question of its own normative foundations. (TCA 1, xli) Axel Honneth argues 
that Discourse Ethics gives account of the normative standards of Habermas‘s critical 
theory. (1991: 282) Probably that is one reason (perhaps the main reason) why right after 
Habermas wrote TCA in the 80‘s then he focused on developing the program of Discourse 
Ethics. (Finlayson, 2013: 522-23) Moreover, TCA focuses on the normative question of 
social integration of modern societies. At the same time, TCA incorporates the perspective 
of the participants for at least two reasons: first, the reconstructive methodology that is 
central in Habermas‘s theory refers to the knowledge that the agents have to perform in 
communicative processes (TCA 1, 103; PT, 23, 36); second, the centrality that TCA gives 
to the concept of the life-world which is reproduced communicatively and by the agency of 
the individuals.8   
These elements of Habermas‘s social theory play a central role in the theory of legal and 
political legitimacy broached in BFN.9 In this book Habermas develops from the very 
beginning the connections and the place that the constitutional state and democracy have 
into the more general sociological theory. Law is a central mechanism to guarantee the 
integration of modern societies and it relieves other mechanisms that perform these 
functions but by other means – i.e., morality, ethics and religion as well. Furthermore, the 
normative component that is broached in Discourse Ethics, namely, the principle of 
discourse (D), has a central place in the reconstruction of the concept of legitimacy in 
Habermas – the principle of democracy.10 (BFN, 82-131) Additionally, legal and political 
legitimacy are inherent to the perspective of the participants. This is because in a post-
                                                          
8 The life-world is a key concept of the sociological theory developed in TCA. According to Habermas, 
society is divided into the life-world and the systems of the State bureaucracy and the market. The latter 
systems are steered by political power and money. On the contrary, the life-world is a communicative 
medium and it is integrated by culture (symbolic systems), society (norms that regulate interpersonal 
relationships) and personality (the individual‘s life-story and identity). (TCA 2) 
9 As a matter of fact, in TAC Habermas develops a more ambivalent view of law. On the one hand, law is an 
institution responsible for integration. On the other hand, it is also a medium through which social systems 
colonize the life world. (TAC 2, 365) The latter interpretation is more coherent with the traditional view of 
the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Adorno and Horkheimer combined the Weberian theory of the 
rationalization of modern societies with the Marxist critique of the capitalist society and in this way law was 
assessed as a formal system that contributed to the reification and alienation of humanity and social 
relationships. In BFN law has a more positive and prominent role in the legitimation process and as a 
mechanism of integration. In TAC, that place was fundamentally taken by morality.  
10 I develop the principle of democracy in the third section of this part of the Chapter.  
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traditional context only from them comes the legitimacy of the constitutional state. In BFN 
the rule of law is conceptually bound to democracy. This means that legitimate law ought 
to protect private autonomy, by legally recognizing basic rights, which are immanent 
components of modern legal11 orders and the principle of Popular Sovereignty (public 
autonomy). Henceforth, this priority of private and public autonomy shows that only from 
the point of view of the participants a modern legal order obtains its legitimacy and its 
Validity [Geltung].  
Nevertheless, legal orders not only refer to this normative dimension and the point of view 
of the participants. There is an additional feature of law which is its enforceability. This 
means that the rights of a legal order are enforced by the state. Habermas endorses this 
position and in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values he asserts that ‗Legal norms borrow 
their binding force from the government‘s potential for sanctions‘. (246) Of course, it is 
true that the subjects can respect law in general and particular rights due to their 
substantive rationality and because this citizens might recognize themselves as the authors 
of the legal norms that rule their political life. However, law functions in the ‗stabilization 
of behavioural expectations‘ and when the recognition of its rationality does not motivate 
external actions (for example a person can recognize law‘s rationality but that does not 
necessarily motivate her) or someone does not recognize law‘s rationality (for example, 
someone who feels excluded from the political process) the participants normally assume 
the perspective of the observer and obey law because there is a threat of sanctions. In other 
words, the subject adopts an instrumental perspective towards the legal order and she 
calculates the cons and pros of respecting a norm. This aspect refers to the Facticity 
[Faktizität] of law. The latter concept and the notion of Validity shape the tension that 
frames the discussion on BFN.   
If one follows the origins of the tension between Facticity and Validity Kant‘s name comes 
to the fore. According to Rehg in the introduction of the English translation of BFN, the 
distinction between Facticity and Validity is heavily ‗indebted to Immanuel Kant‘s concept 
of legitimacy‘. (1996: xi) To my mind, Rehg‘s assertion is completely correct. For instance, 
in his political and legal theory Kant establishes an internal relation between the coercive 
character of law (Facticity) and its function guaranteeing freedom (Validity). This is because 
the definition of right entails ‗an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it‘. 
                                                          
11 The recognition of fundamental rights is an immanent feature of modern law. This thesis does not only 
apply to Habermas‘s normative theory of legal and political legitimacy. Rather, as I show in the following 
section of this part, even it can be found in more positivistic approaches.  
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(6: 231) In the Rechtslehre this coercive character of law is a necessary condition for 
civilization (Reiss, 1991: 26) since without this enforceability the citizens‘ freedom would 
not be protected. This enforceability is combined with the moral nature of legal norms or 
as Kant asserts in the Feyerabend Lectures ‗right is the subset of moral norms that are also 
coercible norms‘. (27: 1327) This clearly shows that Kant‘s political theory can be examined 
in light of the tension between Validity and Facticity. With some modifications, Habermas 
endorses this view of legitimacy as well. (IO, 255)12 He claims that basic rights – or human 
rights – have a ‘Janus-Faced’ nature. On the one hand, they have the same scope – they 
apply to all human beings – and demand the post-conventional justification which moral 
norms do. On the other hand, they are enforceable by the state – or by international 
institutions. (IO, 118; Flynn, 2003: 433) Henceforth, both Habermas and Kant accept the 
view that law is divided into the normative dimension of Validity and the functional 
dimension of Facticity (enforceability).  
Now, I want to show that this connection between these authors is deeper and subtler. 
This is because the tension is conceptually related to the notion of communicative reason 
which is developed in TAC and also in the program of Discourse Ethics. In this respect, 
Habermas asserts that ‗The theory of communicative action already absorbs the tension 
between facticity and validity into its fundamental concepts‘. (BFN, 8) Following 
Habermas‘s terminology, the concept of communicative reason has a ‘Janus-faced’ nature. 
On the one hand, it refers to counterfactual idealizations that ground the notion of rational 
understanding [Verständigung]. On the other hand, it has a sociological role because it is 
actually effective for processes of social integration. These features of the concept of 
communicative action show that it ‗is the origin of the tension between ―facticity‖ and 
―validity‖ that structures Habermas‘s BFN‘. (Baynes, 2016: 132) Now, as I have shown in 
Chapter One, the concept of communicative reason has an internal relationship with 
Kant‘s account of pure practical reason. Combining both, the claim that the notion of 
communicative reason is the proximate ground of the tension between Facticity and Validity, 
and that communicative reason has a close kinship with Kant‘s concept of moral reason, I 
draw the conclusion that the tension is connected with Kant‘s notion of pure practical 
                                                          
12 I say with some modifications because Habermas gives a more legalistic account of the ‗system of rights‘ 
which is detrimental to the moral interpretation of private and public autonomy. (Larmore, 1995; Cohen, 
1999; Forst, 2007; Flynn, 2003) Moreover he includes the principle of discourse in his reconstruction of legal 
and political legitimacy. This principle is a normative procedure and not a moral procedure. I examine these 
issues in more detail especially in the following sections and in the second part of this Chapter.  
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reason. This connection bears out my thesis that Habermas endorses a Kantian view 
concerning legitimacy. 
Having described this connection, now it is important to show that the tension between 
Facticity and Validity appears in two forms: one ‗internal‘ and another ‗external‘ to law. The 
‗internal‘ tension is reflected in the intrinsic rationality of law (validity) and in the fact that 
legitimate orders can be coercible enforced (facticity). As I have shown, Kant establishes 
this tension in his Rechtslehre. The ‗external‘ tension pertains to the claim of a political order 
to be legitimate (validity) versus the de facto recognition of its legitimacy by the citizens 
(facticity). In An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment’? And elsewhere (for example, 
see 6:313–14) Kant endorses this view. There he develops the idea that the only source of 
legitimacy resides in the autonomy of the subjects and cannot be determined by any 
external authority. As Rawls asserts regarding Kant‘s notion of autonomy ‗Kant‘s main aim 
is to deepen and to justify Rousseau‘s idea that liberty is acting in accordance with a law 
that we give to ourselves‘. (TJ, 225) Henceforth, in Kant‘s moral and political philosophy it 
is present the ‗external‘ tension between the claim of a political order to be legitimate and 
the de facto acceptance of its members.   
Up to now, I have developed the ‗internal‘ tension in Habermas‘s theory which refers to 
the relationship between the normative rationality of law and its enforceability. In order to 
examine the ‗external‘ tension, I follow Baynes who suggests that we look at ‗Rawls‘s recent 
account of public reason‘ to illuminate this point. (Baynes, 2016: 133) Rawls proposes that 
the ground of legitimacy is a public notion of reason. This notion is based on the concepts 
of freedom and autonomy that pertain to the relationship between the citizens of a political 
community. The conception of public reason needs to be the focus of an Overlapping 
Consensus of comprehensive doctrines within the political culture, in order to guarantee the 
stability of a well-ordered society. (PL, 141)13 In this regard, in the debate with Rawls, 
Habermas charges that the former collapses the distinction between justified acceptability 
                                                          
13 According to Rawls, the political conception of Political Liberalism ‗can be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus‘ (PL, 141) of comprehensive doctrines. This means that the citizens are going to endorse the 
political conception by means of their comprehensive doctrines. Before I continue developing the argument I 
need to describe Rawls‘s notion of ‗comprehensive doctrine‘. This concept has three different meanings: a) 
world views, religious and secular; b) actually existing moralities, or conceptions of the good; c) philosophical 
theories of one kind of another. (PL 2005: xviii, 12, 144-145) Now, Rawls‘s proposal is that the political 
conception (the conception of public reason) of Political Liberalism is a module that fits into the citizens‘ 
comprehensive doctrines and finds its support there.  
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and actual acceptance. (RPR, 122)14 Moreover, Habermas argues that Rawls gives a purely 
instrumental role to the concept of Overlapping Consensus that instead of guaranteeing the 
intrinsic legitimacy of a legal order only warrants its acceptance by the citizens. The 
‗political ideals and values‘ that Rawls claims to be so merely in virtue of being shared, are, 
according to Habermas, only instrumentally valuable, because they contribute to stability.  
In this way, for Habermas, Rawls is more concerned with the actual acceptance of a legal 
order than with its justified acceptability. Baynes agrees with this interpretation, and he 
states that Rawls seems to assume that the tension between justification and acceptability ‗is 
sufficiently overcome within a liberal political culture‘. (Baynes, 2016: 134) In other words, 
the demand for justification of the political conception – Validity in the external tension – 
and the issue of the actual acceptance of the citizens of it – Facticity in the external tension 
– seems to be taken for granted and solved beforehand in Rawls‘s theory.  
Conversely, Habermas makes the ‗external‘ tension explicit. (Baynes, 2016: 134) 
Specifically, he argues that the public reasons generated in processes of free and informal 
discourses of opinion-formation are channelled and transformed into legal and political 
decisions. In this way, the tension between the validity that a political and legal order 
demands and the de facto validity that it has from the point of view of the citizens it is 
something that needs to be achieved (more precisely a fact of the social world) and not an 
element to be assumed within the theory (as in Rawls). Therefore, in Habermas‘s theory the 
‗external‘ tension emerges in sharp relief.  
In despite of this difference, it is important to mention that both Rawls‘s appeal to ‗public 
reason‘ and Habermas‘s concept of ‗communicative reason‘ as responses to the question of 
legitimacy rely on an intersubjectivistic account of Kant‘s notion of autonomy. (See Forst, 
2011; See also Baynes 2016) This notion of agency in Rawls refers to the fundamental 
moral powers of the citizens and in Habermas to the presuppositions shared by those who 
act communicatively. In what follows, I continue examining Habermas‘s political theory 
and I focus on the less Kantian component of his theory, namely, the legal form. I study 
this component in light of the tension between Validity and Facticity that I have expounded 
in this section.  
                                                          
14 For the sake of my argument, here I am going to follow Habermas‘s argument. That said, it is possible to 
claim that he might be mistaken in his interpretation of Rawls. The latter does not say that the only politically 
relevant feature of the ideas that are the content of public reason is that they are shared by all citizens. 
Habermas seems to think that in Rawls‘s theory the political ideas are constituted as reasonable because they 
are shared. That is not exactly what Rawls says in PL.  
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2. The legal form 
In this section, I examine Habermas‘s Kantianism with a focus on the less Kantian 
component of his theory of legitimacy, namely, the legal form. (BFN, 82-131) The latter 
refers to an historical and functional input (BFN, 83, 111-113; 117-130, Finlayson, 2011: 7-
11; Hedrick, 2010: 105-106) which is the result of two hundred years of Constitutional 
development. (BFN, 129; Hedrick, 2010: 111) According to Finlayson and Freyenhagen, 
the legal form has these three features: (I) it has been passed by a legally recognized body; 
(II) its observance is enforceable by various legitimate means; and (III) it has some intrinsic 
rationale or point independent of II (and of I) which pertains to the common good of the 
members of the legal community. (2011: 10) For these authors:  
This is what makes the legal system consistent, on the one hand, with the autonomy 
of individual citizens who can obey the law out of insight into its intrinsic rationale 
and, on the other, with the functional requirements of positive law, for when 
insight fails there remains the credible threat of prosecution and punishment to 
motivate compliance. (2011: 10) 
Hence, the legal form combines the autonomy of the citizens (Validity) and the 
enforceability of legal norms (Facticity). Now, in light of the distinction between Facticity and 
Validity15 I want to show that the normative element – i.e., the categorical imperative or the 
principle of discourse – has priority over the legal form. More precisely, my claim is that in 
a Kantian political theory, the legal form has an instrumental role protecting the normative 
notion of autonomy which in the political domain splits into private and public autonomy. 
(MW, 113) To examine this thesis, I focus on the tension between Facticity and Validity 
‗internal‘ to law that distinguishes between the immanent rationality and the coercive aspect 
of legal norms.16 A good starting point to elucidate this issue is the tradition of 
Jurisprudence. This is because the legal medium has been the main subject of this 
discipline, where the point of view of the observer tends to prevail – i.e., Kelsen and 
Luhmann.17 In what follows, I reconstruct some of the milestones of this tradition.  
                                                          
15 See section 1 on this part of the Chapter.  
16 In section 1 of this part of the Chapter I discussed the ‗internal‘ and ‗external‘ tension between Validity and 
Facticity in Habermas.  
17 Luhmann‘s theory of law relies strongly on Kelsen‘s positivistic account and the former advances forward 
some theses that were developed in the latter. I develop this relationship in this section.  
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In its origins Jurisprudence endorses a Kantian notion of the legitimacy of law. Friedrich 
Carl Von Savigny develops the theory of ‗subjective right‘ (private law) which establishes a 
conceptual relationship between the legitimacy of law and the protection of private 
autonomy. In his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts18 the inviolability of the person grounds 
the legitimacy of law and establishes an area of independent rule for the free exercise of the 
individual will. Of course, this theory is supported and built from the point of view of 
Kant‘s political philosophy because in the Rechtslehre Kant asserts that the coercive 
dimension of legality is only justified and legitimate as long as it guarantees the protection 
of the freedom of the legal person. As a matter of fact, that is one of the intrinsic features 
of modern law: the protection of individual rights. In this respect, Habermas agrees and 
asserts that the legal form can be understood not only as positive and coercive law but also 
– in the Continental tradition – as ‗subjective rights‘. (Habermas, 2011: 285)   
Nevertheless, in the development of the tradition of Jurisprudence other authors claim that 
the legitimacy of law does not depend on normative components understood in a 
deontological sense – i.e., individual freedom or the principle of discourse. Rather, they 
build the view that legitimacy is immanent to the legal system and they endorse Max 
Weber‘s thesis that legitimacy is based in its legality. (1978)19 For instance, Hans Kelsen 
argues that the legitimacy of a legal order is based on ‗the actual validity that political 
lawgivers confer on their decisions by coupling enacted law with penal norms‘. (BFN, 86) 
Thus, legitimacy depends on the power that the de facto legislator poses and this power is an 
internal and self-referential feature of the legal order. Thus, in Kelsen‘s theory the 
connection of the moral person and her freedom vanishes. The ground of legitimacy is the 
power of the legislator – granted by the legal system – to enact norms backed by penal 
sanctions. Accordingly, Kelsen collapses the distinction between Facticity and Validity: the 
validity of law only depends on its facticity, namely, the will of the lawgiver.  The focus on 
this aspect of law pertains to the notion of positive law. The latter and the coercive 
character of law define the main features of the Facticity of legal orders.  
According to Habermas, the sociologist Niklas Luhmann radicalizes Kelsen‘s theory of law 
concerning the legal form. Luhmann argues, as Kelsen does, that the legitimacy of the legal 
order depends on its own internal features. (Luhmann, 2004: 76-141) Likewise, Luhmann 
                                                          
18 The English translation of this book: System of the Modern Roman Law. (1980) 
19 Weber‘s thesis is that the legitimacy of a legal norm depends on the legality or the intra-legal rationality of 
the procedures that were performed to produce that norm. This view does not take into account the notion 
of self-legislation. Rather, it relies on a formalist notion of rationality. 
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goes beyond Kelsen because in the theory of the former the individuals are not part of the 
social system and of the legal system, rather, they are part of their environment. (Luhmann, 
1996: 212) One of the consequences of this sociological disenchantment of law (BFN, 43) is 
that ‗there is nothing to stop jurisprudence from conceiving rights along purely 
functionalist lines‘. (BFN, 87) Therefore, by means of this methodology, law is completely 
uncoupled of all normative considerations. As far as the person is on the environment of 
the system, then it is not possible to base legitimacy in a Kantian concept of autonomy that 
certainly refers back to the moral or the legal person.   
Habermas confronts the evolution that takes place in this tradition which ends in Kelsen‘s 
legal positivism and in Luhmann‘s sociology of systems. In this respect, the former argues 
that the coercive character of positive law ‗is bound up with the demand for legitimation‘. 
(IO, 254) This demand is satisfied by means of the Kantian notion of autonomy according 
to which the citizens are both addressees and authors of their legal order.  Therefore, private 
autonomy (the legal persons as addressees) and public autonomy (the citizens as authors) are 
the grounds left that underpin legal and political legitimacy. On the one hand, the legal 
medium has a conceptual relationship with individual rights which protect private 
autonomy. (BFN, 128; IO, 256) And this is not only a conceptual relationship but also an 
historical one because ‗Modern legal systems are constructed on the basis of individual 
rights‘. (IO, 256) On the other hand, the legitimacy of legal orders is conceptually related to 
public autonomy (BFN, 89; IO, 253) because ‗To be sure, the source of all legitimacy lies in 
the democratic law-making process, and this in turn calls on the principle of popular 
sovereignty‘. (BFN, 89) 
Now, let me briefly recall a reference from Habermas‘s MW which was stated in the 
introduction of this Chapter. (MW, 113) There, Habermas‘s argument is that when moral 
principles are embedded in the medium of law then moral freedom splits into public and 
private autonomy. (MW, 113) If we read this backwards, then it seems that behind private 
and public autonomy lays the normative principle as the root. Moreover, as I have shown 
in the previous paragraph, the legitimacy of law depends on the Kantian idea of self-
legislation which splits into private and public autonomy. Finally, in Habermas‘s theory the 
normative component is the principle of discourse (D). Putting all these arguments 
together we see that the legitimacy of the legal form depends on private and public 
autonomy which refer back to the principle of discourse (D). Thus in this respect, even the 
coercive character of positive law is grounded in a normative component.  
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Thus, I end up this section claiming that despite the fact that the positivistic account of the 
legal form has tended to prevail in Jurisprudence and that in BFN Habermas aims to 
endorse the immanent approach to law – the idea that legitimacy is an intra-legal concept – 
if we distil the main contents of his concept of legitimacy what we have at bottom is the 
modified and attenuated Kantian notion of autonomy which has priority over the legal 
medium. In this respect, Habermas has to rule out the positivistic understanding of modern 
legal orders – which support an intra-legal notion of legitimacy – to give a proper account 
of his own position. (Larmore, 1995; Cohen, 1999; Forst, 2007; Flynn, 2003, 2011)  
As a matter of fact, Habermas aims to avoid the shortcomings that affect this tradition 
which among other things put people in the environment of the legal order and uncouple 
law from normative components. (BFN, 86-87) Nevertheless, BFN definitely shows a 
more ambivalent relationship towards the developments in the tradition of Jurisprudence 
outlined above: on the one hand, legitimacy is related to normativity (an argument against 
positivism); on the other hand, Habermas aims to develop an intra-legal notion of 
legitimacy (an argument that coheres with positivism). That said, however, in works that 
were written right after BFN – i.e., fundamentally IO and MW – Habermas seems to admit 
the priority of normativity over the historical and functional input on his theory.  
Having described the legal form and as far as the principle of discourse (D) was already 
developed in Chapter One, now we are in a position to present the main principle of 
political legitimacy in Habermas‘s theory, namely, the principle of democracy.  
3. The principle of democracy   
After the principle of discourse (D)20 and the legal form21 have been examined now I can 
introduce the chief principle of legitimacy in Habermas‘s theory, namely, the principle of 
democracy (BFN, 110) the role of which is to confer legitimating force on the legislative 
process. (BFN, 121) As I have shown, it arises from the interpenetration of the principle of 
discourse and the legal form. This principle states that:  
Only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all 
citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally 
constituted. (BFN, 110) 
                                                          
20 See Chapter One.  
21 See the previous section. 
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The conceptual background for this principle is the idea that in a post-traditional order 
legal and political legitimacy can only be grounded when the modified and attenuated Kantian 
notion of autonomy – broached in (D) – is embedded in the legal medium of modern 
societies. (BFN, 128) Legitimacy cannot be based on a metaphysical world-view based on a 
parochial set of values and principles as a contextualist might argue. It cannot be founded 
on any sort of Comprehensive Doctrine in the Rawlsian sense of the term – i.e., world views, 
religious and secular; actually existing moralities, or conceptions of the good; philosophical 
theories of one kind of another.  (PL, 12, 144-145) Moreover, it cannot be based on the 
self-interest of particular agents as the utilitarian approach proposes. Rather, theories of 
morality and legitimacy developed in the Kantian tradition are the most reasonable 
alternative to answer this issue because they ‗hold out the promise of an impartial procedure 
for the justification and assessment of principles‘. (TL, 241) In a post-traditional order this 
is the alternative left because only the ideas of autonomy and equality embedded in the 
medium of law furnish the procedures that ground the legitimacy of Constitutional 
Democracy. Kant and Habermas share the view that legitimacy is connected with 
normative principles that guarantee, due to their procedural character, fair and impartial 
results. This impartiality is connected to the Kantian notion of autonomy, because only the 
mutual recognition of the freedom of everybody guarantees fair and impartial decisions.  
Certainly, these principles demand a social space in which they unfold. In §45 of The 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that the political society [Societas Civilis] is ‗a union of an 
aggregate of men under rightful laws‘. (6: 313) Certainly, Habermas has a similar notion of 
the political community because his theory of Constitutional Democracy defines contents 
and procedures that guarantee the existence of an association ruled under legitimate laws. 
As I have shown, in a post-traditional order this legitimacy can only be ground on a 
Kantian notion of autonomy which pertains to the mutual recognition of equal rights 
among citizens. On §46 of MM Kant describes three rightful attributes of the citizens 
[Cives]. In light of them it is possible to understand Kant‘s concept of legal and political 
autonomy: 
Firstly, lawful freedom to obey no law other than that to which he has given his 
consent; secondly, civil equality in recognizing no-one among the people as superior 
to himself, unless it be someone whom he is just morally entitled to bind by law as 
the other is to bind him; and thirdly, the attribute of civil independence which allows 
him to owe his existence and sustenance not to the arbitrary will of anyone else 
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among the people, but purely to his own rights and powers as a member of the 
commonwealth (so that he may not, as a civil personality, be represented by anyone 
else in matters of right). (6: 314) 
Habermas‘s endorses these Kantian components in his political theory. Above all, the 
concept of autonomy is at the core of Habermas‘s moral and political theories.22 Now, this 
Kantian notion applied to the legal and political realm splits into private and public 
autonomy. (MW, 113) This idea is expressed in the thesis – which is the milestone of the 
project of radical democracy that connects Kant with Rousseau and Marx – which asserts 
that the normative weight of a legal order depends on the fact that the addressees of the 
norms are at the same time their authors. (BFN, 104, 126) In terms of the terminology of 
the modern enlightenment, democracy is based on the recognition of the private autonomy 
of the bourgeois and the public autonomy of the citizen (Maus, 1992: 216).  
Moreover, the principle of democracy has some similarities with the chief principle of 
legitimacy developed in Kant‘s Rechtslehre, namely, the principle of Universal Right. This is 
because in both cases, a normative (or moral) principle is embedded in the medium of 
social space and historical time. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant enunciates this principle 
which says:  
Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each 
individual‘s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a 
universal law is right‘. (6: 230)  
On the principle of right Kant is applying the categorical imperative to the relationships 
between different freedoms. Accordingly, the move is from a moral principle to the social 
domain. (BFN, 83) Thus, Kant begins from the notion of autonomy that in Habermas 
becomes the core of the Constitutional state as well. In Habermas the place of Kant‘s 
principle of Right is occupied by the principle of democracy. In terms of the architectonic, 
                                                          
22 In this thesis I have focused on the concept of autonomy. That said, however, the notion of equality also 
has a central place in Habermas‘s theory. This is because the notion of equality is at the centre of the legal 
medium. As Habermas asserts, basic rights are immanent to the legal form. (BFN, 83; IO, 256) In another 
formulation he states that ‗To be sure, the establishment of the legal code as such already implies liberty rights 
that beget the status of legal persons and guarantee their integrity‘. (BFN, 128) Now, immanent to the 
definition of basic rights is the idea of equality. These basic rights ‗provide all persons with equal legal 
protection, an equal claim to a legal hearing, equality in the application of law, and thus equal treatment 
before the law. (BFN, 125) Thus, the existence of equal rights is an internal feature of the legal code. I think 
that the idea of equality can also be seen from the point of view of the principle of discourse because 
according to (D) everyone counts equally as a participant in discourses of normative justification.  
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in both theories a normative component is embedded in the medium of social space and 
historical time. Nonetheless, Kant‘s and Habermas‘s principles of legitimacy unfold from 
different normative components: on the one hand, Kant‘s principle of law derives from the 
categorical imperative which is a moral principle; on the other hand, Habermas‘s principle 
of democracy depends on the principle of discourse (D) that is different from (U) which is 
‗the central principle of the discourse theory of morality‘. (Finlayson, 2011: 9) By means of 
this strategy, Habermas claims that he has avoided the fully Kantian strategy in which there 
is a monistic reconstruction of law and morality. (Habermas, 2011: 298)  
Due to this distinction proposed by Habermas, it seems that the justification of the 
democratic principle is immanent to the constitutional state and does not need external 
moral support. Despite differences of emphasis in their interpretations of Habermas‘s 
theory several sympathetic critics have nonetheless claimed that he cannot give this 
justification and legitimacy needs to be underpinned by a moral content. (Larmore, 1995; 
Cohen, 1999; Forst, 2007; Flynn, 2003) In general terms I agree with them. However, I 
prefer to limit my claim to state that the normative component of Habermas‘s theory is a 
reworking of Kant‘s notion of pure practical reason, which not necessarily has a moral 
nature. That said, however, Habermas has tried to avoid this interpretation of his political 
theory and he has stressed that he offers an immanent reconstruction of legal and political 
legitimacy, at least in BFN.23 One of the advantages of this strategy is that Habermas has 
good arguments against the Hegelian inspired charge that his theory lacks the institutional 
dimension that any political theory needs to include. Also, he can rebut the criticism that 
his approach is more or less a renewed version of natural law because it would be 
proposing a monistic construction of law and morality. Likewise, as long as it includes a 
normative component, Habermas avoids the shortcomings that in his eyes the positivistic 
approach has, namely, the collapsing of the distinction between Facticity and Validity and 
                                                          
23 There are at least two reasons why Habermas avoids developing a Kantian argument in the justification of 
legitimacy. On the one hand, this is explained by his strategy to give an equal weight to the principle of 
popular sovereignty in front of the rule of law. (Flynn, 2013) If there were a strong Kantian argument, then 
that would suppose the primacy of a liberal ‗system of rights‘ prior to popular sovereignty. Interestingly 
enough, at the end that seems to be the case in Habermas‘s theory. On the other hand, to certain extent 
Habermas has not been allowed to admit the degree of his Kantianism in his notion of legitimacy because of a 
particular context of ideas. Not only in the sociological tradition – i.e., Weber, Luhmann, Teubner, Willke – 
but also in jurisprudence – i.e., Kelsen – and in philosophy – i.e., Foucault, Derrida, Agamben – there is a 
strong rejection to articulate Kantian (or moral) arguments as the justificatory grounds of legitimacy.  
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the exclusion of the point of view of the participants by means of putting them in the 
environment of the legal system – i.e., Kelsen and Luhmann.24  
Consequently, Habermas accomplishes the philosophical Aufhebung of Kant. On the one 
hand, the political theory of the former incorporates the post-conventional level of 
justification which pertains to a modified Kantian notion of autonomy at the centre of his 
concept of legitimacy. However, I say ‗modified‘ because this notion of normative 
justification relies on a dialogical notion of reason, whereas Kant‘s concept of autonomy is 
framed in a monological notion of pure practical reason.25 On the other hand, Habermas 
includes the legal form which refers to an historical and functional input that is not 
elaborated in Kant‘s Rechtslehre. At least, it is not broadly elaborated in Kant as it is in BFN. 
In summary, I have broached the essential stage in which Kant‘s and Habermas‘s theories 
are located and the relationship that they establish between normative components and the 
social dimension of institutions and practices. In part two, I discuss whether and to what 
extent Kant and Habermas succeed or fail in their aims to find the proper balance between 
individual freedom and collective self-determination.   
II. The co-originality between private and public autonomy  
The previous part shows that the essential components of Habermas‘s political theory have 
a Kantian pedigree. In the case of the principle of democracy, the principle of discourse is 
embedded in the legal medium of modern societies. This normative component pertains to 
the idea that the persons grant to each other the equal status of free citizens in discourse. 
In this regard, the private autonomy of the particular subject is co-original with the private 
autonomy of everybody else. Moreover, these autonomies are actualized in processes of 
mutual understanding which refer to the notion of public autonomy. Habermas claims that 
in his theory the legitimacy depends ultimately on both the private and the public 
autonomy of the consociates of a legal and political order. As he asserts,  
Human rights and the principle of popular sovereignty still constitute the sole ideas 
 that can justify modern law. These two ideas represent the precipitate left behind, 
so to speak, once the normative substance of an ethos embedded in religious and 
                                                          
24 See section 2 of this part.  
25 As I have shown in Chapter One, here I side with Habermas against McMahon, in the sense that effectively 
the dialogical approach of the former differs in important ways to the monological ontology of Kant.  
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metaphysical traditions has been forced through the filter of posttraditional 
justification. (BFN, 99) 
The development of Habermas‘s argument shows that at the core of legitimacy there is a 
complementary notion of private and public autonomy. In what follows, I focus on the 
concrete relationship between these components. According to Habermas, he gives equal 
weight to both principles in the co-originality thesis. In his eyes, this is something that no 
one has successfully done before him. (BFN, 84, 100-101; IO, 258) In this part of the 
Chapter, I examine the co-originality thesis in detail. At the beginning I describe in broader 
brush-strokes the stage that in terms of the history of ideas explains the question of the co-
originality. Following Constants‘s distinction (1988), the quarrel between the ancients – 
who gave priority to the political autonomy of the citizens – and the moderns – who gave 
priority to the basic rights of the individual – still now shapes the current debates 
concerning the basic foundations of constitutional democracy. Kant has been regarded as a 
prominent figure that represents the side of the moderns which gives priority to private 
autonomy and it is detrimental to popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, in what follows I 
argue that Kant gives a more balanced weight to both principles (or at least he recognizes 
the significance of public autonomy). Once this preparatory stage is settled I examine 
Habermas‘s thesis of the co-originality.  
The argument unfolds in three steps. First, I describe the essential elements of the debate 
between ancients and moderns – or republicans and liberals – which in modern political 
philosophy is represented by Rousseau and Kant. On the one hand, Rousseau seems to 
grant more weight to the principle of popular sovereignty or public autonomy. According 
to the view endorsed by Habermas, Kant would be emphasizing the rule of law and the 
principle of Universal Right. Here, I cannot examine Rousseau‘s views on this issue. 
Rather, for the sake of my argument I focus the attention on Kant. I argue that it is a 
plausible interpretation of Kant‘s Rechtslehre that he not only gives priority to the principle 
of Universal Right but also to political rights, by means of his concept of self-legislation. 
Habermas argues in BFN that Kant gives priority to liberal rights (BFN, 100), but 
elsewhere he also claims that it is possible to read Kant from a republican point of view. 
(MW, 113) If it is possible to read Kant‘s political theory as granting a more balanced 
relationship between private autonomy and public autonomy, then it is more plausible to 
claim that Habermas endorses a Kantian view in his version of the co-originality (1).  
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Secondly, I describe Habermas‘s co-originality thesis and I examine the ‗system of rights‘ 
that comprises private and public autonomy. At the beginning, this section is more 
descriptive than argumentative. Later, once I have described the ‗system of rights‘, then I 
expound Habermas‘s co-originality thesis. Finally, I briefly discuss some initial arguments 
that could challenge Habermas‘s thesis (2).  
In the last section, I examine in detail Habermas‘s co-originality thesis in light of the 
assessments that some influential critics develop of his thesis. At the end I argue that 
despite what Habermas says on the contrary, the thesis of the co-originality in his theory is 
based on a Kantian methodology – i.e., the two stage construction of the system of rights – 
and on the priority of a Kantian component – i.e., the idea of citizens that grant to each 
other equal rights to freedom (3).   
1. Private and public autonomy in Kant’s Rechtslehre  
The names of Rousseau and Kant are the core of the modern self-understanding of the 
principles that frame Constitutional Democracy. Both philosophers discussed in detail the 
central notions that until now broach the question for legal and political legitimacy, namely, 
the rule of law and popular sovereignty; private and public autonomy; individual freedom 
and collective self-determination. However, their contributions go beyond because they 
tried to ground the intuition that both principles have an equal weight:  
That the idea of human rights, which is expressed in the right to equal individual 
liberties, must neither be merely imposed on the sovereign legislator as an external 
barrier, nor be instrumentalized as a functional requisite for legislative goals. (IO, 
259) 
Henceforth, Kant and Rousseau aim to give a foundation to the idea that Habermas‘s has 
labeled as the co-originality between private and public autonomy. In simple terms, this 
notion means that both principles have to be in a balanced relationship, both having an 
equal weight in the theory of legitimacy. However, Habermas claims that neither Kant nor 
Rousseau were able to find the balance between these principles. According to the widely 
accepted interpretation (Baynes, 2016: 136) – which Habermas endorses –, Kant gives 
priority to individual rights over popular sovereignty and Rousseau does the contrary. 
(BFN, 100: IO, 259) To certain extent, this dilemma can be seen in the difference between 
the approaches of natural law and legal positivism. (Baynes, 2016: 136) The first tradition 
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gives emphasis to individual freedom – i.e., Locke and Kant –, the second locates the 
weight of legitimacy on the will of the lawgiver – i.e., Kelsen (albeit, in the positivistic 
interpretation it does matter whether the will is democratic or not).  
In light of the distinction between private and public autonomy it is possible to distinguish 
the following doctrines as well: Liberalism and Republicanism. On the one hand, the latter 
‗goes back to Aristotle and the political humanism of the Renaissance‘, and ‗has always 
given the public autonomy of citizens priority over the prepolitical liberties of private 
persons‘. (IO, 258)  On the other hand, Liberalism is related to philosophers like John 
Locke and this doctrine ‗has invoked the danger of tyrannical majorities and postulated the 
priority of human rights‘. (IO, 258) Habermas argues that Kant should be seen as a liberal 
and Rousseau as a republican. (BFN, 100)26 Habermas, though, claims that he endorses a 
Kantian Republicanism. (MW, 113) To my mind this hints that there are at least two 
possible readings of Kant‘s Rechtslehre: it can be seen as a classical liberal doctrine or a 
liberal-republican doctrine. In the first interpretation, Kant has been seen belonging to the 
tradition of natural law. After all, he is the philosopher of the modern enlightenment which 
advocates for the primacy of the autonomy of the subject over any form of tradition and 
perhaps even beyond the collective self-determination of the political community (let us 
remember that the emphasis on traditions and popular sovereignty pertains to the self-
understanding of the Republican tradition). In this regard:  
Insofar as Kant‘s argument for the establishment of civil society (or the state) relies 
solely on the Universal Principle of Right, which guarantees equal subjective liberty 
for all, the notion of collective self-determination is subordinated to a moral 
principle. (Baynes, 2016: 136) 
Thus, in Kant‘s theory the notion of private autonomy which is detrimental to public 
autonomy has the upper hand. Nevertheless, in this section I want to show that Kant 
introduces the idea of public autonomy and that there is at least something of a balance 
between the latter and private autonomy. In this respect, it is also possible to read Kant‘s 
engagement with the modern enlightenment in the sense that he not only incorporates the 
principle of private autonomy but also the principle of public autonomy. Now, before I 
                                                          
26 In this section, I do not discuss Habermas‘s claim concerning Rousseau, mainly because the republicanism 
of the latter is not at the focus on the discussion that I address here. Rather, I examine the notion of the co-
originality that can be found in Kant‘s Rechtslehre, because it is the Kantian component in Habermas the 
issue at stake in this Chapter.   
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keep developing my claim that Kant gives a balanced weight to both principles I want to 
summarize the ways in which the different traditions of political philosophy have 
emphasized private and public autonomy. I think that these distinctions can be helpful to 
assess Kant‘s and Habermas‘s reconstructions of the co-originality. For the sake of my 
argument, I distinguish only three main political doctrines:27  
a. Classical Liberalism: in this tradition the constitutional expert gives primacy to 
private autonomy and public autonomy gets overshadowed.  When this expert 
frames the ‗system of rights‘ she focuses on individual rights. Among other things, 
this solves the danger of the tyrannical majorities.   
b. Republicanism: in this tradition the sovereign (the united will of the people) decides 
to frame and shape the constitution according to its own point of view. In other 
words, the people are the only source that establishes the ‗system of rights‘. Among 
other things, this precludes the paternalism of natural law.  
c. Kantian Republicanism: in this tradition the constitutional expert gives primacy to 
public and private autonomy when she is framing the ‗system of rights‘. In other 
words, this expert offers a ‗system of rights‘ which guarantee both individual and 
political rights which in a second moment gain its actual shape by means of public 
autonomy.  
Of course, Rousseau belongs to the Republican tradition, and Kant has been seen 
belonging to Classical Liberalism. That said, however, I think that this is a mistaken reading 
of Kant‘s political philosophy because he takes both private and public autonomy into 
account. As I have shown, Habermas defines his theory as Kantian-Republican. In the 
same spirit, Kant says that ‗The civil constitution in every state shall be republican‘. (8:349) 
This supports my claim that Habermas endorses a Kantian view of legitimacy because Kant 
himself already incorporated a Republican component into his theory. Nonetheless, before 
I move into the discussion of the balance between private and public autonomy in 
Habermas‘s theory I need to justify why Kant could be seen as giving a balanced weight to 
private and public autonomy.   
I want to start my argument by claiming that Kant‘s political philosophy can be understood 
in light of the claim that ‗Nobody can be free at the expense of anybody else‘s freedom‘. 
                                                          
27 Of course, others might distinguish other doctrines.  
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(MW, 113) I read this passage as saying that the only source of legitimacy is the autonomy 
of the subjects in terms of the protection of their private rights but also in terms of their 
public autonomy as citizens of the political association. This interpretation coheres with 
Kant‘s theory. For example in the Metaphysics of Morals he says,  
The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people […] 
Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the 
same thing for all and for each, and so only the general united will of the people, 
can be legislative. (6:313–14) 
It is still necessary to clarify the meaning that the ideas of popular sovereignty and of the 
general will have in Kant. He argues that there is a priority of the political sovereign which 
it is not everybody that belongs to the demos but normally a particular person or a group of 
people whom are able to reconstruct the collective will. As a matter of fact, Kant thinks 
that an elected legislator is the best form of government. (8: 353) In this way, his political 
philosophy has an ambivalent nature because this idea of representation seems to betray its 
concept of autonomy. To certain extent, this is a consequence of Kant‘s broader notion of 
pure practical reason. In his theory, pure practical reason is not based on the medium of 
social institutions and practices (as it is in Habermas). Rather, it is based on the 
monological structure of subjectivity. Henceforth, it is possible to understand that in this 
political theory an elected representative can successfully embody the collective will of the 
people. In this rationalist view, if this representative is correctly appointed then she is the 
best candidate to reconstruct the collective will (probably better even than the demos itself). 
In this respect, the representative is constrained to:  
Give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a 
whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he 
has joined in voting for such a will. (8:297) 
In Habermas‘s view of legitimacy the introduction of the principle of discourse demands 
that the practices of self-legislation cannot be performed in isolation in which one agent 
would reconstruct the collective will. Rather, (D) reconstructs the practice of 
argumentation that takes place between agents and this eminently refers to a cooperative 
process. Even if one agent is sufficiently altruistic, pluralist and moved by a post-
conventional morality – in Kohlberg‘s sense – that allow her – and others – to expect that 
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she can properly reconstruct the collective will, Discourse Ethics claims that a rational 
agreement only can be reached communicatively and intersubjectively and not in isolation. 
In general, I agree with this interpretation of the main difference between Kant and 
Habermas. In Chapter One, I side with the latter in the sense that Discourse Ethics 
proposes a dialogical principle that differs in important ways to the one proposed by Kant 
in the categorical imperative. Conversely, as far as these principles furnish their political 
theories, then the differences in the moral theories pertain to their notions of legitimacy. 
Roughly speaking, Kant seems to develop a monological account of legitimacy – the 
collective will can be reconstructed by a particular subject – and Habermas broaches a 
dialogical one – the collective will can (only) be reconstructed in processes mutual 
understanding.   
Bearing in mind that it is true that Kant broaches this view of the representation of the 
collective will, I would like to end this section emphasizing that in one way or another he 
introduces the idea of public autonomy. Therefore, it is mistaken to take Kant as simply 
giving priority to the idea of individual freedom and dismissing collective self-
determination. If I am correct, then Kant at least allocates a balanced weight to both 
private and public autonomy. Kenneth Baynes leaves rooms for this interpretation of 
Kant‘s theory because he argues that Kant has been seen connected to the tradition of the 
social contract or to the tradition of natural law. (Baynes, 2016: 135-136) The first version 
of Kant recognizes a place to collective self-determination whereas the second only to the 
idea of individual freedom. I think that he grants – certainly from a monological 
methodology – a place in his political theory both to private rights and a form of political 
rights. In this respect, Kant explicitly argues that ‗A person is subject to no laws other than 
those that he (either alone or at least jointly with others) gives to himself‘. (Kant, 1991: 50, 
In Baynes, 2016: 136) Thus, it is implicit that as long as the political community is shaped 
by a plurality of persons, then it self-legislation implies a dimension of public autonomy. 
The quite simple but powerful idea of the political autonomy of the demos which pertains to 
the identity of the citizens as authors and addresses of the legal order is essential in the 
architecture of BFN and also in Kant‘s concept of legitimacy. (BFN, 39, 120, 126) From 
this interpretation, it is not fair to argue that Kant gives only an emphasis to the idea of 
individual freedom, not taking into account at all the idea of collective self-determination. 
As I will show in the following section, individual freedom and collective self-legislation are 
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essential components that explain Habermas‘s discourse theory of law and democracy as 
well.  
To sum up, Kant‘s emphasis in the idea of self-legislation, implies the recognition of both 
private and public autonomy in the same token. Thus, the Kantian theory of legitimacy 
could be read in the sense that private and public autonomy are framed in a ‗system of 
rights‘ that guarantees equal freedoms and that gains concrete shape in a second moment 
throughout the collective self-determination of the demos. As I am going to show, this is the 
idea of a ‗two-stage‘ methodology on the reconstruction of the principles of the 
constitutional state. To my mind, this is a reasonable reading of Kant‘s Rechtslehre that goes 
together with other claims that he could not make at his historical time. For example, his 
notions of human dignity and self-legislation imply the idea that women and minorities 
have individual and civic rights. Albeit, Kant did not grant these rights to these groups, 
certainly for more historical than conceptual reasons. In this regard, in philosophy it is a 
necessary practice to confront the spirit of a particular philosopher with its letter.28 After I 
have broached this interpretation of Kant‘s notion of legitimacy, in what follows I examine 
Habermas‘s co-originality thesis (Section 2). At the end (Section 3), I conclude that 
Habermas‘s thesis is Kantian not only in terms of its contents – i.e., the priority of the idea 
of autonomy – but also in terms of its methodology – i.e., the ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction.  
2. Habermas’s co-originality thesis  
Habermas argues that he endorses Kantian-Republicanism. (MW, 113) The two 
components of this label pertain to a theory of legitimacy that aims to grant to individual 
freedom and collective self-determination equal weight. In this section, I examine the 
interpenetration [Verschränkung] between the principle of discourse (D) and the legal form 
not from the point of view of its logic and its connections with Kant which I did in the 
previous part of this Chapter. Rather, I analyse it from the point of view of its outcome: 
the ‗system of rights‘ which protects and shape private and public autonomy. Thus, this 
section is more descriptive at the beginning. After that, I introduce the dilemma that is 
going to be the issue at the final section, namely, whether and to what extent Habermas 
successfully gives equal weight to private and public autonomy.  
                                                          
28 According to Pinkard ‗In the hothouse intellectual ferment of Germany in the 1790s and the first seven 
years of the 1800s […] a dominant metaphor emerged of ‗completing the Kantian philosophy by 
reconstructing it in terms of its ‗spirit‘, not its ‗letter‘‘. (1999)   
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To begin his thesis of co-originality Habermas argues that in the interpenetration 
[Verschränkung]:  
One begins by applying the discourse principle to the general right to liberties – a 
right constitutive for the legal form as such – and ends by legally institutionalizing 
the conditions for a discursive exercise of political autonomy. By means of this 
political autonomy, the private autonomy that was first abstractly posited can 
retroactively assume an elaborated legal shape. (BFN, 121)  
From the interpenetration, a ‗system of rights‘ arises. In Habermas‘s terms, in a first 
moment, these rights can be divided into three categories. (BFN, 122)  
1. Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the 
right to the greatest possible measure of equal individual liberties 
2. Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the 
status of a member in a voluntary association of consociates under law.  
3. Basic rights that result immediately from the actionability of rights and from 
the politically autonomous elaboration of individual legal protection.  
These first three categories of rights guarantee the private autonomy of consociates under 
the rule of law, or the recognition of citizens as equal addresses of laws. (BFN, 122) In this 
respect, these are the rights that the liberal point of view emphasizes. These sets of rights 
define a domain of autonomy in which the citizens do not have to justify their preferences 
of action and as in Kant‘s Rechtslehre they can act freely. From the point of view of TAC the 
significance of these rights is that a person could participate in the process of mutual 
understanding [Verständigung]. Nevertheless, it also pertains to the possibility of someone 
withdrawing from this process. (BFN, 119-120) After these rights are framed, a fourth 
category of rights which protects public autonomy arises:  
4. Basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion-and 
will- formation in which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through 
which they generate legitimate law.  
In light of these rights, the subjects become authors of their legal order. Therefore, this set 
guarantees public autonomy. This step is when the principle of democracy comes fully into 
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place, as the core of the system of rights. This category of rights which broaches the idea of 
citizens as authors of law, is reflexively applied to the basic rights identified in (1) through 
(3) and certainly also to itself – this is because it is always possible to legislate concerning 
the rules of political participation. (IO, 255) Thus, the ‗system of rights‘ gains its full 
legitimacy.   
Therefore, Habermas‘s theory grants a central place to the liberties of the ancients (public 
autonomy) and to the liberties of the moderns (private autonomy). In BFN private rights 
are conceptually related to political rights. Let us recall here that for Habermas‘s there is a 
conceptual and internal, and not a merely contingent, relation between the rule of law and 
democracy. (IO, 253) Thus, there is not democracy without rights and not rights without 
democracy.  
Finally, a fifth category of rights is introduced which guarantees living conditions that make 
possible the exercise of private and public autonomy:  
5. Basic rights to the provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically, 
and ecologically safeguarded, insofar as the current circumstances make this 
 necessary if citizens are to have equal opportunities to utilize the civil rights listen in 
(1) through (4).  
This set of rights shows that Habermas is not only recognizing private autonomy and 
public autonomy but also social rights. It is relevant to notice that in historical terms, in the 
model of the welfare state this component has come to the fore. Although Habermas 
recognizes this group of rights, it does not seem that they are central to his concept of 
legitimacy. In this respect, and bearing in mind that he always takes into account the point 
of view of the participants, this last group of rights should have also a central place in the 
concept of legitimacy. There are at least two reasons to claim that a proper concept of 
legitimacy should pay more attention to this component. First, it is not possible to protect 
private and public autonomy if it is not also guaranteed the social autonomy of the agents. 
Secondly, the ‗external‘ tension between Facticity and Validity, namely, the claim of 
legitimacy of a legal order and the de facto recognition of its members can only be assured 
if certain minimum level of welfare and even of social equality is achieved.  
Nevertheless, I cannot devote more attention to this issue here. Rather, for the sake of my 
argument the question that requires further elucidation is on which grounds Habermas can 
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convincingly argue that ‗the logical genesis of rights comprises a circular process in which 
the legal code, or legal form, and the mechanism for producing legitimate law – hence the 
democratic principle – are co-originally constituted‘. (BFN, 122)It is important to carefully 
discuss this claim because Rawls and others (RH, 81; Larmore, 1995: 612; Cohen, 1999; 
Forst, 2011) have argued that Habermas fails in his attempt to give an equal weight to the 
principles of private and public autonomy.  
In this way, the rights from (1) to (4) gain their legitimacy when (4) is applied. The ‗system 
of rights‘ is initially introduced abstractly, and then it gains complete shape and substance 
throughout the democratic process. As Rawls‘s reply to Habermas‘s critique (RH) shows, 
the relationship between private and public autonomy in the latter can have two 
interpretations. (Forst, 2007: 109) On the one hand, it seems that the genesis of legitimacy 
stems from public autonomy: the legitimacy of the whole system depends on the 
democratic practice. Then, what is the place of private autonomy? In this interpretation 
private autonomy looks as though it has an instrumental role to generate the conditions of 
possibility of public autonomy and the latter appears as the final ground of legitimacy. On 
the other hand, the introduction of an abstract ‗system of rights‘ at the first stage pertains 
to the recognition of basic rights that protect autonomy and that have moral priority over 
the political self-determination of the demos. Thus, we are confronted with two possible 
readings of Habermas‘s theory.  
That said, however, Habermas maintains that individual autonomy depends on collective 
self-determination in the same degree that the latter depends on the former. This claim can 
be examined from the normative point view of the principle of discourse (D) which refers 
to both private and public autonomy: the autonomy of the subject is conjoined with the 
autonomy of everybody else as participants in rational discourses. This balance can also be 
seen in light of the legal form. This is because ‗The legal medium establishes a logical 
relation between rights-bearing individuals and constitutional law-making‘. (Hedrick, 2010: 
115) In other words, the internal structure of law can be explained in two ways: rights 
bearing individuals constitute a practice of legitimate law-making – then we go from private 
autonomy to public autonomy –; and citizens mutually grant to one another symmetrical 
rights throughout their law-making practice – then we go from public autonomy to private 
autonomy. In what follows, I keep framing and sharpening this discussion relying on the 
work of some more or less sympathetic critics of Habermas. I conclude that at bottom 
Habermas‘s theory grants a normative priority to the ‗system of rights‘ that guarantee 
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autonomy over the actual carrying out of the practice of collective self-determination of the 
political association.  
3. Critical assessments of Habermas’s co-originality thesis  
According to Habermas the tradition of political philosophy has been unable to give a 
proper balance to the principles of private and popular sovereignty. (BFN, 84, 100-101) 
Not only in BFN but also in IO he claims that:  
To be sure, political philosophy has never really been able to strike a balance 
 between popular sovereignty and human rights, or between the ―freedom of the 
ancients‖ and the ―freedom of the moderns‖. (IO, 258)  
After centuries of discussion of this issue, and bearing in mind that the most important 
political philosophers devoted the best of their efforts to elucidate this question 
Habermas‘s claim is at least provocative. The hidden implication of this statement is that 
only in Habermas‘s co-originality thesis it is possible to find the correct balance between 
both principles. In this final section, I aim to assess his thesis of co-originality from the 
point of view of his critics. Here I begin from a claim made by Habermas which contains 
the key move in his theory. In BFN he asserts:  
Nothing is given prior to the citizen‘s practice of self-determination other than the 
discourse principle, which is built into the conditions of communicative association 
in general, and the legal medium as such‘. (BFN, 128)  
The heuristic value of this statement is that although nothing is giving prior to public 
autonomy, there are two elements that are given prior to the collective self-determination 
of the citizens: the principle of discourse and the legal form. In the first part of this 
Chapter I have shown that both components are framed on a Kantian notion of autonomy. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the collective self-determination of the citizens 
can only be conceived within this Kantian frame, namely, the Kantian conception of pure 
practical reason.  
Some of the most relevant critics of Habermas draw similar conclusions: namely that there 
is a priority of the Kantian component in Habermas‘s co-originality thesis. Charles 
Larmore argues that Habermas mistakenly gives priority to public autonomy over private 
autonomy. According to Larmore, this is problematic because private autonomy is actually 
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the ultimate basis on which our political life is organized. Larmore asserts that Habermas 
gives priority to public autonomy, by means of the emphasis that the latter gives to the 
notion of communicative reason and discourse, and what Habermas should do instead is to 
acknowledge that private autonomy has priority. For Larmore public autonomy rests on a 
more fundamental Kantian-liberal principle of respects for persons. (1995) In the terms of 
Habermas‘s theory, the principle of discourse (D) presupposes a prior Kantian principle of 
recognition of persons as free and equal.  
Rainer Forst also argues for the priority of a normative component. In his view, a 
normative pre-political core acts as a foundation which has more weight than popular 
sovereignty. This is because the framers of constitutions and the citizens are moral persons. 
(Habermas, 2011: 298) In his own theoretical work Forst proposes The Right to Justification 
which solves the moral deficit of Habermas‘s notion of legitimacy. (the moral deficit 
especially in BFN, See Forst, 2007) Discussing the Habermas–Rawls debate Forst asserts 
that: ‗[Habermas] still does not get around the problem of assigning these rights an 
antecent status, as he appears to do in the reference to the two-stage reconstruction‘. 
(Forst, 2011: 173) In this regard, Forst correctly illuminates an ambiguity in Habermas‘s 
theory. On the one hand, BFN builds an immanent argument for the justification of a 
‗system of rights‘. On the other hand, in the debate with Rawls, Habermas gives priority – 
an antecedent status – to a moral Kantian content in the justification of the ‗system of 
rights‘.    
Joshua Cohen criticizes Habermas for the moral deficit of his theory as well. He suggest 
that ‗the discourse principle […] appears to rely on a highly generic account of reasons – 
not an account restricted to political argument in a democracy of equal members‘. (Cohen, 
1999: 395) This principle does not give priority to equal liberties which is the essential 
ground of democracy. According to Cohen, democracy cannot be shaped without the 
recognition of substantive Kantian principles as the existence of citizens as free and equal. 
(Cohen, 1994) This is not guaranteed in Habermas‘s discourse theory of Constitutional 
Democracy. From the point of view of moral foundationalism the justification of the 
principle of discourse demands the recognition of moral substantive elements at the 
beginning.  
In summary, these critics on the one hand claim that Habermas is not giving the proper 
place to the normative component which should be set at the centre of the co-originality 
111 
 
thesis. In other words, Habermas does not seem to acknowledge the inner structures of his 
own theory – i.e., Larmore and Forst. On the other hand, a stronger criticism is that 
Habermas‘s reconstruction does not guarantee the protection of this Kantian core, which is 
essential for Constitutional Democracy – i.e., Cohen.   
The idea of a ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction is developed in BFN when Habermas maintains 
that by means of the interpenetration between (D) and the legal form an abstract ‗system of 
rights‘ of ‗unsaturated placeholders‘ (BFN, 125) unfolds in a first stage. In the second stage 
the ‗system of rights‘ gains its actual shape by means of the exercise of Popular Sovereignty. 
This idea is also central in the debate with Rawls (Habermas, 2011: 296; RH, 63, 64, 76)29 
and in the article Constitutional Democracy, A paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles (2001). 
In the latter Habermas asserts:    
The first stage involves the conceptual explication of the language of individual 
rights in which the shared practice of a self-determining association of free and 
equal citizens can express itself – rights, thus, in which alone the principle of 
popular sovereignty can be embodied. The second stage involves the realization of 
this principle through the exercise, the actual carrying out, of this practice. 
(Habermas, 2001: 778) 
In this way, it is possible to observe that the recognition of citizens as free and equal, by 
means of a conceptual reconstruction at the first stage of the ‗system of rights‘, has priority. 
Nevertheless, these rights leave room for the idea of the collective self-determination of the 
demos which becomes a concrete practice in the second stage. In that further step, the 
principle of Popular Sovereignty is performed throughout the exercise, the actual carrying out, 
of this practice. According to Forst and Flynn, the second stage is not possible unless 
citizens bring valid moral norms to bear into legal and political practical discourses, and 
this shows that the justification of basic rights cannot be fully immanent to law. 
Another point which deserves attention is the fact that Habermas‘s political theory gives 
primacy to moral reasons over other considerations – pragmatic and ethical-political 
reasons – whenever popular sovereignty is performed. (BFN, 103, 108, 113; IO, 42-43; 
Flynn, 2003: 434) Furthermore, legitimatite laws must ‗harmonize with the moral principles 
of justice and solidarity‘. (BFN, 99, 155) According to Finlayson this refers to the Moral 
                                                          
29 In RH Rawls asserts: ‗The idea of a two-stage construction is implicit in the summary argument. (RPR–43–
4)‘ (76) 
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Permissibility Constrain in legal and political discourses. (Finlayson, 2011: 12, 2016a: 12, 14) In 
other words, no legitimate law may violate a valid normal norm. Once again, I draw the 
conclusion that not only in terms of the basic frame of the theory, but also in terms of its 
contents there is a priority of a Kantian element, namely, the notion of moral reason 
understood this time in terms of the post-conventional structures of justification contained 
in the principle of discourse of Habermas‘s moral philosophy.  
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4 
Hegelian criticisms of Habermas’s Political 
Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hegel‘s criticisms of Kant‘s moral philosophy are elaborated from the vantage point of 
social and political institutions which in the Philosophy of Right are defined as the 
components of ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. In this respect, Hegel asserts in §142 that Sittlichkeit 
‗is accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing [vorhandenen] world and the 
nature of self-consciousness‘. I read this passage in light of the analytical interpretation that 
Robert Pippin (1989, 1991) and Terry Pinkard (1994, 1999) offer of Hegel as a Post-Kantian 
thinker, according to which, Hegel is not just a philosopher after Kant, but rather, he is a 
Kantian philosopher after Kant. (See the introduction of Chapter Two) Hegel‘s critique does 
not intend to rule out the Kantian concept of moral autonomy. Rather, the issue for Hegel 
is that pure reason cannot define the autonomy of the will independently of institutions 
and practices. Henceforth, freedom is always embedded in a social and political context. 
That is why Hegel states that Sittlichkeit is the concept of freedom which has become the 
existing world and the nature of self-consciousness. (§142) Due to this emphasis on a 
situated concept of autonomy within social and political institutions, it is not difficult to 
present these criticisms as objections to political theories constructed in the Kantian 
tradition in the sense that they may lack this institutional dimension.  
 
In Habermas‘s theory of constitutional democracy both Kantian and Hegelian components 
are given a place. In this respect, I claim that Habermas‘s version of moral validity and legal 
and political legitimacy takes into account the analytical reading of Hegel‘s critique of Kant. 
Habermas has built into the theory the view that the Kantian conception of autonomy 
must be embedded in, and supported by, social institutions and cultural traditions. The 
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incorporation of Hegelian elements in Habermas‘s notion of legal and political legitimacy 
results in the fortification of the theory. 
As I have shown, in Between Facts and Norms at the centre of legitimacy stands the principle 
of democracy which derives from the interpenetration [Verschränkung] of the principle of 
discourse and the legal form. (BFN, 121) In crude terms, the first can be thought of as the 
expression the Habermasian concept of normative justification. (MCCA, 66, 161; BFN, 
107) The second is the result of social and historical processes of evolution. (BFN, 63, 129) 
In this respect, the Kantian element (D) is embedded in the legal medium – the legal form.  
Nonetheless, Habermas asserts that legitimacy is not grounded on morality, because the 
principle of discourse is below the threshold of this domain. (BFN, 107-109, 121; BNR, 84, 
89) Additionally, as already stated, the legal form is a social and historical input. (BFN, 63, 
83, 111-113; Finlayson, 2011: 7-11; Hedrick, 2010: 105-106) Moreover, Habermas 
reinforces the Hegelian side of its theory by incorporating further historical and social 
components. For example, he claims that the constitution is a ‗learning process‘ (BFN, 421; 
2001: 768); democracy demands an active citizenry that embraces a liberal culture (BFN, 
59, 132-133); and post-conventional morality and legal and political legitimacy require the 
support of a life-world context that meets them halfway. (MCCA, 207; BFN, 302, 358, 461, 
471, 487; IO, 252) Certainly, all these components strengthen the claim that Habermas is a 
Hegelian (Gledhill, 2011: 182) and that his concept of legitimacy departs from the Kantian 
tradition. If that interpretation is correct, then the question whether Hegel‘s critique of 
Kant applies to Habermas‘s concept of legitimacy is answered from the beginning because 
it seems that he has already left the Kantian family.    
However, as I have shown in Chapter Three, an analysis of other parts of BFN among 
other texts gives rise to a different picture and it comes to seem that the weight of legal and 
political legitimacy in fact rests not on a rejection of Kantianism but on a modified notion 
of Kant‘s concept of pure practical reason (Chapter One). Among other things, this kernel 
implies the post-conventional notion of normative justification – contained in the principle 
of discourse – (MCCA, 66; BFN, 107; BNR, 80); the Kantian idea of self-legislation (BFN, 
39, 120, 126); and the mutual recognition1 that citizens grant to each other as free and 
equal. (MW, 113) 
                                                          
1 Not an idea exclusively owned by Kant, of course – it may be found in Fichte (2000) and in Hegel. (1977a, 
1991) 
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Thus, on this view Habermas thinks legitimacy is based on a Kantian normative ground. 
Now although that requires the support of social institutions, practices and political 
cultures, and to this extent Habermas recognizes Hegelian components in his theory, 
nevertheless, I maintain that Habermas‘s conception of legitimacy rests upon the Kantian 
concept of practical reason and autonomy. Consequently, legal and political legitimacy has 
a normative core that it is embedded in historical time and in social space. In other words, 
and paraphrasing Hegel, by means of ethical life, the Kantian concept of autonomy 
becomes objective spirit.  
In the 1995 debate between Rawls and Habermas the Kantian component of both 
philosophers emerges in sharp relief. Therefore, this would be the appropriate place to 
discuss criticisms of Habermas´s theory of legitimacy inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. 
In this Chapter, I discuss within the dispute the thesis of the co-originality of private and 
public autonomy (RPR, 40-45; RH, 63-81); and the relationship between principles of 
justice and the fact of pluralism. (RPR, 34-40; RH, 55-63; MW, 92-113) These two issues 
will help me set the stage for the Hegelian criticisms that I examine in this Chapter.  
Concerning the co-originality thesis, I develop the argument I made in Chapter Three 
examining it now in light of the Habermas-Rawls debate. I conclude that the ‗system of 
rights‘ is prior to the actual exercise of popular sovereignty. The notion of a ‗two-stage‘ 
methodology supports this interpretation. In the first stage, a ‗system of rights‘ composed 
of ‗unsaturated placeholders‘ (BFN, 125) that protect private and public autonomy, is 
framed. In the second stage, the system is fleshed out through the ‗exercise, the actual 
carrying out‘ (Habermas, 2001: 778) of popular sovereignty.  
I understand this view in the sense that the ‗system of rights‘ needs the support of a 
normative content which refers to the Kantian concept of autonomy (private autonomy 
and public autonomy) and that has priority over the exercise of collective self-
determination. (Forst develops a similar interpretation of the co-originality, 2011: 164-180) 
This priority is expressed in Habermas when he asserts that ‗the freedom of the moral 
person splits into the public autonomy of co-legislators and the private autonomy of 
addressees of the law‘. (MW, 113) This means that both forms of autonomy, private and 
public, derive from the normative concept of justification. And as I have shown, the latter 
concept is a re-working of Kant‘s notion of practical reason.  
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This return of Kant in Habermas‘s co-originality thesis implies the return of Hegelian 
criticisms that target the priority of an abstract ‗system of rights‘ over the democratic 
process. In this Chapter I examine two criticisms. The first arises in light of the Habermas-
Rawls debate in which both authors argue that in the theory of the other there is a priority 
of the ‗system of rights‘ over democratic self-determination (public autonomy). (RPR, 42; 
RH, 76) This charge can be seen as a Hegelian criticism because it challenges the priority of 
a normative core over institutions and practices. The second criticism is developed by 
Frank Michelman, (1998) and to a certain extent also by Richard Bernstein (1998). It asserts 
that substantive components should be included in the first stage. For example Michelman 
asserts that ‗Constitutional law is institutional stuff from the word go‘. (1998: 320) In other 
words, Michelman‘s claim is that from the beginning the essential norms of the ‗system of 
rights‘ need to be shaped in substantive terms.  
I believe, however that this charge can be successfully answered by Habermas, given a 
proper understanding of his Kantian Republicanism. (MW, 113; BNR, 102) Concerning the 
first criticism – the priority of the ‗system of rights‘ over democratic self-determination – 
Habermas‘s notion of practical reason incorporates an element of mutual recognition: 
‗Nobody can be free at the expense of anybody else‘s freedom‘. (MW, 113) Therefore, it 
must be that the idea of private autonomy is co-original with the idea of public autonomy. 
Thus, the inclusion of a Kantian notion of practical reason at the beginning is not 
detrimental to democracy. Regarding the second criticism, since ‗pragmatic, ethical-political 
and moral reasons‘ are all included in discourses of legitimation (BFN, 108), then, it is not 
true –  as Michelman asserts (1998: 321) –  to say that constitutional democracy is immune 
to the inclusion of substantive contents. That said, even though it is true that the moral 
substance enters into the picture at the second stage of justification, when citizens 
themselves undertake to fill out and justify particular rights, still there is a priority of 
morality here.    
Nonetheless, there is another issue that arises from a particular interpretation of 
Habermas‘s political theory, namely, the priority of morality for the justification of 
legitimate laws. This reading is at hand in Baynes who claims that in Habermas, legitimacy 
depends on a moral core. (Baynes, 2016: 170, 179) If this account of Habermas is correct 
then the question is how do particular agents endorse the moral core of legitimate laws? 
This is because, in this version, legal and political norms not only have to be coherent with 
moral norms but all these different types of norms need to be justified in a similar way: the 
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validity requirement of norms implies that they need to be justified in the basis of impartial, 
agent-neutral reasons. Due to this particular understanding of the centrality of morality in 
legitimacy and to the stringent condition of the validity requirement, then Hegel‘s criticism 
of the will as a tester of maxims not only challenges Habermas‘s moral theory but his 
theory of legitimacy as well.  
To a certain extent, Habermas‘s second criticism of John Rawls deals with this issue. For 
that reason, it will help us to set the stage for this Hegelian criticism. Habermas charges 
Rawls with neglecting to give a clear account of the validity claim of his political theory. 
(RPR, 34) For Habermas, the condition of neutrality of the concept of legitimacy 
determines the epistemic status of the political conception, and sets at the centre of the 
theory a Kantian notion of practical reason.2 
Although, in order to ensure that the agents would endorse the political conception, Rawls 
avoids appealing to comprehensive notions (of practical reason), and legitimacy is instead 
made to rely on the overlapping consensus of the comprehensive doctrines that the citizens 
endorse.3 In this way, Rawls‘s alternative seems to cohere better with the Hegelian question 
concerning the motivation of the participants because ‗moral norms may not be imposed in 
an abstract manner on the life-histories of individual persons‘. (MW, 112) In contrast, 
Habermas‘s strong claim concerning the normative kernel of legal and political legitimacy 
leaves enough room for Hegel‘s criticisms of the will as a tester of maxims.  
Moreover, the Kantian concept of practical reason in Habermas is related to the 
reconstruction of the idea of normative justification and sets strict limits to what can count 
as rational. As I have shown, the procedure that derives from this Kantianism permits the 
justification of norms on the basis of impersonal or agent-neutral reasons, and not at all on 
the basis of agent-relative reasons. (IO, 7, 43; MW, 94) Therefore, it poses once again the 
question whether and to what extent the substance that Habermas includes in his notion of 
normativity can appeal to the particular agents who might be oriented by their agent-
relative reasons.  
                                                          
2 At this point and for the sake of my argument, I am not going to examine the difficult issue whether 
Habermas‘s charge is misdirected or not.  
3 The notion of overlapping consensus is mainly developed in Political Liberalism. (133-167, see also Chapter Three) 
As I have shown (See Chapter One and Three) Rawls‘s notion of ‗comprehensive doctrine‘ has three 
different meanings: a) world views, religious and secular; b) actually existing moralities, or conceptions of the 
good; c) philosophical theories of one kind of another. (PL 2005: xviii, 12, 144-145)  
 
118 
 
Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims now becomes relevant to the question of 
legitimacy. According to this criticism, Kant was not able to combine the particular will of 
the agent with the universal will of pure practical reason. Therefore, he failed to show that 
the agents would be motivated by the abstract principles of morality. (See Hegel, 1991: § 
135, 153) Relying also on Habermas‘s Kantian Republicanism, I offer a solution to the 
problem. The idea of mutual recognition points us to the way in which the agent-relative 
reasons can coincide with agent-neutral reasons. This is because the agent-relative reason 
of the citizen for being the author of her political and legal order coincides with the agent-
neutral reason that this autonomy should be also enjoyed by everybody else. Nonetheless, 
this dialectic supposes that Habermas needs to relinquish – at least in this case – the strict 
distinction that he draws between agreement on the basis of agent-neutral and agent-
relative reasons and the stipulation that moral agreement must rest only on the former – 
agent-neutral reasons. (Finlayson, 1999)  
Nevertheless, once again, the fact of pluralism clouds this alternative and cast some doubt 
on this Kantian solution. In this historical context, it is possible that this notion of mutual 
recognition and practical reason might still not be appealing for the agents. At the end of 
the Chapter, I examine a further Kantian alternative to solve this problem. There I examine 
the particular content that the Habermasian notion of autonomy demands, namely, the 
principle of discourse which refers to the thin and weak ‗concept of normative justification‘. (IO, 
45) I conclude that the nature of the principle that legitimacy demands at its core removes 
most if not all of the difficulties that stood in the way of its endorsement by the citizens of 
a modern political order. 
In order to develop these issues, I divide the Chapter in three sections. In the first, I show 
that Habermas incorporates Hegelian elements in his notion of legal and political 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, I maintain that the normative Kantian part has priority over the 
aforementioned Hegelian components. I disentangle the dialectic between Kant and Hegel 
in Habermas‘s political theory examining two Hegelian criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s 
critique of Kant‘s moral philosophy (I).  
In the second, I examine the co-originality between private and public autonomy from the 
point of view of the Habermas-Rawls debate. I show that the Kantianism prevails and that 
there are good reasons why Habermas still needs to defend this version of legitimacy from 
criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant (II).  
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In the third, I discuss whether the normative core that constitutional democracy demands 
can find the support from the particular citizens. As far as deontological validity demands 
agent-neutral reasons it seems difficult to take for granted the allegiance of the citizens to 
this kernel. Nevertheless, I discuss a solution which implies that Habermas needs to 
slacken the distinction that he draws between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons.  
(III). 
I. Hegelian and Kantian components in Habermas’s political philosophy  
In what follows, I show that Habermas incorporates Hegelian components in his political 
theory. That said, however, I claim also that a Kantian element has priority. This dialectic 
between Kant and Hegel in Habermas‘s theory unfolds in light of two Hegelian criticisms 
of Habermas‘s theory. (Honneth, 2014: 1-11; Bernstein, 1998: 287-305; Wellmer, 1998: 39-
62) I respond to these criticisms from the point of view of Habermas‘s Kantian 
Republicanism which seems to me the best candidate to answer the question of legitimacy 
in a context of social and ideological pluralism.  
To develop these criticisms I divide this part of the Chapter in two sections. In the first I 
develop the criticism which states that Kantian political philosophies are misleading 
because they are not performed as a fully immanent reconstruction of principles of justice. 
In this regard, Honneth asserts ‗we should follow Hegel in abstaining from presenting free-
standing, constructive justification of norms of justice prior to immanent analysis‘. 
(Honneth, 2014: 5) In the face of this criticism it is important to argue that Habermas 
develops immanent components in his theory of constitutional democracy, but not in the 
fully immanent fashion that Honneth proposes. Honneth problematizes the ‗freestanding’ 
character of political theories built on the Kantian tradition.4 Nevertheless, there are good 
reasons that justify putting at the centre a Kantian core which goes beyond historical 
practices. In my interpretation, a proper theory of legal and political legitimacy needs to 
recognize a kernel – which is the idea of public reason and the recognition of citizens as 
free and equal – that it is not justified by means of an immanent analysis (1).   
                                                          
4 Honneth understands the concept freestanding in a different sense than Rawls. For the former, freestanding 
refers to a political theory that is dissociated from substantive institutions and practices. (See Honneth, 2014: 
5) For the latter, freestanding means that political liberalism is independent from comprehensive doctrines i.e., 
religious or metaphysical theories. For Rawls, Political Liberalism is circumscribed within the realm of the 
political and it cannot go beyond that due to the fact of social and ideological pluralism. (PL) It cannot rely 
on particular conceptions of the good, religions, or philosophical theories. This point is one of the focuses of 
Habermas‘s criticism of Rawls. (RPR, 34-40) In order to avoid misunderstanding, in what follows I will use 
other concepts to refer to political theories that are dissociated from substantive institutions and practices 
than freestanding.   
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In the second section, I examine another criticism. According to this objection, Kantian 
political theories do not put at the centre a democratic ethos, which is essential for 
democracy. (See Bernstein, 1998: 289) Instead, the ethical commitments that the citizens 
should embrace towards democracy and liberalism – or what Habermas has defined as a 
culture that meets deliberative politics and law halfway (BFN, 302, 358, 461) – have an 
instrumental role. In this respect, they contribute to the stability of constitutional 
democracy, but not to its justification. The weight of legal and political legitimacy rests in 
the procedures of communicative reason which are independent of historical practices, 
institutions, substantive political cultures and ethical conceptions of the good. From the 
point of view of a political version of Kantianism there are good reasons to support this. 
On my reading, it is not possible to subordinate political legitimacy to ethical commitments 
and particular conceptions of the good. On the contrary, legitimacy is based on principles 
that have a universalistic tinge, namely, the idea of public reason and the Kantian principles 
of freedom and equality (2).  
1. Immanent components of Habermas’s political theory  
In Freedom’s Right, Honneth proposes a theory of justice as an immanent analysis of 
institutions which consists in a normative reconstruction of the structural features already 
present in society. (Honneth, 2014: 3) Thus, he claims that the normative contents or 
values that frame a theory of justice are the result of the analysis of historical institutions 
and practices. This is what defines a fully immanent theory that is opposed to what he 
characterizes as ‗conventional Kantian theories of justice‘. It is important to notice that 
Honneth does not equate Habermas‘s and Rawls‘s theories with standard versions of 
Kantianism, in which political legitimacy would be completely uncoupled from the 
institutional framework of modern societies.5 Rather:  
                                                          
5 It has been asserted that this is not a proper reading of Kant‘s moral philosophy. The Kantian defence is 
that morality does not create moral norms but rather that they derive from social reality. Therefore, the 
categorical imperative and the universal principle of right are not purely abstract and empty categories which 
are uncoupled from social institutions. In Kant‘s moral philosophy and in Habermas‘s moral theory as well, 
the principles of morality regulate conflicts of action that ‗grow out of everyday life‘ (MCCA, 204). 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to draw a more subtle distinction here because Honneth is not contesting that 
the contents of morality in Kant derive from social life. Rather, his argument is that the principles of morality 
in Kant are grounded in a fully transcendental (as opposed to immanent) fashion. As he argues, a Kantian or 
a Lockean theory of justice ‗stipulates that the normative principles according to which we judge the moral 
legitimacy of social orders may not stem from within existing institutional structures, but must stand alone 
outside of this institutional framework‘. (Honneth, 2014: 1-2) Therefore, the problem for Kant remains. I 
cannot examine this particular issue here because the focus of the present work is not Kant himself but 
Habermas‘s Kantianism. Freyenhagen offers a detailed account of Hegel‘s criticisms of Kant‘s moral 
philosophy and Kantian replies. (2011)  
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Both Rawls‘s theory of justice and Habermas‘s theory of law provide good 
examples of an approach that has its point of departure in the historical congruence 
between independently derived principles of justice and the normative ideals of 
modern societies. (Honneth, 2014: 5)   
Thus, Honneth acknowledges that Habermas incorporates historical arguments in his 
reconstruction of political legitimacy. Therefore, normative principles of law and politics 
coincide with the institutions and practices of modern societies. In this respect, Honneth‘s 
criticism begins from a fair reading of Habermas and Rawls. However, the core of his 
position is that a theory of justice should be the outcome of the fully immanent analysis of 
society and its substantive institutions and practices. In Habermas it is possible to find 
immanent components at the centre of his theory – for example, the constitution as a self-
correcting learning process. (BFN, 421; 2001: 768) The presence of these elements rules 
out from the outset the misleading reading that he might be developing a purely formal, 
abstract and empty theory of legitimacy.  
In what follows I develop two central features of Habermas‘s political theory, which show 
that he incorporates an immanent methodology into his philosophy (1.1). Nevertheless, I 
argue, he does not develop a fully immanent reconstruction – as Honneth advocates –  
because even the historical components of a theory of legitimacy have a Kantian core, 
namely, the recognition that citizens grant to each other as free and equal persons which is 
contained in the post-conventional notion of normative justification – the principle of 
discourse (D) –  (1.2).   
1.1. Systematically, Habermas has developed historical arguments in the different programs 
he has been working on. This methodological feature of his oeuvre arises from his early 
book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and is also developed in the Theory of 
Communicative Action. In his theory of legal and political legitimacy that is also the case. In 
Between Facts and Norms his justification of the system of rights is immanent to law. As a 
matter of fact, it can be argued that it is too immanent, which from the perspective of a 
stronger Kantianism is problematic. (Forst, 2011: 173; Flynn, 2011: 253-254) Moreover, 
Habermas asserts that the internal connection between private and public autonomy ‗can 
develop only in the dimension of time – as a self-correcting historical process‘ and that 
consequently the constitution is a ‗living project‘ (BFN, 129) ‗that makes the founding act 
into an ongoing process of constitution-making across generations‘. (Habermas, 2001: 768)  
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Thus, this second argument emphasizes the historical dimension of constitutional 
democracy, in which founders and present generations are part of a common project of 
democratic self-determination. Consequently, Habermas‘s theory of legitimacy 
acknowledges in its construction the historical dimension of modern societies. On the one 
hand, the form of law is an empirical and historical component; on the other hand, the 
constitutional practice is a learning process, which relates founders and present generations.  
Concerning the first element, the legal form has functional and empirical features and is 
introduced from the observers‘ perspective, operating in the stabilization of behavioural 
expectations to guarantee society´s integration. Therefore, it is a component of social 
reality. It is part of the network of practices and institutions that produce the substantial 
shape of constitutional democracy. The relevant point is that due to the features of the 
principle of discourse and the legal form, Habermas is able to connect his formal discourse 
theory with a functional feature of modern societies. (BFN, 83; Finlayson, 2011: 7; 
Hedrick, 2010: 106) Hence, he integrates a normative principle that can operate as a way to 
assess the rationality of modern law and an empirical input. (Hedrick, 2010: 105) This 
functional character of law is expressed in the fact that in modern conditions it has to be 
understood as positive law.  
According to BFN, citizens can and often do obey laws due to an insight into their intrinsic 
normative rationality. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to consider the functional 
requirements of positive law, because when this insight fails the individuals know that there 
remains the threat of prosecution and punishment.6 As Pedersen argues, ‗positive law 
leaves the question of motivation to the participants‘. (Pedersen, 2011: 417, in Hedrick, 
2010) However, even in the case that law is obeyed due to the threat of sanctions, there 
remains a normative core that might not be recognized and accepted by the agents but 
which represents the rationality internal to law.7 Now, the point is that it does not matter in 
which specific grounds an agent obey the law, provide she does. This is different in 
morality because there the worth of the action, and its character as a moral action depends 
on the reasons or the insights that ground an action. Habermas‘s account of moral action is 
Kantian and deontological in this respect (and not consequentialist).  
                                                          
6 The norms can, ‗of course, be obeyed on the basis of insight […] but, they also reckon with the legal 
subjects who act from self-interest and free choice and whose conduct must be bindingly regulated without 
reference to moral motives‘. (Forst, 2011: 166)  This is what Habermas has defined as the ‗Janus-faced 
character of law‘. (BFN, 448) 
7 In this respect, I recall the discussion broached in Chapter Three, section 1 of part I. There, I discuss the 
‗internal‘ tension between facticity and validity. 
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For Habermas, this enforceability – its facticity – of law is always combined with its 
validity. In a context of pluralism, and from the vantage point of radical democracy, law is 
legitimate when it respects the self-legislation of the political community which refers to 
the Kantian idea of citizens as addressees and authors of their constitution. (BFN, 104)8 
Concerning the form of law, Forst claims that this concept is not justified in Habermas‘s 
theory and it is described as the result of a historical development (Forst, 2011: 167) 
reflected in two hundred years of constitutional law. (BFN, 129; Hedrick, 2010: 111) 
The second historical component refers to the relationship between private and public 
autonomy as a ‗learning process‘. (BFN, 421; Habermas, 2001: 768) Habermas develops 
this thesis along two lines. The first focuses on the past where later generations continue 
the project of interpreting the normative content of the constitution embarked upon by 
earlier generations. Thus, the later generations begin with the same standards, as did the 
founders. In this respect, for Habermas all citizens must recognize a core in 
constitutionalism which is the same throughout history. This idea is at the centre of the 
communitarian and republican traditions. Nevertheless, they do not include the normative 
principle of discourse, as Habermas does, which relies on a Kantian account of practical 
reason: namely, the public use of reason (RPR, 38) in conditions of post-metaphysical 
thinking (PT: 3-9), which is shaped by the weak ‘concept of normative justification‘. (IO, 45)  
Concerning, the second line, it implies a change in focus from the past to the future, from 
the constitutional tradition to the performativity of constitution-making as a promise of 
future reconciliation. Here, citizens must still see themselves as the heirs of a founding 
generation, ‗carrying on with the common project‘. (Thomassen, 2010: 54) However, they 
see themselves as heirs and at the same time the constitution making process ultimately 
refers to the promise of an unrestricted exchange of reasons that presupposes the 
possibility of agreement but also provides space for disagreement. In this respect, again the 
normative idea of the public use of reason frames – albeit in an abstract and unfinished 
fashion – the practice of constitution making.  
1.2. Thus, it would not be fair to argue that Habermas does not develop an immanent 
analysis in his theory of legal and political legitimacy. In this respect, at least two elements 
are the result of that methodological strategy. On the one hand, the form of law, on the 
other, the constitutional practice as a learning process. Nevertheless, this reconstruction is 
not performed in the fully immanent fashion that Honneth expects and there are good 
                                                          
8 See other essential features of the validity of a legal norm in. (Finlayson, 2011: 10)  
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arguments which explain this theoretical decision. In Habermas, there is still a Kantian 
element that is independent and beyond historical practices and institutions, namely, the 
post-conventional notion of normative justification.9 (D) is a universal – it is transculturally 
valid. However, Habermas thinks it comes to be historically as a result of the process of 
modernisation and rationalisation. As a weak transcendental principle it is not logically or 
metaphysically necessary, but necessary for our (communicative and discursive) form of 
life. That said, principle (D) is not fully immanent in that its idealizing presuppositions 
transcend actual conditions. Moreover, this component pertains to the public use of reason 
which is internally connected with citizens who grant each other equal rights to freedom.  
In the argument concerning the practice of constitution making as a learning process 
developed in history, the Kantian principle of Discourse is shared by the founders and the 
heirs of the constitutional practice whenever they want to legitimately regulate their 
political life by means of law. Additionally, this normative core frames the legitimacy of 
constitutional democracy when it is embodied in the medium of law.  
This claim is sustained in the fact that the principle of democracy includes the post-
conventional notion of normative justification at its core. (BFN, 107) Thus, as far as this 
element is included at the centre of legal and political legitimacy, it is not difficult to 
understand why moral reasons have priority in the justification of legal norms over ethical-
political and pragmatical considerations. (BFN, 103, 108, 113; IO, 42-43; Flynn, 2003, 434) 
Moreover, legitimate laws must ‗harmonize with the moral principles of justice and 
solidarity‘ (BFN, 99, 155) which Finlayson has called the Moral Permissibility Constraint MPC. 
(Finlayson, 2011: 12, 2016a: 12, 14) 
Consequently, even the historical features of the theory are framed in Kantian terms. In 
other words, in Between Facts and Norms and elsewhere this component prevails in the 
grounding of political and legal legitimacy. Thus, Honneth is correct to argue that 
Habermas does not build his theory as a fully immanent reconstruction of principles of 
justice. Notwithstanding, the former is not correct when he advocates that the theory of 
legitimacy has to be developed in this fashion. Habermas‘s political theory includes the idea 
of normative justification which responds to what might be called Kantian Republicanism. 
(MW, 110-113; BNR, 102) 
                                                          
9 It is possible to argue that the principle of discourse is an immanent reconstruction of the practice of 
justification in a post-conventional context. Nevertheless, in Chapter One and Three I showed that there is 
still a transcendental component in (D).  
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This kernel is grounded in a notion of practical reason, and not in the historical features of 
modern societies. Moreover, this Kantian substance is apprehended in the principle of 
discourse which is an intersubjective conception of practical reason. Naturally, Habermas‘s 
conception of a weak ‘concept of normative justification‘ (IO, 45) – that alludes to the capacity to 
redeem validity claims in discourse – has an intersubjective character. In Chapter One and 
Three I examined the relationships between this concept and Kant‘ notion of pure practical 
reason and I concluded that at bottom the post-conventional notion of normative 
justification – which is at the centre of Habermas‘s oeuvre – belongs to the Kantian family.  
Nevertheless, Habermas‘s dialogical idea of autonomy presupposes a break with the 
monological conception of autonomy that structures Kant‘s account of pure practical 
reason. In other words, Kant‘s reconstruction of the moral point of view, the categorical 
imperative, defines a procedure that every agent can perform on their own to check the 
universalizability of moral norms. By contrast, Habermas has an intersubjectivistic 
understanding of practical reason and autonomy. (See Chapter One) However, there are 
many elements which both philosophers share, and this is one of the reasons that allow 
Habermas to consider his position as a form of Kantian pragmatism (T&J, 83-130) and 
also of Kantian Republicanism. (MW, 110-113; BNR, 102) In the case of the latter, the 
Kantianism in Habermas arises in the medium of law itself. In the interpretation that I have 
been developing, this empirical input – the legal form – has to be framed to protect and 
enact the basic rights to exercise private and public autonomy.10 Therefore, the normative 
component frames the form of law and then the historical argument is dependent on the 
former.   
Habermas argues correctly that in a weak sense his theory of political legitimacy includes 
Hegelian elements. (1998: 384) He would be a Hegelian in the strong sense if he were 
developing a fully immanent reconstruction. Now, in my interpretation this weak 
Hegelianism runs alongside a weak Kantianism, and rightly so. The weight of the 
justification of political legitimacy is normative, in a weakly Kantian sense. As I have shown, 
even the immanent elements of the theory incorporate the Kantian notion of moral reason. 
The form of law itself, which in Between Facts and Norms is reconstructed as an historical 
feature includes normative Kantian components. The American legal philosopher Lon 
Fuller proposes that the legal form includes several normative elements which he has called 
the ‗morality of law‘: being publicly promulgated, clearly formulated and not applicable 
                                                          
10 See Chapter Three, part I, section 2.  
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retroactively. (1969: 33-38) One might include others: the autonomy of the judiciary, the 
system of rights and its relationship with subjective rights that guarantee equality and 
freedom. Of course, these features have a normative character, but still, it is possible to 
understand them as procedures and contents which guarantee legal and political 
legitimacy.11  
The ‗system of rights‘ certainly has a normative flavour. These rights have as their principal 
function the protection of equality and freedom among legal subjects. Furthermore, these 
rights should be coherent with fundamental rights, which, Habermas claims, have both a 
legal and fully moral nature. No one can deny that Human Rights are moral norms because 
they square with everyone‘s interest. Therefore, they are universalizable norms, and have a 
deontological character. In this respect, Human Rights are internally connected with 
Human dignity, which acquired its current canonical expression in Kant. (Habermas, 2010: 
465) Nevertheless, they are also legal entities which are embodied in and supported by 
institutions and practices. This is what pertains to its Janus-Faced nature. (BNF, 454; Flynn, 
2003: 432) This nature of basic rights shows how Habermas‘s notion of legal and political 
legitimacy squares with the analytical interpretation of Hegel‘s critique of Kant: moral 
content is embodied and supported by a modern Sittlichkeit.  
Finally, the very independence of the judiciary can be interpreted as another argument for 
the primacy of a normative core in the form of law. From the point of view of the tradition 
of juridical positivism, this independence is related to the necessary expertise of the jurists. 
However, this can be understood also as the autonomy that the legal system needs in order 
to protect the freedom of legal subjects. For example, it expresses the protection of the 
integrity of the person in front of others and in front of institutions that have more 
political power; and also, the liberal principle of the defence of minorities against the 
collective will of majorities.12  
Concerning the constitution practice as an historical process, the founders and heirs share 
Kantian notions of freedom and autonomy. This is a universalistic and still untapped 
                                                          
11 Nevertheless, this morality of law does not refer to the morality of Discourse Ethics. It is a thin and narrow 
notion of morality, confined to certain aspects of the legal system, which does not reaches the post-
conventional level of morality of Discourse Ethics. It does not regulate every action, not bind every moral 
agent. 
12 However, to be democratic the collective will cannot contradict the system of rights which protects public 
and private autonomy; otherwise it is simply not democratic. It can be called something else, but not 
democracy. Historically, whenever a political system stops respecting private autonomy in the name of the 
general will, what is taking place is something different to what could be conceived as a proper democratic 
system.  
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normative core of normative insights. It is still untapped, because the constitution making 
is a learning process that is not closed from the outset. At the beginning of the 
constitutional history of many countries, subordinated groups were not granted rights. For 
example, the political rights of women did not exist until the second half of the twentieth 
century. The normative core of democracy clashed constantly with this situation. Through 
historical struggles women finally could also be part of the democratic process. My 
question here is if politics were only an immanent process, then how is it possible to get 
from an order in which one group does not have political rights to another where it does? 
Constitutional democracy contains a universalistic core which when developed and 
interpreted through public discourses, gives a concrete shape to a legitimate political 
system, in which the addressees of the norms are also their authors. (BFN, 104, 120)   
To sum up, in this section I have shown that Habermas includes immanent components in 
his political theory, but does not develop all the contents of a political conception of 
justice, and the notion of political legitimacy in a fully immanent fashion, because both 
these elements are subordinated to the Kantian core, namely, the principle of discourse. 
This principle is embodied in the medium of law by means of the interpenetration that I 
have examined in detail in Chapter Three. This means, that whatever Habermas may claim, 
a Kantian concept of autonomy frames Habermas‘s notion of constitutional democracy. 
Furthermore, the constitution as a self-correcting learning process also retains a Kantian 
notion of normative justification. Namely, founders and heirs understand themselves as 
bounded by the idea of freedom and equality. Thus, as far as this Kantian component is 
included at the centre of legitimacy, it is understandable that moral reasons have priority in 
the justification of the ‗system of rights‘ over ethical-political and pragmatical 
considerations. (BFN, 103, Flynn, 2003, 434) In this respect, in issues concerning 
legitimacy Habermas insist in the priority of the right, as he does in the program of 
Discourse Ethics. In what follows, I examine a further Hegelian component of Habermas‘s 
notion of legal and political legitimacy, namely, the idea of a democratic political culture.  
2. Democratic Sittlichkeit and political culture  
A further Hegelian criticism of Habermas‘s political theory refers to the priority for 
democracy of the existence of citizens who embrace democratic political values. In this 
respect, Richard J. Bernstein (1998: 287-305) and Albrecht Wellmer (1998: 39-62) argue 
that a democratic regime needs an active citizenry with the will to deliberate. This active 
citizenry ‗accept reasonable and rational arguments‘, and are ‗oriented toward the common 
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good rather than their own particular interests‘. (Hedrick, 2010: 129) This element is 
constitutive for democracy and according to these critics it has only an instrumental role in 
Habermas. As Hedrick reports, for them in Habermas‘s theory, ‗the dependence of the 
legal order on democratic Sittlichkeit is asymmetrical: a community‘s ethos is called on to 
support the ongoing legitimation of the legal order, but only after its essential structure has 
been determined‘. (2010: 130) 
In other words, in Habermas this democratic political culture is subordinated to the 
Kantian principles which frame the practice of self-legislation, namely, the principle of 
discourse (D) and the principle of democracy. The weight of the argument in his theory 
rests on the normative core that structures the system of rights and democracy. In 
Bernstein‘s terms the problem is that the more Habermas insists upon the ‗purity‘ of his 
theory ‗the more formal and empty it becomes‘. (Bernstein, 1998: 289) On Bernstein‘s 
account a discursive theory of democracy has to be built as a hermeneutical circle that 
presupposes a democratic ethos. Such a democratic substantive ethos does not determine 
specific norms, values, and decisions. While it is still formal it is substantive at the same 
time. According to Bernstein, Habermas should be more faithful and recognize that ‗all 
social and political theory involves ethical presuppositions and commitments‘. (Bernstein, 
1998: 290) However, this raises the problem of those ethical commitments (ethical as 
opposed to moral).  
This criticism is based on an insight that is present in Habermas‘s methodological 
approach. In Theory of Communicative Action he combines both a reconstructive component 
and the point of view of the participants. In the case of political legitimacy, in the former, 
the fundamental features of a legal order are based on its capacity to guarantee the rational 
and autonomous governance of society. From the perspective of the participants, political 
issues are substantive problems. In relation to the charge that I am discussing in this 
section, Habermas‘s political theory focuses on the side of the reconstruction of principles 
and it does not seem to ‗be capturing the reasons that participants in practices of self-
government would give for viewing those practices as justified‘. (Hedrick, 2010: 125) 
The earlier theory of universal pragmatics does not suffer from this problem since the 
reconstructive perspective seeks to make explicit the knowledge that participants 
presuppose in their actual communicative practice. In other words, the reconstructive and 
the participants‘ approach coincide. That is not the case in Habermas‘s political theory. 
According to Bernhardt Peters (1994), modern institutions such as law and politics are 
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based not on a substantive insight, but in rational procedures. The problem is that from the 
participants‘ perspective, there ‗is still the convincing force of substantive arguments that 
(ideally or rationally) leads them to accept certain propositions as true, certain norms or 
institutional orders as legitimate‘. (Peters, 1994) Thus, in Habermas there is a difference 
between the knowledge that participants have and the reconstructive knowledge generated 
by the theory.  
Rawls‘s concept of overlapping consensus (PL, 133) gives a central role to the perspective of 
the participants in a political theory. Therefore, his theory seems to involve two elements 
which are difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, he is developing a theory of justice in the 
Kantian tradition. On the other hand, he is responding convincingly to a Hegelian charge: 
namely, that the Rawlsian citizens participate in public justifications oriented towards 
reaching a shared conception of justice embedded in their diverse comprehensive 
doctrines. Thus, Political Liberalism formalizes certain components which are already present 
and accepted in the life-world of the citizens. Thereby, in this theory at least some of the 
substantive views that are reconstructed from the participant‘s perspective have a place in 
the legitimacy of politics. In this respect, Hedrick asserts that Habermas‘s argument should 
make ‗some concessions to the Rawlsian position, by conceiving of reasonableness as a 
substantive commitment to a rational and communicative form of life shaped by a process 
of legitimate law-making‘. (Hedrick, 2010: 127)  
However, this commitment to a particular form of life is not feasible in light of the fact of 
pluralism. (BNR, 102; Finlayson, 2011: 19) In this context democratic practice in modern 
societies cannot be grounded in a pre-political ethical core. Political legitimacy can be 
constrained only ‗by the preconditions for rational discourse through law‘ and it does not 
depend on a particular form of ethical life. (Hedrick, 2010: 127) 
As I have shown, Habermas recognizes that political legitimacy needs to be met by a 
coherent political culture halfway (BFN, 302, 461), but this does not mean that it depends 
entirely on this form of life. It is important to notice that the form of life is not a thick 
conception of the good, but to a form of life where moral agents and citizens have the 
disposition to solidarize with other citizens and to act on insight into moral and political 
norms. As agents at stage 6 they are disposed to be bound by the results of moral and 
democratic discourses.  Moreover, the allegiance to this form of life does not mean the end 
of the public autonomy of the citizens. This is because the concrete shape that democracy, 
the ‗system of rights‘ and the constitution take is something that has to be constantly 
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worked out by the citizens. It is important to emphasize that Habermas‘s claim that a form 
of life must meet morality (and deliberative democracy) halfway, does not amount to the 
claim that a substantial ethos is required as the basis of political association. This is because 
morality and politics are embedded in a form of life, but their validity and legitimacy 
depend on the principle of Discourse and its specifications in the principle of 
universalization (U) and the principle of democracy.  
In the case of politics, this might sound problematic given that the normative core of a 
democratic constitutional state looks underdetermined, ethically underdetermined, so to 
speak. However, for Habermas this is an advantage and is more congruent with the fact of 
pluralism and the conditions that this fact brings about. Furthermore, it responds to the 
demands of a critical perspective, because the outcomes of the discourses are left up to the 
participants to determine. That is the reason why Habermas defines the first three 
categories of rights that form the system of rights as unsaturated placeholders that are ‗more 
like legal principles that guide the framers of constitutions‘. (BFN, 126) In principle, public 
autonomy is not constrained by procedures neither from the beginning nor from the end. 
Nevertheless, self-legislation cannot contradict – what I want to call following Baynes – a 
thin core (Baynes, 2016: 107-108) of universal norms. This condition is related to what 
Finlayson has called the Moral Permissibility Constraint. (Finlayson, 2011: 12; 2016a: 12, 14) 
Habermas‘s answer to these criticisms relies on his Kantian Republicanism within the 
context of a society characterized by the fact of social and ideological pluralism. In modern 
conditions, ethical appeals to ground a legal order are not possible. Therefore, its 
justification has to rely on a procedural basis. This defines Habermas´ commitment to a 
Kantian Republicanism which seeks to:  
Transform the moral level of justification into procedures of political self-legislation 
and attach justice less to the general principles than to the democratic legitimation of 
norms and laws. (Forst, 2011: 164-165)  
Nevertheless, the question remains whether Habermas is able to illuminate the actual 
practice of everyday human reasoning, which from a Hegelian perspective is oriented from 
and toward substantive norms as grounds with which to evaluate the legitimacy of modern 
legal and political orders. There are strong reasons for arguing that Habermas‘s theory can 
illuminate this: the modern condition is characterized by a plurality of conceptions of the 
good. Therefore, a procedural theory in the Kantian tradition has more chances of 
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illuminating the dimension of validity in its universality.  
So far, I have discussed a criticism of Habermas‘s theory of constitutional democracy from 
a Hegelian point of view. This charge is based on the distinction between the theorist‘s 
perspective and the participants‘ perspective. It has been argued that Rawls in his concept 
of overlapping consensus seems to be more aware than Habermas of the participants‘ 
perspective. (Hedrick, 2010: 127) Namely, the substantive principles that are based on the 
comprehensive doctrines that the participants embrace have a central place in Political 
Liberalism.  
To answer this criticism I shall appeal to Habermas‘s Kantian Republicanism and his 
notion of post-metaphysical thinking. (PT: 3-9) In this paradigm, as a result of the fact of 
pluralism, according to Habermas, it is not possible to ground legal and political legitimacy 
in any particular doctrine of the good life or in any set of specific ethical commitments. If 
that were the case, then we would not know which one would be the right conception of 
the good. A proper account of legitimacy needs to acknowledge and deal with the fact of 
pluralism. Therefore, only a procedural theory – understood as a Kantian Republicanism – 
answers the question of how of legitimate laws can be produced that can to be obeyed due 
to their intrinsic rationality.   
II. The co-originality and the return of Hegel 
In the 1995 debate between Habermas and Rawls, the sketch that emerges is that the 
theories of both philosophers are ‗two-stage‘ constructions. (RH, 63, 76; Habermas, 2001: 
766-782; Forst, 2011: 171)  In the first stage an abstract core of basic rights is constructed 
from the vantage point of the nonparticipant. (BFN, 118) These rights are defined as 
‗unsaturated placeholders that guide the framers of constitutions‘. (BFN, 126) In a second 
stage, they gain their actual shape through the exercise of public autonomy. (Habermas, 
2001: 778) This reconstruction supports the Kantian reading of Habermas‘s theory. At the 
first stage the normative component is incorporated beyond democratic institutions and 
practices. In this way, a post-conventional notion of normative justification bears the 
weight of legal and political legitimacy.    
With this version of the relationship between public and private autonomy in hand the 
question that I want to examine is whether Habermas‘s Kantianism is immune to Hegelian 
criticisms. To develop these issues, I discuss the co-originality between private and public 
autonomy in the Habermas-Rawls debate. Here, it is possible to conclude that both are part 
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of the Kantian family, because at bottom they share a conception of moral reason and 
autonomy at the centre of their political theories. (Forst, 2011: 153; Laden, 2011: 135) This 
component results in the return of the Hegelian criticisms that target the priority of 
normative procedures and an abstract set of basic of rights prior to the democratic process 
(1). We will then see whether these Hegelian objections can be answered by Habermas‘s 
Kantian Republicanism (2).   
1. The Habermas-Rawls debate, the co-originality and the Hegelian objection  
According to Habermas, his debate with Rawls is a familial dispute. (RPR, 25) Perhaps the 
fundamental reason why he names it in those terms is that both share a Kantian notion of 
practical reason and autonomy. (Forst, 2011: 153; Laden, 2011: 135) If they endorse this 
Kantianism, then their dispute is a good place to examine the particular shape of this 
component of Habermas‘s theory. In this context, I focus first on the issue of the co-
originality of private and public autonomy. I argue that Habermas and Rawls share a 
common Kantian conception of legitimacy and we can show this by means of an analysis 
of their ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction of a ‗system of rights‘ (1.1). Then, I discuss this aspect of 
Habermas from the point of view of two criticisms that are inspired by Hegel‘s critique of 
Kant. The first concerns the thesis of the co-originality. The second concerns the inclusion 
of substantive components in Habermas‘s political theory (1.2).  
1.1. Habermas‘s criticism of Rawls, in light of the co-originality thesis, is that the latter 
gives primacy to liberal rights over democracy. (RPR, 42) In other words, in the well-
known dispute between the moderns and the ancients (following Constant), Rawls shifts the 
balance on the side of the modern conception of liberties, by privileging individual 
autonomy. Public autonomy, so Habermas argues, is modelled at the level of the original 
position. This means that the possible outcomes of the democratic practice are decided in 
advance. As a result, this autonomy is present just on the first level of the theory and ‗does 
not fully unfold in the heart of the justly constituted society‘. (RPR, 42) Public autonomy is 
part of the original position but later when the veil of ignorance is lifted, Rawls´ citizens 
confront principles and norms that already have been anticipated within the theory and are 
beyond their control. Thus:  
They cannot reignite the radical democratic embers of the original position in the 
civic life of their society, for from their perspective all of the essential discourses of 
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legitimation have already taken place within the theory; and they find the results of 
the theory already sedimented in the constitution. (RPR, 42) 
Consequently, the citizens are confronted with norms and also with political questions that 
have been already anticipated in the theory. Therefore, Rawls fails to do justice to the co-
originality of private and public autonomy. In this respect, Habermas argues that this leads 
to a democratic deficit in the theory – or the privileging of political philosophy over 
democratic politics.    
In Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas, Rawls rejects this criticism. He asserts that his 
construction of a four-stage sequence [original position, constitutional convention, 
legislation and adjudication] is misunderstood by Habermas, because at every step there is 
space to check the contents. In his own words, ‗The four-stage sequence fits, then, with the 
idea that the liberties of the moderns are subject to the constituent will of the people‘. (RH, 
71) Thus, according to Rawls in his theory there is a proper place for public autonomy. He 
argues that even ‗the political conception of justice, like any other conception, is always 
subject to being checked by our reflective considered judgements‘. (RH, 66)   
Nevertheless, the answer given by Rawls is not convincing because he is referring to the 
four-stage as a model for the reflexive application of the principles of justice: it is not up to 
the citizens to decide them; they are given before discourses of political legitimation take 
place. In Political Liberalism this is also the case. There Rawls ‗advances the thesis that the 
collective use of reason in questions of ‗constitutional essentials‘ and ‗basic justice‘ is 
subject to the restriction that these questions should be answered only on the basis of 
‗political values‘ and not with reference to contested doctrines‘. (Forst, 2011: 170) Thus, as 
Forst argues, Rawls‘s account of political legitimacy recognizes principles of justice that 
have priority over the self-legislation of a political community. In other words, the citizens 
are first addressees of rights and only after that their authors.  
Furthermore, additional evidence that supports this reading is that Rawls‘s theory does not 
seem to go beyond a monological account of reason with political-public intent towards a 
theory of deliberative democracy. (Forst, 2011: 171) In consequence, Rawls‘ answer does 
not successfully deal with Habermas‘s criticism and the former does not adequately capture 
the co-originality of private and public autonomy. In Justice as Fairness a system of rights 
oriented to protect individual freedom is prior to the public practice of self-legislation.  
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That said, although Rawls‘s reply is ultimately not satisfactory, it nonetheless makes two 
important contributions. On the one hand, it helps to clarify his position concerning the 
balance between private and public autonomy.13 On the other, it advances an interesting 
interpretation of Habermas‘s co-originality thesis. According to Rawls the theory of Justice 
as Fairness and Habermas‘s theory of constitutional democracy are necessarily ‗two-stage‘ 
reconstructions. (RH, 76) In this respect, Habermas cannot avoid a methodology that 
assigns to private autonomy and human rights a moral meaning and consequently a 
normative priority. The first statement that refers to the moral content is something that 
Habermas does not deny. (BFN, 455-456) Nevertheless, the claim that Habermas is giving 
priority to individual freedom over collective self-determination is at odds with his official 
version of the co-originality thesis which implies among other things that private and 
public autonomy have ‗equal-weight‘. The idea of a ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction necessitates 
the specification of particular rights prior to their institutionalization. According to Forst, 
Rawls argues ‗that Habermas also cannot get around a ‗two-stage‘ theory construction that 
assigns to human rights a moral content and normative priority‘. (2011: 171)  
Now, as I showed in Chapter Three, this opens an ambiguity in Rawls‘s critique of 
Habermas. On the one hand, the ‗system of rights‘ become part of positive law only when 
it is understood as condition for the institutionalization of political autonomy. This is 
Larmore‘s interpretation of Habermas‘s thesis of the co-originality. (1999: 64-65) In this 
respect, although Habermas allots an intrinsic value to the ‗system of rights‘, he fails 
because in his theory basic rights and political rights are supposed to have only a functional 
place in the institutionalization of collective self-determination.  
Nevertheless, the other reading is that by means of the ‗two-stage‘ construction Habermas 
needs to assign normative priority to the ‗system of rights‘ and this is detrimental to public 
autonomy. Ingeborg Maus (1995: 825-882) is critical of this reconstruction of the co-
originality, whereas Jeffrey Flynn (2003, 2011) and Rainer Forst (2007) agree that the 
priority of a moral content is the only alternative remaining which would allow Habermas 
to give a proper justification to the ‗system of rights‘ and to ensure co-originality. (See also 
Baynes, 2016) This reading is more coherent with Habermas‘s theory in general and with 
the development of his notion of legitimacy in writings after Between Facts and Norms. (MW, 
110-113; Habermas, 2001: 766-782; 2010: 462-480) 
                                                          
13 In this respect, Rawls recognizes that by means of the debate ‗I have been forced to think through and re-
examine many aspects of my view and now believe I understand it better that I once did. (RH, 91) 
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In summary, Habermas argues that the principle of discourse is embodied in the medium 
of law. Then, the ‗system of rights‘ that arises has normative priority over the democratic 
process. By means of the ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction (2001: 766-782; 2011: 296) Habermas 
is acknowledging the priority of the ‗system of rights‘, before the concrete practice of self-
legislation gets in motion. Hence, he errs more on the liberal side – which gives priority to 
the ‗system of rights‘ – than on the republican side – that put the emphasis on the actual 
exercise of public autonomy. Interestingly enough, when Habermas opens the debate and 
pushes Rawls to recognize himself in the Kantian family, the unexpected outcome is that 
the debate pushes Habermas to acknowledge that he also belongs more to that family that 
he admits in BFN.14  
Despite what Habermas says to the contrary in BFN, in his theory of legitimacy the weight 
moves towards the ‗system of rights‘ before it gains actual shape through public autonomy. 
Then, as in Kant, a normative concept has temporal and conceptual priority over the 
historical practice of self-legislation.15 As I have shown, this interpretation of Habermas‘s 
theory is at odds with the official view set out in BFN - and also in BNR. In that version, 
the justification of the ‗system of rights‘ is fully immanent to law. (Forst, 2011: 173; Flynn, 
2011: 253-254) Nevertheless, following Forst and Flynn I claim that the ‗system of rights‘ 
needs the support of a normative component. (Forst, 2011; Flynn, 2003; 2011; Baynes, 
2016) As I have argued in Chapter One, this content refers to a modified version of Kant‘s 
notion of autonomy. Naturally, this re-emergence of a certain Kantianism lays Habermas 
open once again to the Hegelian critique we have been attempting to rebut. The question is 
whether and to what extent the Kantian version of Habermas can adequately answer these 
criticisms. 
1.2. Hitherto, I have shown that Habermas‘s version of the co-originality grants priority to 
‗the system of rights‘ over the exercise of public autonomy. Therefore, a Kantian motive 
returns because a previous ‗system of rights‘ with a universalistic meaning arises before the 
democratic practice takes place. Now, I discuss two criticisms of Habermas‘s thesis of co-
originality that are prompted by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. The first concerns the 
subordination of democratic institutions and practices to a Kantian core of universal 
rightness. The second is strongly connected with the first, although it does not target the 
                                                          
14 I am indebted to Rainer Forst for this interpretation of the Habermas-Rawls debate.  
15 It is important to note that this is a matter of controversy. According to Baynes ‗The difficulty is reflected 
in the question whether Kant is best understood as a natural rights theorist or a social contract theorist‘. 
(2016: 135) For example, according to Habermas and O‘Neill (1975) the universal principle of right is a 
subsidiary formula of the categorical imperative.  
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priority of private autonomy per se. Rather, it focuses on the issue that the system of rights 
is in the first stage abstractly reconstructed and it does not incorporate substantive 
components of ethical life from the beginning.  
The first is the charge that Habermas and Rawls formulate against each other. It claims that 
the priority of the system of rights is detrimental to democracy and the actual practice of 
self-legislation. (RPR, 40-45; RH, 63-81; Maus, 1992) In the vocabulary of Hegel‘s critique 
of Kant, institutions and practices are ancillary to a moral core that constrains them.16 
Thus, the notion of practical reason and autonomy – that in Habermas frames the system 
of rights – has priority over social space and historical time. Of course, from a Hegelian 
point of view this is not the right way to proceed. As we have seen, Honneth argues that a 
theory of justice should abstain from offering principles of justice prior to immanent 
analysis. (2014: 5) 
The second criticism is developed by Frank Michelman in his contribution to the collection 
entitled Habermas on Law and Democracy. The claim here is that the ‗system of rights‘ cannot 
be constructed in an abstract mode. Michelman asserts that law is always an institutional 
domain; it is embedded in social space and historical time from the beginning. Thus, 
Habermas‘s ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction that begins from abstract rights, or what he calls 
‗unsaturated placeholders‘ (BFN, 125), is challenged. In Michelman‘s view, there is 
‗nowhere to go‘ if the starting point is only an abstract definition of rights, beyond any 
particular context. Instead, it is always necessary to frame these rights taking into account 
substantive institutions and practices. In this respect: 
For suppose we start, as the discourse-theoretic paradigm would have it, with a 
liminally abstract principle of right […] Then there is nowhere to go from there –
nowhere to go from where we start- except by steps that cannot be taken without 
reference to institutional-practical questions of concrete definition in context. 
(Michelman, 1998: 321) 
Thus, Habermas‘s ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction (Habermas, 2001) that begins from abstract 
rights, or what he calls ‗unsaturated placeholders‘ (BFN, 125), is challenged from a 
Hegelian point of view.  
                                                          
16 Undoubtedly, this is a modern democratic reading of Hegel. (See Cortella, 2015) 
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Furthermore, according to Michelman Habermas is wrong when he incorporates Kant‘s 
distinction between questions of justification and of application.17 More precisely, ‗the 
dissociation is analytical, not empirical-practical‘ (Michelman, 1998: 321) something that 
Habermas does not seem to acknowledge. In questions of legal and political legitimacy the 
disjunction is misleading because ‗Constitutionalism requires enactment at the originary level 
of what are called laws, because constitutionalism means a rule of law, a government of laws‘. 
(Michelman, 1998: 321) Hence, the ‗two-stages‘ reconstruction is undermined from a 
Hegelian point of view. The system of rights should contain from the beginning 
substantive rights that among other things are shaped not only in terms of their rational 
justifiability but also of their practical applicability. (1998: 322)  
The balance proposed by Habermas between the ‗system of rights‘ and collective self-
determination can be targeted by this criticism as well. In light of this charge, it is plausible 
to argue that the substance should be incorporated from the beginning by means of the 
exercise of self-legislation or public autonomy.18 If that were the case, then the ‗system of 
rights‘ and public autonomy would co-originally produce the legal order, and both 
principles would have equal weight. In Habermas‘s theory, the co-originality fails and the 
constitution cannot rule: it cannot be enacted if it does not incorporate substance and the 
norms of its application at the first stage. In this Hegelian spirit, Michelman asserts that the 
‗system of rights‘ needs to have already a substantive basis in a concrete form of ethical life.  
In the next section, I address these two Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s thesis of co-
originality. I assert that not only this position can be defended but also that in modern 
conditions it is the best candidate to respond to legal and political questions in a context of 
social and ideological pluralism. At the present time, it is not possible to ground the 
legitimacy of a legal order in its contingent development, in a national history or in a 
conception of the good life. Rather, a basic system of rights can be generally accepted if is 
based on a universal core of normative rightness that finds support by means of an 
accommodating political culture.  
                                                          
17 In Justification and Application Habermas addresses this criticism which was formulated by Wellmer in The 
persistence of modernity, from the point of view of Discourse Ethics. In that book Habermas accepts that 
discourses of justification have to be complemented in a second stage through discourses of application. (JA, 
37-39) Nevertheless, there is still a primacy of justification. In this respect ‗Deontological ethical conceptions 
assume in the final analysis only that the moral point of view remains identical; but neither our understanding 
of this fundamental intuition, nor the interpretations we give morally valid rules in applying them to un- 
foreseeable cases, remain invariant‘. (JA, 39) 
18 This charge resembles one of Hegel‘s criticisms of Kant. This specific criticism asserts that Kant‘s empty 
formalism obscures the consideration of institutions and practices. (See Hegel, 1977: 258; Benhabib, 1986: 
309) I examine in detail this issue in Chapter Two, section 1.  
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2. Kantian Republicanism as a solution to the Hegelian challenge  
So far, I have described two Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s thesis of co-originality 
between private and public autonomy. In what follows, I develop replies to them. The first 
objection targeted the primacy of private autonomy over the exercise of public autonomy 
which results from the ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction of Habermas‘s theory. To this charge I 
argue that this strategy is cogent as far as private and public autonomy require a normative 
core of universal rightness (2.1). The second challenged the ‗two-stage‘ methodology 
because it did not include ethical substance in the definition of legal norms from the 
beginning. I will assert that Habermas is right when he claims that there is a common core 
to different legal orders that is fleshed out considering the context in a second stage (2.2).  
2.1. Bearing in mind the first criticism, I argue that it is necessary to establish a ‗two-stage‘ 
reconstruction of a system of rights which gives priority to private autonomy over public 
autonomy. In the first stage an abstract frame is reconstructed by means of the external 
perspective of the nonparticipant. (BFN, 118) This is the perspective of the philosopher 
who ‗tells citizens which rights they should acknowledge mutually if they are legitimately to 
regulate their living together by means of positive law‘. (BFN, 126)  
Hence, the conditions for legal and political legitimacy are at hand from the beginning. 
Moreover, the system contains the basic rights that citizens must grant each other, not only 
to be addressees of the legal order that regulates their political life but also its authors. In other 
words, the system of rights protects private autonomy and at the same time, establishes the 
necessary conditions for the exercise of public autonomy. In the second stage, the system is 
shaped and gains concrete form by means of public autonomy. This is where pragmatic, 
ethical-political and moral reasons (BNF, 108) are incorporated and the system of 
unsaturated placeholders is fleshed out with content. Strictly speaking, this stage is not 
performed within the theory. Rather, it is shaped by means of self-legislation.  
There are good arguments to maintain that this is the correct method to employ. Habermas 
asserts that, ‗moral principles must be embodied in the medium of coercive and positive 
law‘. (MW, 113) In this respect, Habermas argues that basic rights are both moral and legal 
entities (BFN, 454) that have to be justified twice – morally and legally –. Hence, this 
means that the moral content is not just the thin and narrow morality of law that Fuller 
identifies. Rather, it pertains to the post-conventional notion of normative justification 
which is reconstructed in the program of Discourse Ethics. 
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Thus, a ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction is necessary to include these principles in the medium of 
law, and this is what is assured at the first stage. Otherwise, whether self-legislation would 
or would not incorporate this kernel is an open question. Historical cases show that by 
means of the exercise of popular sovereignty or by the will of the political legislator, 
undemocratic or even tyrannical outcomes might take place.  
The ‗two-stage‘ reconstruction is the best methodology to respond to the question of 
legitimacy. It ensures that in the first stage the Kantian notion of practical reason will be 
included in the ‗system of rights‘ by means of the embodiment of procedures in the legal 
medium. (Forst, 2011; Flynn, 2003, 2011) The ‗system of rights‘ as a basic structure of 
unsaturated placeholders is justified by the normative notion of post-conventional justification. 
(2011; Habermas, 2011: 296) This ‗system of rights‘ is oriented towards guaranteeing 
private and public autonomy and sets the basic conditions that the practice of self-
legislation meets, if it is going to be legitimate not only in terms of its procedures but also 
in terms of its outcomes. Furthermore, when at the second stage substance is included, 
moral reasons have priority over other considerations, namely, ethical-political or 
pragmatical. (BFN, 103) As Finlayson argues, ‗no legitimate law may violate any valid moral 
norm. He calls this the moral permissibility constraint. (2011: 12; 2016a: 12, 14) In 
summary, the two-stage model enables levels of normativity to be ordered in the way that 
Habermas favours — firstly, moral reasons, secondly, ethical reasons, and thirdly, 
pragmatic reasons. This is because in Habermas‘s view, moral reasons have been already 
filtered by the normative net of the principle of discourse – via the principle of 
universalization. In this way, they have priority over other considerations. Because the 
MPC guarantees that legal systems enshrine human rights as basic rights, Habermas can 
claim that legitimate laws always operate within the bounds of moral permissibility. This is 
the priority of the moral.  
2.2. Concerning the second criticism, in the same volume where Frank Michelman 
develops his criticism, Habermas writes a brief reply. The criticism states that the ‗system 
of rights‘ cannot be abstractly reconstructed because a legal order consists of substantive 
laws from the beginning. In this same vain, Michelman charges Habermas with endorsing 
the distinction between questions of justification and questions of application. From 
Michelman‘s Hegelian point of view, the norms that compose the rule of law need to 
include in their definition the conditions of their application, otherwise they cannot rule 
and be enacted. Thus, the system of rights needs to be modulated by the historical and 
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social conditions that it aims to regulate. In other words, the system does not depend only 
on its rational justifiability but also on the context dependent conditions of its applicability.  
Faced with this criticism, Habermas claims that there is a common core to different 
constitutions, which does not depend on their particular histories. This kernel concerns the 
implementation of basic rights, which have a universalistic meaning (Habermas, 1998: 389) 
that is introduced at the first stage. At this point, it is important to emphasize that 
Habermas mentions the term ‗universalistic‘ here when he is replying to criticisms to his 
political theory. In his oeuvre, this concept has a moral connotation which pertains to a 
validity claim to rightness, to the property of being morally justified. After all that he has 
written on Discourse Ethics, the term universalistic is a concept with a certain history and a 
heavy moral weight. Among other things, this universalism means a rejection of ethical 
relativism ‗which holds that the validity of moral judgments is measured solely by the 
standards of rationality or value proper to a specific culture of form of life‘. (MCCA, 121) 
Consequently, if the system of rights at the first stage already incorporates a moral kernel, 
as far as it has a universalistic meaning, the legal order cannot be grounded merely on the 
contingent contents of a particular culture, a national history or a form of ethical life.   
So it is clear that the Kantian notion of moral reason has priority in Habermas‘s theory. It 
is a moral priority in the full sense, not just an instrumental and functional priority. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Habermas‘s rules out the historical and social 
dimensions. At the second stage the framers of constitutions flesh out the system of rights 
taking into account pragmatical, ethical-political and moral reasons. (BFN, 108) In this 
respect, Habermas asserts that the universalistic meaning that is at the centre of legitimacy 
is introduced alongside competing horizons of interpretation. (Habermas, 1998: 389-390) 
The substance that Michelman wants to include from the beginning is incorporated in 
Habermas at the second stage in which public autonomy shape the system of rights.  
III. Morality, institutions, practices and the fact of pluralism  
Section I and II specified that there is a normative Kantian ground for the production of 
legal and political legitimacy. In this final section the issue is whether and to what extent it 
is reasonable to expect that particular citizens will support and endorse this Kantian 
foundation. In other words, and following Hegel‘s critique of Kant, the question is how is 
it possible to develop a post-conventional morality and an accommodating Sittlichkeit at the 
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level of particular wills? 19 Now days this problem should be examined in light of a social 
context of value pluralism that did not apply in Hegel‘s time.   
In order to answer this, some more or less sympathetic critics of Habermas have proposed 
to blur the distinction between morality and ethics. (Michelman, 1998; McCarthy; 1991; 
Bernstein; 1998 and Putnam; 2002) There are good reasons to reject this alternative, among 
other things the fact of pluralism.20 Nevertheless, Habermas is correct when he claims that 
‗Rawls salvages a valuable insight of Hegel‘s critique of Kant‘, because ‗Moral commands 
must be internally related to the life-plans and lifestyles of affected persons in a way they can 
grasp for themselves‘. (MW, 112) The question is, is this also the case in Habermas‘s 
version of democratic and political legitimacy?  
The 1995 debate between Rawls and Habermas is an excellent place to discuss this 
problem. Here, Habermas argues that due to the fact of pluralism, a procedural normative 
core is needed to establish principles of political justice. Nevertheless, this fact also makes 
this hardly achievable, if effectively pluralism really cuts deeper (Finlayson, 2011: 19) and it 
not only concerns different religions, ideologies but even conceptions of practical reason.  
In the following sections, I will discuss the debate regarding the normative principles of 
justice and the return of the Hegelian challenge. This objection is based on Hegel‘s 
criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. Here, I focus on the dissociation between the 
normative principles of legitimacy and the particular wills of the citizens (1); then I examine 
a Habermasian answer to this challenge which relies on Habermas‘s Kantian concept of 
political autonomy. I suggest that this answer is theoretically plausible, but empirically 
difficult to achieve bearing in mind the fact of social and ideological pluralism. However, at 
the end I examine a Kantian solution that relies in a thin and weak ‗concept of normative 
justification‘. (IO, 45) (2).  
 
                                                          
19 It is important to remember that this is a pressing issue for Habermas because he admits that legitimacy 
demands the support of an active citizenry and an accommodating political culture. This thesis was examined 
in the first section of this Chapter. There I showed that Habermas admits that constitutional democracy 
demands an accommodating political culture. Now, the question is how to expect that the citizens will 
endorse this culture, if legitimacy has a moral core and this kernel is based on agent-neutral reasons and not 
in agent-relative reasons. This issue becomes even more difficult in a context of deep pluralism where even 
conceptions of practical reason are contested.  
20 The concept of Constitutional Patriotism (BFN, 500; Müller, 2007) is additional evidence which shows that 
Habermas supports the distinction in the political domain. The allegiance to a legal order does not depend on 
a particular national or ethical history. It is ground on the loyalty towards the universalistic embers of the 
constitution.  
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1. The normative principles of justice and the return of Hegel  
In what follows, I discuss the 1995 debate between Habermas and Rawls concerning the 
normative principles of justice. (RPR, 34-40; RH, 55-63; MW, 92-113) The picture that 
arises from the debate in general, and in this criticism in particular, is that the weak Kantian 
component has priority over the historical and functional arguments in Habermas‘s version 
of legal and political legitimacy. This has been read in the sense that normative moral 
components are crucial to political legitimacy (1.1). Then, from a Hegelian point of view a 
criticism returns because it seems problematic that constitutional democracy can expect the 
support of the citizens when the fundamental reasons that constitute the moral core of 
political legitimacy have to be agent-neutral (1.2).   
1.1. Habermas opens his second objection to Rawls discussing the political meaning of justice 
as fairness. This feature is motivated by the fact of social and ideological pluralism that is the 
main problem that Political Liberalism addresses. The question that this theory aims to 
answer is:     
How is it possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal 
citizens are deeply divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines. (PL, 133)   
Rawls argues that the political conception needs to ‗be neutral toward conflicting 
worldviews‘ (RPR, 34) and this means that it does not go beyond the political realm – for 
example it does not reach the controversial arenas of morality, metaphysics and religion. 
Otherwise, it would not be reasonable to expect that the citizens would endorse this 
political conception, due to their different interpretations of the good. Thus, Rawls aims to 
rule out any comprehensive doctrine as the justificatory ground of the political 
conception.21  
According to Habermas, this ‗strategy of avoidance‘ (MW, 92) indicates certain ‗unclarity‘ 
and ‗indecisiveness as to how the validity claim of the theory itself should be understood‘. 
(RPR, 34) In this respect, this strategy has to do with not presenting the theory as valid 
because true, but as valid because justified by shared political values. The heart of 
Habermas‘s criticism is revealed when he asks ‗whether the overlapping consensus, on 
which the theory of justice depends, plays a cognitive or merely instrumental role‘. (RPR, 
                                                          
21 Rawls‘s concept of ‗comprehensive doctrine‘ has three different senses: a) world views, religious and 
secular; b) actually existing moralities, or conceptions of the good; c) philosophical theories of one kind of 
another, including moral theories such as utilitarianism or Kantianism. (PL, xviii, Finlayson, 2016a: 8)  
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34) Rawls seems to be more concerned with the question of ‗whether a society constituted 
in accordance with the principles of justice could stabilize itself‘ (RPR, 35) and therefore, 
Habermas argues, he fails to do justice to the ‗epistemic meaning‘ of his own theory, 
because he does not recognize that it necessarily makes a claim to truth. This problem is 
obscured by simply introducing the predicate ‗reasonable‘ instead of ‗true‘ and this 
distinction for Habermas has an ambiguous meaning. (RPR, 38-40) Due to this strategy of 
avoidance, Habermas contends, Rawls collapses the distinction between justified 
acceptability and actual acceptance. (RPR, 36) In this respect, if Rawls is still part of the 
Kantian family, then he needs to clarify and acknowledge that the overlapping consensus 
possess a cognitive meaning and not a purely functional role to guarantee social stability.  
Rawls in his rejoinder asserts that the answer to these criticisms ‗lies in the way in which 
political liberalism specifies three different kinds of justification and two kinds of 
consensus‘. (RH, 56) At this point, I do not need to develop Rawls‘s defence. Rather, I 
focus on his criticism of Habermas that goes alongside his reply. For the former, the latter 
takes ‗too many theoretical hostages to fortune‘ (Finlayson, 2011: 19) and this charge is 
explained by Rawls‘s claim that Habermas‘s position is ‗‘comprehensive‘ while mine is an 
account of the political and it is limited to that‘. (RH, 47) According to Rawls, the specific 
kind of comprehensive doctrine that Habermas develops is a philosophical theory, while 
justice as fairness concerns the political ‗leaving philosophy as it is‘. (RH, 48)  
In his reply, Habermas does not contest the charge that his theory is ‗comprehensive‘ and 
philosophical. (MW, 93) Rather, his claim is that his version of legal and political legitimacy 
and Rawls‘s ‗cannot ultimately avoid giving full weight to requirements of practical reason 
that constrain rational comprehensive doctrines rather than merely reflect their felicitous 
overlapping‘. (MW, 94) According to Habermas, a political theory that claims to be neutral 
with respect to worldviews, cannot move itself entirely within the narrow domain of the 
‗political‘, as Rawls construes it (RH, 47) ‗and steer clear of stubborn philosophical 
controversies‘. (MW, 93) This condition of neutrality undermines the epistemic status of the 
political conception, and sets at the centre of legal and political legitimacy a normative 
kernel.  
Habermas has good arguments to justify the claim that his theory of legitimacy is not 
comprehensive and philosophical in the negative way that Rawls asserts it is, even if it 
incorporates at its core a Kantian conception of moral reason. Habermas‘s account of 
normativity is post-metaphysical, and therefore it rules out any sort of metaphysical 
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doctrine of reason and the world (PT: 3-9); and it is procedural and not substantive. 
(MCCA, 197) Moreover, his principle of justification has a weakly transcendental status, 
because validity claims are embodied in the medium of social practices and institutions, 
although they appeal to standards of rightness which are context transcending.  
In this respect, the Habermas-Rawls debate leaves room for an interpretation in which 
morality has a central place in Habermas‘s theory of legal and political legitimacy. Now, at 
this point let us recall the main features of legitimate laws in Habermas‘s account of them.22 
The first is that a particular law is legitimate if has been properly passed by a recognized 
legal process (principle of democracy); the second is that it does not violate any valid moral 
norm MPC (moral permissibility constraint); and the third is that it achieves some measure of 
congruence from each citizens‘s ethical values.  
In his understanding of Habermas‘s political theory, Baynes reads the centrality of morality 
and the fact that legitimate laws does not violate any valid moral norm in the sense that 
legitimacy and legitimate laws contain a moral core. In this regard, he asserts that ‗Citizens 
must simultaneously both presuppose and strive to articulate a basic political consensus 
[…] focused on the idea of a core morality that all citizens can endorse as valid for the 
same (publicly available) reasons‘. (Baynes, 2016: 179) Baynes seems to think that this 
moral core comes about because democratic constitutions legally enshrine human rights as 
basic rights, and human rights have a fully moral content. In virtue of this moral core, not 
only valid moral norms, but also legitimate laws satisfy the validity requirement expressed 
by Baynes: ‗basic political norms […] are legitimate only if they […] could be agreed to by 
all citizens as participants in a practical discourse for the same (publicly available) reasons‘. 
(2016: 170) 
If Baynes‘s interpretation is correct then whenever we look at the conditions that legitimate 
laws have to meet, then we need to examine the validity requirement of morality. 
Concerning Habermas‘s understanding of the validity of moral norms, it has been argued 
(see Chapter Two) that for him valid reasons are agent-neutral and not agent-relative and 
only the former type are apt to provide a normative moral justification.23 The fact that at 
the centre of legitimacy he installs a Kantian notion of practical reason and autonomy 
                                                          
22 In Chapter Three and in this Chapter I have discussed in detail these features.  
23 As shown by Finlayson, there are agent-relative reasons that can be universalizable. For example, everyone 
has a reason to avoid pain, to themselves. Therefore, the moral worth of reasons does not get totally captured 
by their universalizability. Rather, their moral status depends in the fact that they are universalizable but at the 
same time exactly the same reason for everyone. This can account as a moral reason. (Finlayson, 1999) This 
issue it is discussed in detail Chapter Two, section 3.  
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explains that he also understands his debate with Rawls in terms of the agent-relative and 
agent-independent distinction. Habermas charges Rawls that in the latter‘s theory agent-
independent reasons support ‗the ―reasonableness‖ of a political conception, while […] 
agent-relative reasons establish the claim to moral ―truth‖‘. (MW, 94) In contrast, for 
Habermas agent-independent reasons furnish a normative core of legitimacy and not the 
agent-relative reasons of the citizens embedded in their particular comprehensive doctrines. 
In Habermas‘s words:  
Reasonable citizens cannot be expected to develop an overlapping consensus so 
long as they are prevented from jointly adopting a moral point of view independent 
of, and prior to, the various perspectives they individually adopt from within each 
of their comprehensive doctrines. (MW, 94)  
In the final analysis for Habermas agent-neutral reasons are at the centre of legitimacy and 
this implies that a version of the Hegelian question returns. This is because, from the 
particular point of view of the citizens, it does not seem to be plausible that they will find 
the motives to sustain both the political conception and legitimate laws, without bringing 
their agent-relative reasons into play.24 This problem is even more burdensome bearing in 
mind the fact of pluralism that not only pertains to conceptions of the good but also to the 
concept of moral reason itself. In what follows, I expound this problem (1.2).   
1.2 Considering both the place that a moral Kantian core has in Habermas‘s political theory 
– following Baynes‘s interpretation – and that these principles, Habermas claims, can only 
be established by agent-neutral reasons, the problem that I want to examine is how 
individuals with their own agent-relative motives, can relate to legitimate laws. This issue is 
connected to Hegel‘s critique of Kant, namely, the break between the concept of the will 
and the empirical will.  
According to Hegel in the Philosophy of Right, Kant‘s concept of the will is distinguished by 
‗formal correspondence with itself, which is no different from the specification of abstract 
indeterminacy‘. (§135) Thus, the moral will is only identical with itself and it cannot 
incorporate particular contents and interests and consequently remains purely abstract. In 
                                                          
24 It is important to remark that this reconstruction of Habermas‘s theory relies on commentators like Baynes. 
Surely, his interpretation is based on Habermas‘s letter. That said, from another interpretation of Habermas‘s 
theory of legitimacy is possible to claim that he does not say that political norms can only be justified by 
moral reasons and as moral reasons (agent-neutral reasons). Legitimate laws can be justified not only by moral 
reasons but also by ethical and pragmatic reasons. And the latter two may well be seen as agent-relative 
considerations.    
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this regard, as far as the Kantian concept of moral validity rules out agent-relative reasons, 
it is incomplete, it is an empty formalism. Hegel‘s concept of ethical life was his strategy to 
solve this issue. By means of Sittlichkeit ‗the individual can be ‗at home with himself‘‘ 
(Pinkard, 1999: 227) and she can find her particular way to be moral.   
Due to his Kantian concept of practical reason, Habermas‘s theory is not immune to this 
Hegelian criticism. In light of Baynes‘s reading – like moral norms – legitimate laws are 
valid when they are shaped in everyone‘s interest, when they are universalizable. And valid 
norms are grounded on agent-neutral reasons, and agent-relative motives are not 
susceptible of being universalized, because they refer back to particular, individual agents 
and their ‗pathological‘ feelings and inclinations. Legal and moral norms are not justified by 
agent-relatives motives, and this condition leaves ‗the epistemic core of moral validity 
intact‘. (IO, 7) This is related Habermas‘s account of the cognitive content of normativity 
which rests on the fact that validity claims to rightness are analogous to validity claims to 
truth. (MCCA, 196) Inasmuch as Habermas endorses this distinction – which allows him to 
secure the epistemic status of his concept of practical reason and normative rightness – the 
question that returns is how the agents can support the normative core that legal and 
political legitimacy demand.  
Modern legal orders have a component that guarantees the obedience among citizens: the 
threat of sanctions. As a matter of fact, this dimension of law targets one of the deficits 
that ‗accompany a post-conventional rational morality‘, namely, ‗the motivational 
uncertainty that results from the fact that moral insight does not guarantee compliance‘. 
(Baynes, 2016: 137) Morality is binding but has to be self-imposed. It cannot be enforced 
externally, although, someone can have moral feelings of shame, blame, etc., whenever she 
violates a moral norm. Thus, modern law aids morality to stabilize behavioural expectations 
and supports the integration of modern societies. Nevertheless, a normative order cannot 
be based only on this functionalist feature. It also needs the quasi-voluntary and rational 
assent of the citizens, and in Habermas‘s picture, this legitimacy is based on a modified 
version of Kant‘s concept of autonomy. In this regard, the debate with Rawls can be 
interpreted in the sense that the citizens are not only conceptually bound by a legal and 
political order, but also they are ‗morally‘ bound. In other words, they have a moral 
commitment, so to speak, with constitutional democracy. 
Considering this reading of Habermas‘s political theory, then legitimacy is very hard to 
achieve. Habermas can afford as he does to admit that morality (valid norms that pass the 
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test of universalization) is a scarce resource in modern pluralist, multicultural societies. (JA 
91) But legitimate law is supposed to compensate for this. As I have shown, legitimate law, 
according to Habermas, functions in modern societies as a compensation for the 
diminishing moral (and shared ethical) substance. And thus helps achieve social integration, 
and it can only provide that help because it is more abundant and easier to ‗produce‘ than 
valid moral norms. (BFN 98-99) Hence, in introducing his revisions, Baynes weakens 
Habermas‘s sociological account of the socially-integrating function of law and democracy. 
2. Kantian Republicanism and the fact of pluralism 
In what follows, I discuss a Habermasian answer to the Hegelian criticism of the will as a 
tester of maxims this time applied to legal and political legitimacy. According to 
Habermas‘s Kantian Republicanism the freedom of the citizen, which certainly appeals to 
his agent-relative reasons, depends on everyone else‘s freedom, which is an agent-neutral 
reason. Thus, in this concept of autonomy – which incorporates an element of mutual 
recognition – it is possible to answer to the Hegelian question (2.1). This solution is 
theoretically plausible but socially difficult to achieve, if the fact of pluralism not only 
concerns different religions and ideologies but also conceptions of practical reason. 
However, I examine the plausibility of a Kantian answer to the dilemma opened by the fact 
of pluralism (2.2).     
2.1 From his Kantian Republicanism Habermas claims that ‗Nobody can be free at the 
expense of anybody else‘s freedom‘. (MW, 113) This formulation is an echo of Kant‘s 
formula of humanity of the categorical imperative, namely, the recognition of other as ends 
in themselves. (4:429) Besides, it incorporates an element of mutual recognition, as I think 
Kant‘s formulation already does. Applied to the political realm, this concept becomes the 
notion that the freedom of the citizen, which certainly appeals to her agent-relative reasons, 
depends on everyone else‘s freedom, which is an agent-neutral reason. Thereby, by means 
of his Kantian Republicanism Habermas solves the Hegelian question concerning the 
reconciliation between the concept of the will and the particular will, such that the agent-
relative freedom of the person is co-original with the agent-neutral freedom of the other 
persons.  
This solution squares with Hegel‘s insight that the individuation of particular agents takes 
place by means of practices of socialization. (MCCA, 199) In this regard, the freedom of 
the ‗individual cannot be tied to the freedom of everyone else in a purely negative way, 
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through reciprocal restrictions‘. (MW, 113) Rather, the social dimension of freedom can 
only be actualized in the frame of an association of free and equal persons, where ‗all 
members must be able to understand themselves as joint authors of laws to which they feel 
themselves bound individually as addresses‘. (MW, 113) Consequently, the autonomy of the 
particular person depends on the mutual recognition of the autonomy of everyone else.   
Now, the Habermasian response to the Hegelian challenge seems to be coherent and 
cogent from the theoretical point of view. However, it does not address properly the 
question concerning the motivation of the participants. In this respect, Finlayson claims 
that Habermas was wrong when he excluded agent-relative reasons from moral justification 
because some agent-relative reasons are universalizable. (1999) The solution that Habermas 
and Habermasians could find to this Hegelian charge would be to relax this condition and 
allow that some agent-relative reasons can justify norms.  
In the Kantian and Hegelian idea of mutual recognition there is a dialectical relationship 
between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons that supposes the loosening of the 
distinction and this results in the solution of the problem. In this way, the agent-relative 
reasons of the particular persons who are addressees but also authors of the legal order are co-
original with the agent-neutral insight that their private autonomy emerges only when is 
enjoyed by everybody else. By means of this dialectic between the particular will – agent-
relative reasons – and the normative will – agent-neutral reasons – that the Kantian notion 
of self-legislation incorporates, the Hegelian problem can be solved. Albeit: this demands 
that we slacken blur the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. 
In summary, I have answered Hegel‘s critique of the will as a tester of maxims from the 
point of view of Habermas‘s Kantian Republicanism. Nevertheless, the picture gets more 
complicated if we discuss this problem in view of the fact of pluralism. In this context and 
considering the perspective of the agents, the question returns because how is it reasonable 
to expect that empirical persons would put into practice a procedural notion of autonomy 
supporter by their particular points of view?  
2.2 The Habermasian solution to the Hegelian challenge seems problematic to achieve in 
the context of social and ideological pluralism. If this fact really cuts deep (Finlayson, 2011: 
19) and ‗reasonable disagreement about the nature of the good life and even about the 
philosophical foundations of morality […] is the situation we should expect‘ (Larmore, 
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1995: 63) then, how is it possible to presuppose that the citizens will comply with laws 
based on publicly available (agent-neutral) reasons?  
In my interpretation of the Habermas-Rawls debate, in the end the fact of pluralism 
demands a Kantian kernel for the production of legal and political legitimacy: it is no 
longer possible to ground legitimacy on a particular conception of the good – religious, 
philosophical or of any other sort. At the same time, in light of one of the Hegelian insights 
that Habermas incorporates, constitutional democracy requires an active citizenry that 
endorses these moral norms. Otherwise, it cannot be effective. Notwithstanding, the fact 
of pluralism makes it problematic to achieve this Hegelian end, because today the social 
and cultural context is not the same as it was in Hegel‘s time. Hence, it is unreasonable to 
expect a common Sittlichkeit that will support a normative notion of post-conventional 
justification at the centre of legal and political legitimacy. Moreover, and following the 
results of the previous section, the existence of citizens endorsing principles of political 
justice seems at least difficult in the frame of a theory that strictly distinguishes between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons.  
In this respect, the gap between the concept of the will and the particular will that Hegel 
founded on Kant‘s moral philosophy arises once again at the political stage. To address this 
issue one option would be to revisit Rawls‘s alternative. According to his philosophy, the 
support that Political Liberalism demands of the citizens arises from the comprehensive 
doctrines that each of them endorse. However, the answer that Rawls can provide depends 
on the interpretation of his concept of overlapping consensus. Habermas‘s critique shows that 
Rawls is not sufficiently clear in this respect and this ambiguity does not rule out the modus 
vivendi interpretation of Political Liberalism. (RPR, 37) Nonetheless, Rawls certainly does rule 
out the modus vivendi interpretation of Political Liberalism. (2011, 2016a) Moreover, the 
opposite version that will give a centrality to a Kantian core in Rawls‘s theory still needs to 
be convincingly proved.  
Another option is to blur the distinction between normativity, morality and ethics, as some 
critics of Habermas propose. (Michelman, 1998; McCarthy; 1991; Bernstein; 1998 and 
Putnam; 2002) Notwithstanding, this alternative does not seem to square with the fact of 
pluralism. In a context of diversity in terms of particular conceptions of the good the 
distinction between ethical and deontological reasons is necessary because it motivates 
citizens to distance themselves from their ethical commitments and view specific 
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disagreements in a more general light. (Müller, 2007) It is not possible to expect that 
political and legal issues can be solved satisfactorily appealing to ethical commitments.  
There is still a Kantian alternative to envision a possible answer this dilemma. In a first 
step, it is important to elucidate what is the object that needs to be embraced by the 
citizens at the centre of legal and political legitimacy. This content is the principle of 
discourse (D), which is a weak ‗concept of normative justification‘ (IO, 45) that refers to a ‗thin 
[…] idea of justification in which individuals are viewed as mutually accountable agents‘. 
(Baynes, 2016: 115) It is weak because it does not incorporate a particular conception of 
the good life, but relies purely on a procedural notion of practical reason. Furthermore, it is 
non-negligible, since if someone wants to participate in legal and political discourses it is 
undeniable. Why? Because whenever a person wants to utter validity claims in discourse, 
she needs to recognize the same possibility for everybody else. (T&J, 94)  
Once this weak ‗concept of normative justification‘ is embodied in the legal medium, it emerges 
the ‗system of rights‘ which afterwards gains shape through political self-determination. 
This content is the pre-condition of constitutional democracy. It is its condition of 
possibility, because it is impossible to imagine this practice without this Kantian element of 
mutual recognition. Now, is it possible that someone can reject this weak and thin content 
and at the same time be reasonable? It is true that today is not appealing to make claims for 
some immovable content as the ground of legal and political. However, the weak and thin 
character of the Kantian content that legitimacy demands at its core makes this call less 
demanding. Moreover, in so far as rational discourse does not refer to a substantive norm, 
but to a procedure, it is reasonable to expect that citizens will put it into motion in a 
context of pluralism. This practice demands certain commitments and rules, for example, 
they have to recognize others as autonomous and equal participants in discourse; the 
inclusion of all the affected; and sincerity. The everyday practice of giving justifications 
shows that in way or another we are committed with these rules. Otherwise, perhaps we 
would not say anything.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the introduction I mentioned the ‗Kant oder Hegel?‘ question and I claimed, following 
Robert Brandom, that Habermas sees himself closer to Kant. (2015: 34) Many passages of 
his oeuvre support this interpretation. However, his theory takes on board Hegel‘s critique 
of Kant‘s moral philosophy. Consequently, the normative foundations of Habermas‘s 
theory incorporate Kantian and Hegelian components. At the same time, I have shown 
that Hegel is best seen as extending Kant‘s rationalist morality by critiquing and 
supplementing it, but not rejecting it. This work demonstrates that this is also the spirit that 
informs Habermas‘s project of social criticism. Habermas asserts that he is a Kantian and 
according to the Post-Kantian interpretation Hegel was also a Kantian.  
 
In light of this background, in what follows, I will sketch the main conclusions that arise 
from this thesis. But first it will help to recall the main pillars of the argument. The first was 
referred already in the words that I have said at the beginning of this conclusion, namely, 
the Post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel. From the latter it is possible to elucidate a second: 
Hegel‘s critique of Kant. This is because the Post-Kantian reading provides a particular way 
to understand the intention and the letter of Hegel‘s critique. A third component that 
allowed me to set the stage of this thesis is Habermas‘s Kantianism. I will begin discussing 
the latter.   
 
It is not difficult to find the name of Kant in Habermas‘s project of social criticism. 
However, it is more problematic to examine to what degree Habermas‘s is a Kantian. In 
Habermas‘s oeuvre the presence of Kant is wide and deep. And since STPS, towards BFN 
and in the debate with Rawls, the philosopher of Königsberg seats at the front. In Chapter 
One I focused on Habermas‘s moral theory and I studied its Kantian main features. In 
Chapter Three I examined Habermas‘s Kantianism in his political philosophy and I 
concluded that this theory also has at its centre Kantian components. In these two 
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Chapters I proved that Kant is not only an important philosopher with whose work 
Habermas engages, but rather, that Kant helps Habermas to set the foundations of his 
critical theory.  
 
Inasmuch as Habermas incorporates this Kantian component at the core of his theory, 
then it is relevant to examine whether and to what extent Hegel‘s critique of Kant applies 
to Habermas. Certainly, Habermas develops a modified and attenuated version of Kant‘s 
notion of moral reason. And these features allow him to claim that his project of social 
criticism can consistently rebut Hegel‘s critique. Indeed, Habermas addressed the issue over 
four decades ago (MCCA, 195-215) and his answer has convinced many critics that we are 
not dealing with a real problem. That said, Habermas takes a philosophical hostage to fortune 
which makes his Kantian position vulnerable to Hegel‘s critique of Kant, namely, the 
stringent distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, and the claim that 
only the former are apt to justify moral norms. Habermas‘s moral theory trades on a view 
of impartiality in which valid norms have to be justified by agent-neutral reasons and never 
by agent-relative considerations. This reconstruction of impartiality is explicitly mentioned 
in Habermas‘s Discourse Ethics. (IO, 7, 43) And in this theory he seems to conflate agent-
relative reasons with reasons that are particular, i.e. in each case only mine. Hence, he does 
not allow that reasons of the kind of – I want to avoid my own suffering – apply relatively 
to everyone. Rather, moral justification refers to norms which discard all sorts of 
considerations that refer back to the particular person (and her interests, inclinations and 
needs).   
 
In my opinion, this strict distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons 
implies that Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims applies to Habermas. In 
Chapter Two I examined in detail this objection. Roughly speaking, this charge states that 
Kant‘s moral philosophy introduces a break between the will of morality (universal laws) 
and the particular will of the agent (her interests, inclinations and needs). Insofar as the 
latter criticism applies to Habermas, a twofold dilemma arises. The first part is that 
Habermas cannot explain how morality can include enough content to guide moral agents 
in social space and historical time. The second part is that he cannot provide an adequate 
account of how particular agents can be motivated to act according to moral norms. In 
Chapter Two I address the first part of the dilemma. I think that only with that answer we 
can begin to properly address the second part. Indeed, from a Kantian point of view if one 
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answers the first part then the second fades because, as Korsgaard claims, ‗the reasons why 
an action is right and why you do it are the same‘. (Korsgaard, 1986: 10)  
 
My proposal to deal with this issue rests on slackening the strong distinction between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. By an analysis of two other components of 
Habermas, namely, the idea of mutual recognition and the concept of ideal role taking, I 
argue in Chapter Two that this modification is the best alternative to fix this problem. In 
the concept of ideal role taking the particular will of the agents are channelled and shaped 
in terms of the universal will of morality. Why? Because throughout the process of 
discourse the agents take as their own the point of view of impartiality. In this regard, 
agent-relative considerations become agent-neutral reasons, or rather the commitment to 
give equal weight to other people‘s agent-relative reasons is agent-neutral. Likewise, in the 
idea of mutual recognition, the agent-relative interest of the particular will to be recognized 
can only be actualized inasmuch as the agent-neutral reason of everyone else to be 
recognized is also taking into account. Both solutions imply that in Habermas the strict 
distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is slackened. In other 
words, ideal role taking and mutual recognition show that moral justification can rest not 
only on agent-neutral reasons but also on universal agent-relative considerations as well.  
 
With regard to Habermas‘s political theory, it is slightly more difficult to build Hegelian 
criticisms. In Habermas‘s understanding of Kant‘s Rechtslehre the former claims that the 
latter builds a monistic view that conflates morality and politics. In BFN Habermas avoids 
this sort of construction because it does not give a proper account of the complexity of 
modern societies. More precisely, it is implausible and incorrect to claim that morality alone 
is capable of integrating highly differentiated social orders. (BFN, 8, 29) Rather, it is 
necessary to rely on the functional features of modern law and politics. Thus, this work is 
more sociologically informed and appeals to an immanent reconstruction of legitimacy. 
And the latter means that the justification of legal and political norms depends on the 
internal features of the institutions and practices of modern law and democracy. To a 
certain degree, here Habermas closes the gates to any sort of moral justification of 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, Habermas takes few more philosophical hostages to fortune, namely, 
the Moral Permissibility Constraint which implies that legitimate laws must ‗harmonize with 
the moral principles of justice and solidarity‘. (BFN, 99, 155) And among the 
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considerations that can underpin legitimate laws moral reasons have priority. (BFN, 103, 
108; IO, 42-43) 
 
In writings after BFN Habermas begins to open the gates even more and it comes to seem 
that he builds a moral argument in the justification of political legitimacy. In his debate 
with Rawls, Habermas asserts that legitimacy demands a moral core which secures the 
epistemic status of the political conception. (MW, 97) He also says that political justice 
stands on its own moral feet. (MW, 111) Moreover, already in BFN one reads that Human 
Rights are legal entities and at the same time moral entities. (454) And in IO Habermas 
claims that moral considerations enter into the justification of Human Rights. (191) 
 
In his interpretation of Habermas‘s political theory Kenneth Baynes takes these lines of 
argumentation to mean that legitimate laws contain a moral core. In this regard, he says 
that ‗Citizens must simultaneously both presuppose and strive to articulate a basic political 
consensus (focused on the idea of a core morality mentioned above) that all citizens can 
endorse as valid for the same (publicly available) reasons‘. (Baynes, 2016: 179) If this is 
correct, then not only valid moral norms but also legitimate laws need to satisfy the validity 
requirement, namely, they have to be justified on the basis of ―the same‘ i.e. agent-neutral 
reasons, and not on agent-relative reasons. The upshot of this reading is that political 
legitimacy is quite hard to achieve. Habermas can afford to make this claim in the case of 
morality which becomes a scarce resource in modern societies (JA, 91) because legitimate 
law is supposed to compensate for this deficit. (IO, 256-58) Albeit, Baynes‘s stringent core 
morality weakens Habermas‘s account of the socially-integrating function of modern law 
and politics. The solution that I have proposed to fix this problem entails making the 
validity requirement of legal and political norms less stringent. In this view, not only valid 
moral norms but also legal norms can be justified on the basis of impartial reasons but also 
on the basis of universal agent-relative reasons.   
 
Perhaps, the fact of reasonable pluralism invalidates this solution because it is difficult to 
expect that all citizens are going to put into practice rational discourse whenever they want 
to deal with conflicts of action. That said, I believe that the thin and weak features of 
Habermas‘s notion normative justification combined with the relaxed view of impartiality 
leave enough space to presume that, if not all, then most of the citizens can engage with 
this practice. Among other things, they have to recognize others as autonomous and equal 
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participants in discourse; they cannot reach an agreement and exclude some; and they have 
to be sincere whenever they utter validity claims. I do not think that the allegiance to these 
commitments and practices is exceptionally demanding. To finish just one brief example: 
the social struggles for recognition show the interest of the vast majority to take part in the 
construction of a public sphere in which the notions of inclusion, autonomy, publicity and 
equality are embedded.  
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